Jihad is one thing, yet killing Muslims within the context of the Islamic faith is even more carefully curated than waging war against non-Muslims.158 Yet there are
certainly precedents for overcoming these limitations, permitting Muslims to be
155 Hallaq (n 45) 48–49. 156 Zulfiqar (n 67) 429. 157 Ibid 429–430.
158 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Evolving approaches to jihad: from self-defense to revolutionary and regime-
118
identified as the target of jihad.159 The process for rendering a Muslim permissible to
kill is named takfir;160 not only does invoking takfir remove an individual or group
from the umma and its’s attendant privileges, but is often understood as being attended by an injunction for their death.161 Killing Muslims en masse is sometimes deemed
important in the modem era, often forming a component of the strategy used by armed groups and terrorists.162 An awareness of these precedents and the purported basis
scripture is important, as contemporary movements and organisations seek justification by equating the situation in which they find themselves with past situations in which Muslims resorted to disenfranchising and killing other professed Muslims.163 Such instances have necessitated the production of mechanisms that either
permit the use of violence against self-professed Muslims or outlaw Muslims on the basis of their failure to conform to certain expectations. The works of Ibn Taymiyyah remains a key touchstone in this regard.164 Other scholars discussed the variable
mechanisms by which individuals from the privileges afforded by membership of the Ummah would be excluded based on the behaviour of affiliation, with an analysis of takfir. Whilst the invocation of takfir is stressed by most classic and modern thinkers, as a grave matter,165 it is not entirely absent from modern Islamic discourse.
The modern extremist use of takfir is generally as an internal purity mechanism, to eject individuals from the faith that they see as subverting Islam.166 Whilst modern
jihadists rigorously defend their right to use takfir as a means to justify the killing of Muslims, most Islamic scholars are highly critical of this approach. As Badar et al note, however, the approach taken by groups like ISIS today is heterogeneous and is resisted by the vast majority of Islamic scholarly institutions, these having recognised
159 This step is extensively telegraphed in ISIS’s Dabiq magazine, in which most of the Muslim
population of the world is identified as apostates. See Dabiq 7 (alhyat media 2015) 17-19.
160 Mohamed Badar, Masaki Nagata and Tiphanie Tueni, ‘The Radical Application of the Islamist
Concept of Takfir’ (2017) 31 Arab Law Quarterly 134.
161 Ibid.
162 There have been a number of “takfirist” factions in the last century, of which the Wahhabi of Saudi
Arabia are perhaps the most notable. See Firro, (n 52)773-774. The Egyptian Takfir-wal-hijra is also of note, see Barry. Rubin, Revolutionaries and reformers: Contemporary islamist movements in the Middle East (State University of NY Press 2003) 13-17
163 Badar et al (n 3). 164 Maher (n 17) 84–85. 165 Badar et al (n3) 133-137.
119
that not only is the current usage of takfir inconstant with Islamic law, but additionally noting the damaging impact it has on Muslims at large.167
As a brief postscript to the discussion of Takfir, it is work noting the history of takfirist sects in Islam. A common contention in relation to takfirist groups today is that they are Khajarites;168 a detested sect of Islam dating back to the first fitnah.169
There is additionally a basis to suggest that today’s neo jihadist armed groups can be equated with many examples of Islamic rebellion that were likewise designated as such. It is common practice to denounce radical groups, particularly those that kill or oppress Muslims as kajarites.170 Of course, those levelling accusations at today's
kajarites need to be mindful of the nature of the term. Based upon its historical usage, to invoke such an accusation is not just a mere epithet, but an injunction against the individual accused. for instance, scholars branding modern-day sects as kajarites are not only denouncing them but compelling themselves and other Muslims to go forth and kill them.171 Much like the term Amalekite in the Jewish tradition,172 the use of
such a term is a call to action and imposes an obligation.
The theological progenitors of today’s jihadist unconventional armed groups permitted jihad to be used against other Muslims, but only in very specific circumstances- when for example, (in the case of an adversary) they have accepted Islam, but a short time later expressed their enmity towards Islam.173 As the movement
evolved it rapidly dispensed with such qualms eventually applying to takfir en masse.174 The relevance of takfir to today’s terrorists and unconventional armed
groups will be demonstrated in further chapters. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that numerous Islamic groups have lost the support of their associated population by Killing Muslims.175 Takfir, if appropriately utilised, can be used to place Muslims
outside of the fold of Islam, and therefore permit them to be killed. It is important to
167 Badar, Nagata and Tueni, (n 3) 159-160.
168 See Muhammad Al-Yaqoubi, Refuting ISIS (second edn, Sacred Knowledge 2016) 13-22. 169 A. K. Kazi, Moslem Sects & Divisions (J. G Flynn tr, Routledge 1984)
170 Shawki Allam, ‘The Ideological Battle’ <http://dar-
alifta.org/BIMG/The%20Ideological%20Battle%20(2).pdf>131-137 accessed 9/11/2016,.
171 A verse from the Hadith Bukhari (9:84:68) is often utilised to demonstrate the prophet Mohamed
predicted the emergence of the Khawarij sect, as with the source above. The following verse, which demands they are killed, is however often omitted.
172 See I. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (Council on Foreign
Relations 1988) 131.
173 Firro (n 52) 174 Ibid
175 See Lawrence Wright, The looming tower : Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11 (New York : Knopf 2006)
120
understand both jihadi and takfiri inclinations present in earlier movements in order to better understand today’s armed groups.176 As the next chapter will demonstrate, a
preoccupation of many neo jihadist theorists is marketing the idea of killing Muslims with the same alacrity of non-Muslims to a mass audience.
4.6 Conclusion
Whilst today it is difficult to think of religion of a supranational form of authority and law, the Islamic example demonstrates that this has been the case. In the past, the authority invested in Islamic systems of governance depended upon their adhering to the proscriptions of Islamic international law and Islamic governance. It can be contended that today, having recognised the fundamentally different context in which they find themselves, many Muslim leaders choose to realise these functions in different ways, more appropriate to the prevailing international system and global reality. These changes, however, are not universally accepted, provoking political opposition, terrorism, and the emergence of organised armed opposition.
In relation to the present thesis, the changes that have occurred to the institutions in which Islamic law have been vested are relevant from two different angles. First, it suggests the relevance of religion in terms of understanding modern conflict. Second, it is suggested that there are typical features of religious conflict that differentiate it from armed conflict more generally. It is important to distinguish the different aims and organisational features taken on by organisations seeking to restore “legitimate” Islamic governance. IHL has been conventionally connected to a highly specific form of organised state violence that is difficult to equate with previous instances in which war has been waged for religious purposes, and this poses a potential challenge.
This chapter has made allusions to instances in which a perceived failure on the part of Muslim authorities has resulted in the emergence of movements seeking to overthrow leaders and governments. The argument that follows is that contemporary unconventional armed groups represent a contemporary iteration of this approach. The veracity of this assertion will be addressed next.
176 Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam : From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (I.B. Tauris
121
5 Religious Conflict as a Contemporary Phenomenon
5.1 Introduction
The traditional framework of Islam consisted not only of a system of social norms and law but political powers and rules capable of modulating and restraining how this law and code of morality was applied.1 Yet, as contended in the last chapter, this system
has largely dissolved. This current chapter will address what happens when modern armed groups and political movements seek to secure for themselves the authority once vested in Islamic leaders and systems of governance. As will be set out in this chapter these new individuals and organisations have sought to show deference to classical Islam, whilst also being seen to reject modernity the state system and in particular western influences, they have produced an approach to the use of force that is at once anachronistic and at home in a globalised world. This modern context has resulted in the inclusion of non-Islamic thought, notably the inculcation of traditional Islamic symbols and institutions with concepts drawn from very non-Muslim sources, most notably from fascism and communism.2 Visibly, however, the established
lexicon has changed little, the rationale for religious violence connected with the Islamic tradition being underpinned by the extensive use of primary scripture and the works of certain classical scholars.3 This ideological approach, termed neo-jihadism,
necessitates the organisations mobilised by this ideology peruse certain aims and utilising methods that are generally deemed to be impermissible. This as this chapter will explore, suggests a causal relationship between neo jihadist ideology and the negative trends observed in relation to contemporary warfare
This chapter will identify neo jihadism and its role in contemporary religious conflict so as to better understand the threat with which International humanitarian law (IHL) must contend. The intention is to determine some typical features of this approach to armed conflict that differentiate it from armed conflict as understood by IHL. Due to the examples available, as well as the general focus of this study, the
1 Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Routledge 1991) 120. 2 Alan Cassels, Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World (Routledge 1996) 237. 3 Cook for instance notes that today’s jihadists utilise the same terminology as classical Muslim
scholars. See David Cook, ‘Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism’ (2009) 10 Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 177, 186.
122
emphasis will be on contemporary interpretations extracted from the Islamic context. Naturally, this represents a critical limitation when later determining typical features for wider application. Generating an understanding of contemporary religious conflict in the Islamic perspective –or neo-jihadism as it will be termed– is, however, sufficient to articulate some of the more general challenges that IHL must confront if it is to ensure appropriate protections are applied in modern conflicts.
Understanding the basis for contemporary religious conflict is a complex exercise. Despite clear deference to the past, depicting this wider movement as simply revisionist in scope cannot be considered entirely reflective of reality, notwithstanding visible concessions in this regard. Referring to contemporary jihadist theorists, several novel strategies and approaches to Islamic law couched within their published works may be presented. Adaptations and innovations have occurred at the ideological, strategic, and tactical levels to amend both the Quranic and classical legal interpretations of holy war and produce a religious code of law that is better adapted to contend with the prevailing international system, as well as the opportunities provided in terms of insurgency and media-orientated terrorism.
This does not, however, mean that the new form of Islam as a “political religion”4 conforms to the traditional, classical concept of Islamic governance and law.
Changes to the manner in which the religious or ideological component is interpreted may, in turn, serve as a basis for differentiating contemporary religious conflict from religious conflict of the past. Accordingly, it is useful to accumulate an understanding of the religious ideology in question, as this will dictate aspects of how the groups inculcated with it are organised, how they emerge, and ultimately how they use armed force, altering the aims and methods relevant to the conduct of hostility.
5.2 The Islamic revival and its relevance to today’s unconventional armed