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B. Movimientos Campesinos como Acción Social Efectiva

3.3 Red de Acción Social Efectiva (RASE) de la Comunidad Campesina Polobaya en las

3.3.5 Escala de Valor de la Posta de Salud de Polobaya sobre la Comunidad

Corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that writing about its cases could be a difficult task. Where would one begin from? Cases of corruption have been reported in pre-independent Nigeria. Certain public officers were formally investigated and indicted (Sklar 1963).6 The First Republic has also been

6For instance, Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu, who was chairman of Ibadan District Council in 1956

and at the same time a Minister in the Federal Government, was found guilty along with three other councillors of corruption by the (E.W.J.) Nicholson Commission of Inquiry (Sklar 1963: 300); in the Eastern Region, a Commission of Inquiry into Bribery and Corruption headed by Chuba Ikpeazu found a Minister of Finance, Mazi Mbonu Ojike, guilty of corruption while he was Minister of Works in 1954 when he influenced award of a contract for the construction of Onisha market to Borini Prono & Co. in return for a kickback (Sklar 1963: 158-161); in 1956, the Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry also found Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Premier of Eastern Region to have grossly abused his office when he influenced the transfer of securities belonging to the Region’s Marketing Board to the Region’s Finance Corporation and their subsequent investment in the African Continental Bank Limited for which he was the

accused of corruption (Osoba 1996). In fact corruption was one of the reasons cited by the military when it toppled the government (Joseph 1987: 71-72; Agedah 1993: 13, 15). But the military did not launch formal inquiry into the allegations let alone securing convictions. The military turned out to be no less corrupt. In fact, large scale corruption was first witnessed in the 1970s during the Gowon regime. And for the first time after independence, key perpetrators were formally tried and convicted by a succeeding regime. The Gowon regime shall therefore be our starting point. This approach we feel is sufficient to achieve the main purpose of the chapter which is showing the extent of corruption and how it has affected development.

i. The Gowon Regime (1966-1975)

Gowon seized power from Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi in July 1966, six months after the first military coup. Although cases of corruption have been reported during the civil war which broke out later (Osoba 1996),7it was after the war in the 1970s that allegations of corruption in the Gowon regime became more glaring. The federal government initially dithered but later challenged the public to expose any such cases. One of the first such exposures was Mr Godwin Dabo’s exposure of the Federal Commissioner for Communications, Mr. Joseph Tarka, who he accused through an Affidavit (sworn to in a Lagos High Court) of “abuse of office and corrupt self-enrichment”. The government was initially silent but due to press pressure, the Head of State asked the Commissioner to resign (Jakande in Oyediran 1979: 117). It was only then that the government, in accepting the resignation, said it had not been “unmindful of the concern displayed in the past fortnight over this and other similar incidents in the past.

principal shareholder (Sklar 1963: 186); and in 1962, the Coker Commission of Inquiry found that as the leader of the Action Group and the Premier of Western Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo had expended public funds (multi-million pounds) in financing the party’s campaigns for the 1959 general elections (Sklar 1963: 457-458).

7For instance, some commanders misappropriated the salaries and allowances for several months

of their soldiers killed in the war; military procurement contracts were grossly inflated; inflated contract fees for same goods or services or none at all were paid several times; public properties in occupied territories were looted as in the looting of millions of pounds sterling from the Central Bank Benin in 1968 (Osoba 1996).

No responsible government can be indifferent in matters of this nature” (in Agedah 1993: 29). That was all the government did.8

Another case was one involving the governor of Benue-Plateau and a member of the Supreme Military Council, Joseph Gomwalk. In an affidavit sworn to in Jos High Court, Mr Aper Aku accused the governor among others of “corrupt use of power” by awarding N5.3 million contracts to a company wherein his relations had interest and “without going through the proper procedure” of reference to the Tenders Board and the State Executive Council. Contrary to standard practice, about 90 per cent of the contract sums had been paid when the actual work had gone only half way.

The governor’s response was simply that he and his relatives had a right to “legitimate ownership of property”; payments were made irrespective of work done to enable government to arrange with banks regular payments to contractors; he had contributed to the unity of the country; and that he did not deserve to be portrayed as a corrupt person. Gowon declared him innocent of the charges. Not only that, he saw allegations of this nature as mere character assassination against his lieutenant; mischievously giving the government a bad name and an indirect way of attacking him personally (Jakande in Oyediran 1979: 117).9Posterity was to prove Gowon wrong as many cases of corruption were subsequently proven before formal bodies of inquiry.

Gowon’s government was replaced in a coup of 29 July 1975 by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. The new regime focused on stamping out corruption in the public service. It instituted Assets Investigation Panel under the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975 to look into allegations of corruption in order to bring to book those found guilty of abusing their powers. Those investigated were key public officers like State governors and Federal Commissioners.10

8

The accusations that the Commissioner did engage in corrupt practices were later confirmed by four separate probe panels: those headed by Sunday Adewusi, Col. A.A. Ochefu, Umaru Shinkafi, and Major-General Joe Garba respectively.

9We shall see later in draft chapter 7 how this matter affected rule of law in Nigeria. 10

There is no evidence that General Gowon was personally corrupt. He was on a foreign official trip when the coup took place. He lived in the UK and studied at the University of Warwick up

The outcome of the investigations was revealing. Out of the 12 governors then existing, only two were not found to be corrupt. As General Mohammed stated himself, “All the ex-military governors and the former Administrator of East Central State with the exception of two (Brigadiers Mobolaji Johnson and Oluwole Rotimi)11were found to have grossly abused their offices and guilty of several irregular practices. Clearly, this investigation has revealed that they had betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in them by the nation. Those of them who wore uniforms betrayed the ethics of their professions and they are a disgrace to their professions. They should be ashamed of themselves” (in Agedah 1993: 36). Cash and value of properties seized from the ex-governors alone totalled over N10 million.

The governor of Benue-Plateau, Joseph Gomwalk, who Gowon summarily declared innocent of corrupt charges, was among the ex-governors found guilty of corruption. The Justice Alfa Belgore Commission of Inquiry found among others that the ex-governor “who hardly had N630 in his bank in 1967” when he was appointed state governor, had by 1975 illegally acquired property and shares running into several thousands of Naira. He was made to forfeit two houses on Naraguta Avenue Jos, a house at Langtang Road Jos and three other properties in Jos and Lagos. The Belgore Report had this to say on the governor: “It is a tragedy of unequalled proportion to find that a graduate, a former administrative officer, clothed in the uniform of Police Commissioner and functioning as a military governor with all the powers of the legislature and executive in his hands, was acting as a common criminal with hardly anybody to challenge him” (in Agedah 1993: 37)

to PhD level. He returned to Nigeria after a number of changes in government during the Babangida era.

11According to the African Concord of 1 April 1991 (page 28) however, “Even the two

governors spared by the Federal Government were still indicted by the probe panels initiated by their successors… The new administration in Lagos [for example] accused Johnson of influencing the award of N25 million contract for a design of the state’s proposed secretariat and parliamentary building project to a firm which acted as middleman. The administration said the firm, Messrs Conterno International, were neither a firm of architects nor engineers” (in Agedah 1993: 38).

Similarly, a former governor of North Central state, an Assistant Commissioner of Police, was found to have illegally earned N264,000 and also illegally acquired properties which included two houses at Rahab Road, Kaduna and another in Gombe all of which he was forced to return. The (Mrs S.O.) Akaiku Board of Inquiry in Kwara State also found the ex-governor of the state guilty of corruption. He was indicted for his dubious involvement in the negotiation and investment of N3.88 million state funds in the United Match Company, Ilorin in 1973. He was compelled to forfeit two properties both on Umaru Audu Road Ilorin in lieu of N59, 361 which he illegally acquired. The governor of former South Eastern state was also found guilty of overspending a total of N3,261,074.38 (N1,906,238.70 from capital budget and N1,354,835.68 from recurrent budget) during the 1971/72 financial year; and wrongly allocating to himself 4 acres of state land paying N3,240 instead of N13,000. Governor of Mid-Western state was found guilty of many corrupt practices12that his multi- million Naira Palm Royal Motel, a house at Eguadase Street in Benin City together with his 10 farms located in different parts of the state were all seized by government (Agedah 1993: 36-37).

The probe panel which investigated a Brigadier former military governor of North-Eastern State found that between 1968 and 1973, the state had a total unvouchered expenditure of about N4 million. Between 1972 and 1973 alone, the state made expenditure in excess of N2 million without corresponding receipts. There were other unvouchered expenditures totalling about N5 million incurred by the governor during the financial year which ended 31 March 1974. He was also made to forfeit properties to the government (Agedah 1993: 38).

The civil service during the Gowon era also had a share in the widespread corruption. In an unprecedented purge, over 11,000 public officers were either dismissed or summarily retired from work (Asiodu in Oyediran 1979: 73, 89-90). As the various reports indicated, the scale of corruption during the Gowon era

12These included receiving N39,000 contrary to official advice as compensation for a piece of

land acquired from him in Isiokor village in Benin West Division as part of the University of Benin; purchasing for the state an unseaworthy ship named *MV Emotan; establishing and using the Mid-West Farms Management Board to develop his own farms; etc.

was unprecedented. One could not agree more with Obasanjo when he commented in his book ‘Not My Will’ that:

Corruption became unchecked in almost all facets of national life and virtually became a way of life. Officials abandoned their offices with impunity to attend to their private businesses; the attitude of workers at all levels was to the say the least, lethargic. There was general indiscipline all around as if nobody was in charge of the affairs of the nation. Everybody, except the few self- disciplined ones, did as he liked. There was absolute lack of political motivation. The political leader, General Gowon, was not only weak, but was also by then, apparently tired, fed up and seemed to have given up in helplessness and desperation feeling that he had done his best and could do no more …” (in Agedah 1993: 33).

ii. The Second Republic (1979-1983)

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime handed over to Shehu Shagari as elected president in October 1979.13 The new regime did not escape the corruption monster notwithstanding the fact that it was a constitutional democracy. In fact, it could be argued that it had outdone the Gowon regime in corruption. The democracy meant having more people at the corridors of power since in addition to the legislative houses at both federal and state levels (which never existed during military regimes) elected executive officers had to appoint more hands if only to settle party loyalists.

Instead of being strength, the democracy turned out to be a weakness. Public accountability which Shagari stressed at the beginning vanished as public property was literally turned into a booty. It has been recorded for instance that “the manner employed in the lifting of crude oil from the Nigerian shore during the Shagari years was not only suspect but it clearly left the flanks open for dubious characters to have a field day, even with the knowledge of certain personnel in government. Lifting crude oil was, to say the least, as easy as munching meat-pie, since all that was required was a note to the NNPC from the presidency or someone up there in the corridors of power” (Agedah 1993: 18).

13General Murtala was assassinated in a failed coup in February 1976 and his Second-in-

Command, General Obasanjo, took over power. Obasanjo stuck to a transition time table already drawn leading to the handing over.

Contracts were over-inflated, poorly executed or not executed at all despite receipt of the contract sum; ‘kickbacks’, ‘10 per cents’ were taken. There were cases where contractors received money to supply furniture to houses which had not been built, to clear bush in obscure places, to supply fertilizers to ghost farmers, etc. And there was the 1982 N50 million contract awarded by the Ministry of Housing and Environment to ghost contractors. There were fraudulent cases of payment of large sums of money to ghost workers; outright stealing of government property; illegal transfer of public money into private accounts; and resorting to destruction of files or arson to destroy evidence14 (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 107-108). The President had realised how over- inflation of contracts for instance was eating deep into public resources and he promised to use the recommendations of a committee on the issue in costing projects in the Fourth National Development Plan:

We have observed that since the era of the so-called ‘oil boom’ in this country there has been the misguided impression that money was no problem to the government. Against this background, project costs were often inflated. Designs … were over-costed [sic], equipment and machinery for the projects over-priced. It was this genuine concern that led me to set up a panel which examined the problem and came to a conclusion that contracts in this country were often awarded at exorbitant costs. The recommendations of the committee … will be used in costing projects in our Fourth National Development Plan (in Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 107).15

The situation was so bad that a party chieftain did, at a social party at night, order the manager of a government-owned bank to withdraw N20, 000 which he used in spraying his friends and dancers at the venue; legislators rejected accommodation meant for them and ejected civil servants from a preferred one, got it refurnished at exorbitant cost, and incurred over N3 million (equivalent to $7 million then) telephone bill (by 1982) “as if they made all the laws they were expected to make by phone”;16Tenders Board of the House of Representatives

14

As in the burning down of the Ministry of External Affairs and the accounts section of the Federal Capital Development Authority, Abuja following allegations of fraud in those places.

15This was in the President’s Budget Speech to the National Assembly, January 1981.

16The Obasanjo administration prepared for them the ultra-modern Festac 77 (formerly Durbar)

Hotel situated along Badagry Expressway, Lagos. They rejected it and opted for the newly built 1004 block of flats at Victoria Island, Lagos which were already occupied by civil servants.

which had a contract award limit of N150,000 awarded contracts in excess of N20 million; overseas trips by legislators cost the nation N2 million in two years; legislators were bribed by government to pass bills (as in for example the Revenue Allocation Bill of 1981) (Agedah 1993: 19-22); legislators and even executives increased their salaries and allowances at will (e.g. within 9 months in 1980, federal legislators obtained as salaries and allowances N44,309,300) (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 108-109).

The story from the federal agencies, as revealed by Forrest (1993: 85-86), was the same if not worse: Customs department is generally regarded as a very corrupt institution; N53 million was unaccounted for at Nigerian External Telecommunications; N43 million at the Federal Housing Scheme got missing; Federal Mortgage Bank was rendered impotent as a result of a systematic plundering and looting of its treasury by its board members acting in concert; officials of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) siphoned off over N16 million;17 a Central Bank foreign exchange manager unlawfully transferred $24.1 million out of Nigeria in 1983; the London Manager of Nigerian National Supply Company stole £1.9 million between April 1979 and December 1980; and renegotiation of the Jaguar jet contract with British Aerospace saved N30 million in kickbacks. State-owned banks were virtually crippled as loans were collected with no security or any repayment schedule. For instance, the Rivers state owned bank had bad and doubtful debts of N172.9 million that had to be written off out of a total of N248.8 million outstanding. Bank of the North, owned by the Northern states, also had bad and doubtful debts worth N131 million (ibid: 83).

17In addition to overshooting its limit by a staggering N100 million through the Inter Bank

Adjustment Facility (through which they had access to money from CBN irrespective of their balance provided it was within budgetary limits), the NYSC became a place where kickback was a ‘rule’. For instance, in giving the NYSC Director-General (an army colonel) an 88-year jail term, the Military Tribunal headed by Brig. Paul Omu said: if the Colonel had diligently managed the funds of the federal government entrusted into his care, he would have done himself credit. Instead, he allowed himself to be carried away … by joining the get-rich-quick. By October 1983, the dimension of fraud in the NYSC had turned into a landslide…We take note of the fact that the convict had voluntarily surrendered the various sums of money involved …Even so, the tribunal cannot lose sight of the fact that [he] grossly abused his office and corruptly enriched himself. We are therefore, duty-bound to give him the punishment he deserves” (in Agedah 1993: 54).

Achebe (1984: 39-40) also tells us two mind-boggling stories of corruption during the Second Republic. One was reported by theNational Concord of 16 May 1983 where the Federal Minister of Communications, Mr. Audu Ogbe, disclosed that in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs of the Ministry, the Federal Government was losing N50 million every month as salaries to non-