Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery.
1. Since the first three elements of robbery are the same as those for theft, that is, (a) intent to gain (animus lucrandi), (b) unlawful taking (apoderamiento or asportacion), and (c) personal property as the subject matter (bienes muebles), the discussion here of those elements shall apply to both crimes.
The difference being in the mode of taking, that for robbery being violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, and that for theft being stealth or strategy, this fourth element of these felonies will be separately discussed under the corresponding articles.
2. The element of the offender’s animus lucrandi is what principally distinguishes robbery from coercion. However, in the crime of cattle rustling which was introduced into our criminal justice by P.D. 533, the accused is liable for the unlawful taking of the animals “whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things” (Sec. 2[c]).
a. It is worth reiterating here that a claim of ownership in good faith, even if the claim is untenable, destroys the element of animus lucrandi (U.S. vs. Manluco, 28 Phil. 360). Conversely, where the claim of ownership is patently a mere ploy or was made in bad faith, animus lucrandi exists (People vs. Garlitos, CA, 36 O.G. 1119).
b. Intent to gain is presumed juris tantum the moment there is apoderamiento (U.S. vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754; People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52). The culprit is criminally liable even if he did not make use of the property he stole but gave it to third persons, as his appropriation and disposition thereof constitutes his personal gain.
c. Mere intent to gain is sufficient even if no actual gain resulted, as mere temporary disturbance of property rights is generally sufficient in crimes against property (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil. 117).
3. The second element, unlawful taking or apoderamiento, at one time had a controversial interpretation and application but has now more or less achieved a settled understanding.
a. Mere physical taking is not sufficient and does not constitute the legal concept of apoderamiento in its Spanish law origin. Such physical taking of the personalty must be coupled with the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.
b. The controversy then arose as to whether or not such appropriation must be with the intent of the offender to permanently deprive the owner of the property subject of the crime.
(1) In one robbery case, it was held that there must be permanency in the taking, or in the intent for the asportation, of the stolen property (People vs. Kho Choc, CA, 50 O.G. 1667).
(2) In several theft cases, there were divided opinions, one line of cases holding that the intent of the taking was to permanently deprive the owner thereof (People vs. Galang, CA, 43 O.G. 577; People vs. Rico, CA, 50 O.G. 3103, cf. People vs. Roxas, CA-G.R. No. 14953, Oct. 31, 1956). The contrary group of cases argued that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the propriety rights of the owner was already apoderamiento (People vs. Fernandez, CA, 38 O.G. 985; People vs. Martisano, CA, 48 O.G. 4417).
(3) The second line of cases holding that there need be no intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property was later adopted by the Supreme Court, in construing the theft clause in an insurance policy, and ruling that there was criminal liability for theft even if the car was taken out only for a joyride but without the owner’s knowledge or consent (Villacorta vs. Insurance Comm., et al., G.R. No. 54171, Oct. 28, 1980; Ass’n of Baptists for World Evangelism vs. Fieldmen’s Ins. Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-28772, Sept. 21, 1983).
c. To constitute apoderamiento, it is sufficient that the subject that the object was taken and held by the offender in a manner sufficient to enable him to dispose of it as he intended, even if his possession thereof be merely temporary or even transitory (U.S. vs. Adiao, supra). This is to be determined from the factual scenario on a case-to-case basis.
4. The subject of the crime, according to the Code, is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as it does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial, whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.
a. The classification of personal property under Arts. 415 and 416 of the Civil Code is for civil law purposes and does not apply to the subject matter of robbery and theft. Thus, it will be noted that in the Civil Code, even fruits on trees and fish in fishponds, inter alia, are considered as real property, but under the Revised Penal Code, coconuts in a plantation and fish in a fishpond can be subjects of qualified theft as they are considered personal property.
b. A plausible test that may be advanced for purposes of this Code, to declare the property as personalty in crimes of robbery or theft, is whether or not the object is susceptible of appropriation and transportation or transfer from place to place without altering its nature or essence. If so, it will thereby constitute the third element of these felonies requiring that the object should be personalty.
5. The fourth element is the mode of commission of robbery, as distinguished from theft, hence the discussion hereon will not apply to the latter, except tangentially only where proper. Robbery is committed by violence against or intimidation of persons, or by the use of force upon things.
a. All other elements being present, the moment there is violence against or intimidation of persons, the unlawful taking is robbery. However, the violence need not be present from the commencement of the felony. As long as violence is employed before the asportation is complete, the crime is simple robbery.
b. With respect to robbery through the use of force upon things, some qualifications are called for, since it will be robbery only if the force is as described in Art. 299. Not every physical force exerted by the offender is covered by Art. 299, hence breaking store windows to steal something but without entry, is only theft (People vs. Adorno, CA, 40 O.G. 567). On the other hand, even if no physical force is used, there may be constructive force which makes the offense robbery. Thus, unlawful entry through an open window, use of fictitious name, or simulation of public authority do not entail physical force but they will make the crime robbery as these are considered as constructive force upon things.
c. As just stated, if violence is employed at any time before the asportation is complete, the crime is robbery. The same is true in robbery through the use of force upon things which also converts the crime into robbery if used at any time before the unlawful taking is completed.
The first is illustrated by the case of a thief who employed violence against the victim when the latter became aware that his pocket was being picked. Although it would only have been theft at the outset, since violence was used before the unlawful taking was completed, the crime became robbery (People vs. Omambong, CA-G.R. No. 44645, June 3, 1936). In the second instance of robbery through force upon things, if the entry was though an open door, but sealed receptacles are broken inside or taken to be broken outside, there was no force on things at the outset, but the crime is robbery because force upon things was employed before the apoderamiento was complete.
6. In robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, the value of the property stolen is immaterial and the penalty is determined by the effects or results of the violence employed, as illustrated by Art. 294. In robbery through the use of force upon things, the penalty is based on the value of the property taken and whether the offender was armed if the crime was committed in an inhabited house, public building, or place devoted to religious worship; or based only on the value of the stolen property, if committed in an uninhabited house.
7. Where robbery was committed with violence against or intimidation of persons, and force upon things was also present and employed by the offender, it has been held that the crime should be categorized and punished under the first mode, that is, through violence or intimidation under Art. 294 and not under the second mode under Art. 299. This was justified on theory that violence or intimidation should supply the controlling qualification since it is graver than robbery through force upon things and produces greater disturbance to social order and the security of the individual (People vs. Sebastian, et al., 85 Phil. 601, and cases therein cited). A modification of this rule appears to have been later introduced by the Napolis and Disney cases which are discussed in Note 1 under Art. 294.
8. As earlier pointed out, robbery, like theft, is committed even if the person from whom the personal property was taken by the offender is only a lessee or bailee thereof. If, however, it is the owner who forcibly takes the personalty from its lawful possessor, the crime is estafa under Art. 316(3) since the former cannot commit robbery of his own property even if he uses violence or intimidation. Nevertheless, he thereby wrongfully deprives the victim of the latter’s right of possession and the lawful possessory or other rights flowing therefrom to the latter’s prejudice and damage.
9. Under Art. 302, the penalty for robbery of mail matter and large cattle is one degree higher but, as already stated, the applicability of that article appears to be limited to mail matter because of P.D. 533, the anti-cattle rustling law, which has taken over the matter of robbery or theft of large cattle (Canta vs. People, G.R. No. 140937, Feb. 28, 2001).
Section One. – Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Art. 294. – Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons.
1. Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons takes place without entering an inhabited house under the circumstances in Art. 299. When both circumstances are present, the offense shall be considered as a complex crime under Art. 48, and the penalty shall be for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, if without violence, the penalty is reclusion temporal under Art. 299, yet if in addition thereto the robber lays hands on the occupants but without inflicting the injuries in Pars. 1 to 4 of Art. 294, the penalty would be very much lower (Napolis vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-28865, Feb. 28, 1972; People vs. Disney, et al., G.R. No. L-41336, Feb. 18, 1983).
2. Art. 294 refers to and punishes robbery with either homicide, rape, mutilation, arson, serious physical injuries or with clearly unnecessary violence, while Art. 297 deals with attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide. These offenses with their respective components re punished as single crimes, and have become known as “special complex crimes,” or composite crimes,” or sometimes “special indivisible crimes” (see People vs. Carandang, et al., G.R. No. L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973). In Art. 294, the robbery and homicide must be consummated, and in Art. 297, the homicide must likewise be consummated.
3. Accordingly, if the offenses committed on the same occasion are (a) consummated robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide, (b) consummated robbery with slight serious physical injuries, or (c) attempted or frustrated robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide, those crimes are not covered by either Art. 294 or Art. 297; but they may be complexed if attempted or frustrated homicide is the means to commit robbery, and the physical injuries are absorbed if only slight or less serious, or will be separate crimes depending on the circumstances. See, in this connection, Art. 48.
4. The rape mentioned here must also be consummated. Robbery with attempted rape does no fall under either Art. 48 or Art. 294 but are distinct crimes (People vs. Cariaga, CA, 54 O.G. 4307).
5. It has repeatedly been held that where the crime is robbery with homicide, rape committed on the occasion thereof is an aggravating circumstance (People vs. Ganal, 85 Phil. 743; People vs. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136; People vs. Mongado, et al., G.R No. L- 24877, June 30, 1969; People vs. Villa, et al., G.R. No. L-31401, Oct. 30, 1979; People vs. Aspili, G.R. Nos. 89418-19, Nov. 21, 1990; People vs. Timple, et al., Nos. 100391-92, Sept. 26, 1994; People vs. Fabon, G.R. No. 133226, Mar. 16, 2000).
6. When the accused committed robbery with rape and the victim is killed, the crime is robbery with homicide and the rape is ignominy, unless there is no direct connection between the robbery and the killing, in which case they will separate crimes of robbery with rape apart from homicide. Where robbery was committed at Jones Bridge in Manila and the victim was killed by the offender who thereafter took the victim’s female companion to Quezon City where he raped her, it was held that the crime was robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The rape committed in Quezon City was directly connected with the robbery with homicide in Manila, despite the time interval between and the different places of commission of the two offenses (People vs. Tapales, et al., G.R. No. L-35281, Sept. 10, 1979).
7. The term “homicide” in Art. 294 is used in its generic sense and includes any kind of killing, whether of parricide or murder or where several persons are killed (People vs. Cabuena, 98 Phil. 919) and the name of this special complex crime shall remain as robbery with homicide. The treachery, if it was murder (People vs. Repato, G.R. No. L-23431, July 20, 1979; People vs. Macabales, et al, G.R. No. 111102, Dec. 8, 2000); the relationship, if it was parricide; the cruelty, if multiple killings were involved (People vs. Mabilangan, G.R. NO. L-48217, Jan. 30, 1982) will only become aggravating circumstances, but not separate offenses (People vs. Bacsa, supra).
8. In People vs. Genoguin, et al. (G.R. No. L-233019, Mar. 28, 1974), the serious physical injuries inflicted by the accused were deemed integrated into the crime of robbery with homicide. The same holding was reiterated in People vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. L- 34290, Mar. 28, 1980) with regard to serious physical injuries inflicted on other victims at the crime scene. In People vs. Gatcho (G.R. No. L-27251, Feb. 26, 1981), the three other cases of frustrated homicide were not considered anymore, presumably because of the fact that the accused was nonetheless sentenced to death due to the presence of three other generic aggravating circumstances.
8. In the more recent case of People vs. Sultan (G.R. No. 132470, April 27, 2000), the Supreme Court handed down what appears to be a revisory doctrine on the matter of robbery with homicide and rape, or involving multiple homicides and/or multiple rapes, in this wise:
x x x In this regard, this Court had declared in some cases that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty. There were also cases, however, where this Court ruled that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appropriated as an aggravating circumstance. Finally, in the recent case of People vs. Regala (G.R. No. 130508, April 5, 2000), the Court held the additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant “anomalous situation” wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under this view the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance. x x x (Other citations omitted).
The rationale therein adverts to the fact that while Par. 10, Art. 13 of the Code on mitigating circumstances provides for other circumstances analogous and similar to those enumerated in that article, there is no such provision in Art. 14 on aggravating circumstances. This theory was foreshadowed by the ruling in People vs. Garcia, et al. L-42580-81, June 11, 1981) where the victim was raped by two felons. The Supreme Court held that rape was committed by two or more persons is a qualifying circumstance as specified in then Art. 335, as amended, emphasizing that such fact is not among the aggravating circumstances in Art. 14 of the Code.
Now, in the Sultan case, the Supreme Court suggested that the problem created by the conflicting decisions on the same issue should be addressed by the legislature and that until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the courts should construe the penal law in favor of the accused by not aggravating his liability. This proposal is reminiscent of the amendment of the last paragraph of Art. 267 on kidnapping and serious illegal detention when the victim is killed, due to the fact that the original provision gave two conflicting decisions variantly holding that the crime was complex, or there was only
one crime, or there were two separate crimes. Regrettably, however, pending such projected congressional action the “anomalous situation” lamented in one line of cases cited in Sultan will continue to the benefit of the accused but with injustice to his additional victims of rape and homicide.
It is accordingly submitted that a more perceptive view of this controversy would yield a reasoned conclusion that, without disregarding the textual differences between Art. 13 and Art. 14, the additional rapes or homicides should aggravate the liability of the accused in the scenario subject of the conflicting holding under Art. 294. Par. 10 of Art. 13 adopts as extenuating circumstances such other situations similar and analogous to any of the generic mitigating circumstances enumerated therein. This means that it would be sufficient if those additional circumstances are analogous and similar in character to, and not necessarily identical with constitutive of, the factual and legal nature of the circumstances in Art. 13. Thus, for instance, among the cases under said article, ante, even the mere outrage of an unpaid creditor was considered akin to passion and obfuscation, and the restitution of malversed funds was deemed equivalent to voluntary surrender.
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, the additional crimes of homicide and rape can be considered as aggravating circumstances of cruelty and ignominy, respectively, not because they are merely analogous and similar to these aggravating circumstances. Such additional crime of homicide actually constitutes and is itself the very act of cruelty, while the additional crime of rape is by itself constitutive of the circumstance of ignominy which is even inherent in the crime. Consequently, the absence of a provision in Art. 14 concerning analogous and similar circumstances is unnecessary and of no consequence in order that additional rapes or homicides committed by the accused may aggravate his liability.
Notably, these additional offenses cannot be independently considered or integrated into the special complex crime under Art.