Escaleras de mano

The above passage underscores the sense of a real need for philosophical oversight of religious discourse. Philosophers in principle did not wrangle over words but were to transcend them for pure meanings discoverable through logic alone. The expectation that philosophers were to be detached from the ways of the world was not only meant to protect religious teachings from political agenda. There was also consensus that a scholar who was not properly detached from the world could not be said to have knowledge. There were two reasons behind this.

Firstly, worldly appearances, as noted above, could not be trusted. The senses easily deceive. The oar in the water looks bent, but our mind tells us it

is not. The sun appears no bigger than a plate, but our mind tells us it is not. Thus, logic—the mechanics of the mind—can be trusted more than our senses to inform us of the truth of a thing apart from our perception of it. The truth of a thing, it was held, lay not in its appearance to the senses but rather in the reason or purpose for which it was created. A thing is what it is not because of how it looks but because of what it is meant to do. A horse is a horse because it runs swiftly, andfire is fire because it burns. The purposes for which a thing exists could be known not by the senses but only by rational analysis—logic. The senses were useful for collecting information about the world, but it was the mechanics of the mind that disclosed the truths of things, that is, the purpose for which they exist. Indeed, since people had different impressions of the world, it was clear that reliance on senses alone invariably led to conflicting views about the nature of reality. Logic was the key to certainty.

Philosophers followed logic, a science meant to bring clear-headed inquiry into the true nature of appearances. The expectation that a single truth could be found beyond the multiplicity of sense impressions, including the multi- plicity of religious beliefs, made it important for scholars to be wary of worldly appearances. One could know something with certainty only by logic, as indicated in the words of a little known but significant scholar of the period, Abu- l-H. asan al-‘A-mirı- (d. 992):

It is impossible to decide the truth of matters that are disputed without the scale of logic, which is reliable for its justice and brings certainty. The art of logic is the intellectual tool by which the rational soul [that is, the human being] distinguishes between true and false in theoretical matters, between good and evil in ethical matters. Its place in souls that make use of it is like a straight standard by which knowledge is weighed in the balance. It is the control for question and answer, objection, contra- diction, and deception [that is, the rhetorical techniques of theological disputation]. By it one resolves ambiguities and exposes distortions—and other matters related to the verification of allegations. It is also beneficial in terms of intellectual pleasure, which grows pure with its use, and also in taking satisfaction in knowledge, making the soul in itself a cause for the acquisition of wisdom [that is, philosophy], not to win the praise of others but to become contented in gaining truth by it and the spirit of certainty.7

There was a second reason that made it necessary for a scholar to be detached from the world. The senses could deceive, but so could the soul. A scholar could not be trusted if his mind was unduly influenced by self-interests or distracted by worldly pleasures. For the mind to achieve its purposes, it had to be free of desires and ambitions. The philosopher was to be solely occupied with the metaphysical realm, which is where truth, it was held, lay. If caught in the grips of the world, he would be unable to discover truth.

Attachment to the ways of the world kept one from thinking clearly. Detachment was the ideal. Since the truths of things were ultimately meta- physical, it was impossible to know them while immersed in the physical realm. A philosopher who sought to win the favor of the masses was a pseudo-philosopher, more interested in fame and fortune than truth. His mind had no mastery over his passions, making his words more rhetorical than truthful. The pseudo-philosopher (mutafalsif) might regale the unlearned with the names of Plato and Aristotle, Euclid and Ptolemy, but he was still a dis- sembler. If he understood the point of philosophy, he would act in a godly rather than beastly fashion, with no regard for his own glory. The Brethren of Purity capture the idea:

Whoever wants to know the realities of things shouldfirst search for the causes of all that exists and the reasons for which they were created. He should have a heart free of concern for worldly matters, a pure soul untouched by ignoble qualities, and a breast unimpaired by corrupt beliefs. He should not be a partisan of one school of thought against another since such fanaticism is based on mere whim, which blinds the mind’s eye, blocking apprehension of realities and keeping the insightful soul from conceiving things in their true reality.8