In this chapter, the question of singularity will be discussed as a crucial continuity in Milton and Derrida's thought. The Abdiel episode in Paradise Lost and Derrida's discussion of Nelson Mandela in his essay "The Law of Reflection," in For Nelson Mandela, will be discussed to show that both thinkers reject exemplarity in favour of singularity. Abdiel and Mandela are fit readers/democratic intellects because of their method of radical critique, the principles of which are not available to any individual in the form of definitive models or procedures. Milton, like Derrida, warns us that there is no absolute example able to provide a definitive model for decision and action. All singular examples (like, Abdiel, Mandela, the Son of God, Samson) are admirable figures but not exemplary.
In his works, John Milton demonstrates a lifelong concern with the question of idolatry, martyrdom, and iconoclasm. The notion of fit reader/audience is a crucial preoccupation because only a radically critical and free reading is capable of distinguishing between admirable figures (like Abdiel) and false martyrs like Charles I. Milton scholars have noted his engagement with the question of idolising martyrs in his tracts, Eikonoklastes and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates.9 However, Milton criticism, as Margaret
9 For Milton's iconoclastic purpose in Eikonoklastes, see Laura Lunger Knopper's Historicizing Milton,
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Justice Dean argues,10 has not "yet noted the prominence of this issue in Paradise Lost"
(227).11 How is the "false" martyr to be discerned from the "true" ones? This question
constantly addresses itself to Milton's fit reader who, through their radically critical reading of exemplary figures, develops the essential fitness, qualities, and attributes to make a just judgment and decision. Nevertheless, exemplary figures present themselves to us in two groups; those who evoke our admiration like Nelson Mandela and Abdiel and those who necessitate our iconoclastic approach. My argument in this chapter is that Milton warns us (and fit readers) about the possibility of the idolization of admirable figures like Abdiel.12 Although Abdiel is depicted in Paradise Lost as admirable, in
Milton‘s terms he is a singular example and should by no means be considered as exemplary.
To elucidate my contention, I will first attend to the way Derrida is thinking about the question of singularity and exemplarity in relation to Nelson Mandela. In "The Laws of Reflection," Derrida presents his argument on the question of singularity and singular examples - "exemplary witnesses," as he calls them. He addresses two main questions in terms of Nelson Mandela's life and experience: what true admiration is, or how we
especially pages 160–84; Achsah Guibbory ―Charles‘s Prayers" in Of Poetry and Politics: New Essays on Milton and His World.
10 See Margaret Justice Dean's essay, "Martyrdom reconsidered," in Milton in France. In this essay, Dean
focuses on the links between "Milton's definition of martyrdom from De Doctrina Christina with his depiction of Abdiel and his discussions of false martyrs, such as Charles I and Mary Queen of Scots, with Adam" (227).
11 See also John R. Knott‘s Discourses of Martyrdom, and Laura Lunger Knoppers‘s Historicizing Milton. 12 In chapter three, attending Milton's iconoclastic approach in Eikonoklastes, I will be arguing that
Milton exemplifies the radically critical and free reading of his fit reader through a deconstructive reading of King Charles's book, Eikon Basilike.
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should admire or respect Mandela; and, why we admire him, or what he has done that forces us to admire him. Derrida argues that we admire Mandela because of his own singular act of admiration which is the outcome of his radical and critical reflection and analysis. His reflection is a practice of both contemplation and reflection in the sense of mirroring and casting light on some institutionally blurred and unreadable situations or issues. Mandela as a democratic subject stands against the state and its laws, questioning the whole legitimacy of the apartheid government and choosing a law, which he calls the law of conscience, or the law of laws. He presents his self in the voice of conscience through his radically critical and free approach to the law of the state. This radical critique is a true response to his profession and his duties as a lawyer. The radical reading makes visible the institutional unreadability of the apartheid legal system. Derrida argues that the singularity of Mandela's critique and experience depends on the irreducible social, political, cultural, and contextual specifics of his life. We must respect Mandela, Derrida writes, "in his irreplaceable singularity," which is not exemplary. In other words, Derrida reminds us that our admiration of admirable people like Nelson Mandela should not lead to their idolization, making them absolute exemplary figures and models. We must instead respect and pay attention to his radically critical examination of the violent apartheid legal system, through which he aims to bring justice to his people and humanity. Mandela's critique is in direction of justice, democracy, or humanity that is not yet in place.
Derrida's argument will help us to understand Milton‘s representation of lapsarian and prelapsarian figures (―one just man‖ or fit reader) like the Seraph Abdiel. I will argue
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that not only, like Derrida, does Milton explore the questions and issues located by Derrida in the terms of singularity, exemplarity, and singular examples, but also he demonstrates a similar understanding of those questions and issues. Milton has exemplified his request in the question of exemplarity throughout his works, both prose and poetry, but I will consider one of the singular figures of Paradise Lost, Abdiel and his unique experience, for my discussion. Like Derrida, Milton emphasizes the singularity and exemplarity of Abdiel's experience and the appropriateness of admiring him on the grounds of his radically critical and free reflection of his situation and his individual decision. He opposes Satan by responding to his "right reason," the law inside him, "God's Law." Milton demonstrates the significance of the process of reasoning and choosing in Abdiel's case; his experience is narrated for Adam and Eve not because it must be imitated as a fixed model as Satan's possible attack or temptation occurs, but because it emphasizes the process of radical critique, reasoning and choosing in different contexts.13