La escatología en el Credo

The many years of delayed mineral projects in central India seem to show that it is not merely the available material resources and capabilities which are important for outcomes. If this was the case the promoters of bauxite mining would be certain to come out on top due to their ability to influence state functions, and their greater command over technical and financial resources. A starting point for the need to extend political economy analysis is the land rights at the focus of this thesis. As we have seen in section 2.2.2, the demand for tribal rights to land are as much depending on identity claims as they are based on material livelihood needs. This is similar to

Baviskar’s critique of Guha’s political economy as overly relying on Marxist interpretations of class interest. According to Baviskar

... a focus on the complex material and symbolic dimensions of how 'natural resources' come to be imagined, appropriated and contested, enables one to move away from the dull rigours of economic determinism that dog political ecology (Baviskar 2008, 1).

But while the symbolism of polluting extractive industries proposed in the ‘green’ hills reserved for tribal peoples continues to provide support for local land uses is an important theme, this research is however focused on the possibilities for affecting policy preferences and implementation across a range of different forums. A discursive model can here be seen as more appropriate since it involves

a plurality of forms of association, roles, groups, institutions, and discourses. ... [T]he means of interpretation and communication are not all of a piece. They do not constitute a coherent, monolithic web but rather a heterogeneous, polyglot field of diverse possibilities and alternatives (Fraser 1989, 165)

In this cacophony of claims and counter-claims, the sought outcomes from the groups involved are not necessarily the same, or even use the same discourse. A core difference exists where the developmental alliance favours a discourse based on economic growth, while civil society concerns over tribal land rights are based on identity. Redistribution and recognition claims are thus not necessarily speaking the same language. Clearly, the analysis needs to be broadened to include the ability to make claims embedded in material and cultural discursive contexts.

Deliberations over the needs of various groups of people in society take centre stage in Fraser’s the ‘politics of need interpretation’ since these needs appear “as a site of struggle where groups with unequal discursive (and nondiscursive) resources compete to establish as hegemonic their respective interpretations of legitimate social needs” (Fraser 1989, 166).³² ‘The politics of need interpretation’ focus not only on the needs themselves but also on the fact that the interpretations of these politically contested. Also, it puts attention on who does the interpretation.

32Fraser (1989) gives the following reasons for focusing on need interpretation:

- Need interpretation is politically contested as well as the need itself - It is of importance who does the interpretation of needs

- It is not right to assume that the existing ways of interpreting needs are adequate. The discourse of interpretation might be skewed in favour of dominant sections of society.

The struggle over interpretations of needs take place between the status quo position of those who wish to keep current policy preferences in place, and the oppositional discourse of challengers. In this research, the ruling developmental alliance strikes the status quo position in wanting to extract mineral resources based on a discourse of economic growth. Working against this interpretation of needs is an oppositional discourse around the need for achieving social justice by ensuring that tribal people have ownership over and access to land in their traditional areas of habitation.

There are three moments in Fraser’s politics of need interpretation:

The first is the struggle to establish or deny the political status of a given need, the struggle to validate the need as a matter of legitimate political concern or to enclave it as a nonpolitical matter. The second is the struggle over the interpretation of the need, the struggle for the power to define it and, so, to determine what would satisfy it. The third moment is the struggle over the satisfaction of the need, the struggle to secure or withhold provision (Fraser 1989, 164).

The existing land legislation and the many actors supporting it provide a foundation for the realisation of the established need of tribal peoples’ in the present struggle. Tribal land rights across the eight States with Scheduled Areas in central India have not been reformed to reduce their strength since the onset of economic reforms, but as we have seen there is plenty of room for manoeuvre within the existing legal framework for those intent on exploiting minerals. The contrast between land transfer laws and the Samatha Judgement on the one hand, with economic policy in general and specifically the new mineral policy framework with its emphasis on economic growth via private investment on the other could hardly be any starker. Yet, these seemingly incompatible policies and acts continue to live side by side to be shaped by ongoing contestations and the amount of pressure various controlling groups are able to exert in each particular case. Bauxite mining in Andhra Pradesh is but one instance of hundreds of similar battles currently raging across central India.

The interpretation, or legitimisation, of needs offers possibilities to mediate between the two conflicting positions via the state which is in charge of ensuring that due course of law is followed. But the state comes with many internal contradictions, most clearly seen in the examined case from the dual role of the politicians as promoters of industry and mining, and the judiciary as upholder of the law which bans land transfer to non-tribals. This is further complicated by the overlapping jurisdiction of national and State governments who may or may not share a common agenda.

These

[r]egulations emerge through a political process of negotiation between a wide range of actors, in multiple sites. The result is usually an uneven, and often diverse, compromise, based on a combination of technical, social, political and, sometimes, moral considerations.

In such a view, it is the process of co-construction of regulatory policy, operating in a hybrid world between science, business and policy which is key (Scoones 2003, 1).

Though outcomes build on existing governance and legal structures each case is contingent on the particular circumstances of struggles which “... reflect differences in the relative power of the mining company, the relative fragility and power of the social movement, and the role of government” (Bebbington et al. 2008, 2900).

The satisfaction of needs depend to a large extent on the possibilities of those currently excluded from power to challenge policy preferences in the public sphere. This sphere can be seen through the Habermasian ideal of “... a theater in modem societies in which political participation is enacted” (Fraser 1997, 70). This sphere is a space where citizens can deliberate issues of common concern, and it is distinct from both that of the state and of the market. But modern societies have separated the sphere of public political participation from a private sphere in which only certain interests are allowed to participate, whether relating to issues perceived as family matters or those to be dealt with exclusively by the state or a private company. In Fraser’s words:

[T]he result is to enclave certain matters in specialized discursive arenas and thereby to shield them from broad-based debate and contestation. This usually works to the advantage of dominant groups and individuals and to the disadvantage of their subordinates (Fraser 1997, 88).

Jenkins seems to imply something similar when stressing the importance of ‘private’ decision-making forums in India’s experience of economic reform when stating that:

The ability of opportunistic politicians to devise new methods of obtaining illegal income in a liberalising economy relies upon the exploitation of decision-making structures that are obscured from the public gaze (Jenkins 1999, 112).

An important part of the possibilities for deliberation over the need for protecting tribal land is the ability to publicise, in the sense of making public, information about what is being planned and what decisions are being made in currently private spheres. In high profile, large-scale mining like the proposed bauxite project it is very unlikely that decision-makers will be able to entirely obscure decisions however. To start with the project promoters themselves will want to have recognition for work towards fulfilling their vision of economic development and will tend to actively spread information to the media. This media coverage can become the starting point for a wider examination of what is being planned. And the existence of forums outside of the

immediate control of any state-business alliance is likely to allow challenges to be made. But different kinds of resources are required to access different forums. Poor people can be expected to find it difficult to access courts on their own due to a lack of formal education.