RECORDANT A ALBENIZ
3. Escritura flexible: grafización aproximativa
296. At the time when Free Radio Kossuth was broadcasting the appeals of Premier Nagy, Mr. Kádár, speaking on the same wave-length used previously by Ferenc Münnich, announced the formation of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. This announcement was made at 6 a.m. He said that he, with Ferenc Münnich, Deputy Premier, who would also hold the portfolio of Minister of the Armed Forces and Public Security Force, György Marosán as Minister of State, István Kossa as Minister of Finance, Imre Horváth as Foreign Minister, Antal Apró as Minister of Industry, Imre Dögei as Minister of Agriculture, and Sándor Rónai as Minister of Commerce, would constitute the nucleus of the new Government. As soon as national order had been restored, there would be added from outside the Party other ministers who were ready to “defend the achievements of socialism”. Mr. Kádár accused the Rákosi-Gerő clique of numerous mistakes committed over the past twelve years. On the other hand, “reactionaries had sought to destroy the achievements of socialism by aiming to return the factories and enterprises to the capitalists and the land to the big landowners. Fascist elements had exploited the mistakes which had been committed in the past and had misled the many honest workers and the youth who had risen against the People’s Government out of honest and patriotic intentions.” He called upon one and all to put an end to the excesses of the counter-revolutionary elements, for he had formed his Government to protect the people and lead them out of the existing grave situation. He then proclaimed the programme of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. The programme consisted of fifteen points. It concluded:
“The Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, in the interest of our people, working class and country, requested the Command of the Soviet Army to help our nation in smashing the sinister forces of reaction and restoring order and calm in the country.”
“After the restoration of order and calm, the Hungarian Government will begin negotiations with the Soviet Government and with the other participants to the Warsaw Treaty about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.”
Mr. Kádár ended his announcement by asking the people to disarm the “counter-revolutionary gangs” and to assist the new Government in fulfiling its programme. It may be noted that this political declaration of fifteen points differed only on two major points from what had been advocated by Premier Nagy - the non-inclusion of the question of neutrality and the holding of free elections.(18)
297. The announcements of the formation of Mr. Kádár’s Government were broadcast on 1,187 kilocycles - the wavelength usually occupied by the Balatonszabadi transmitter and normally used for the Hungarian Radio’s foreign services. They are said to have been made from the town of Szolnok, some 100 kilometres southeast of Budapest, on the Tisza. The Committee has no evidence of the presence of Mr. Kádár at Szolnok on the morning of 4 November, and assertions by witnesses that the broadcast was made from a tape recording may well be correct. From evidence given to the Committee, it would indeed appear that, if Mr. Kádár had not already proceeded to Moscow, he was in Moscow on the 4th, in Prague on the
5th or possibly the 6th, and in Budapest in the afternoon of the 6th, or not later than the morning
of the 7th. The Committee is not in a position to check Mr. Kádár’s movements.
298. One notable feature of the new Kádár Government was indeed its absence from the scene of action at the time of the second Soviet intervention. Not only did it not fill any position of leadership in repressing the insurrection in these crucial moments, but the Committee knows of no Hungarian who acted in such a capacity. For three days, even the formal presence of any representative of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government was hardly noticeable to lead the fight which allegedly the Hungarian people and their army were waging against the Government of Imre Nagy and the insurgents of 23 October. From the information available to the Committee, it would follow that during these days of 4-6 November, if any Hungarians fought against the insurgents, they were only the few members of the dissolved ÁVH attached and acting as guides to the Soviet troops in the various battles or skirmishes which were taking place in Budapest and throughout the country. Mr. Kádár’s Government does not appear to have taken any action or otherwise communicated with the people of Hungary until noon of Tuesday, 6 November, when a statement was issued in the name of Mr. Kádár to the effect that he hoped that the country would soon return to normal life, and which made a general appeal for food, construction materials and medicines. Only of the activity of the Soviet Army Command, of their edicts to the Hungarian people and of their seizure of administrative control is record to be found from these days of the establishment of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government.(19)
299. Several witnesses have testified before the Committee that the Kádár Government was unconstitutional, for it had come into being without regard to the formal requirements of the Hungarian Constitution. They have contended that the provisions of article 23(2) had not been observed. According to this article, the Council of Ministers or its single Members are elected or relieved of office by Parliament, on the recommendation of the Praesidium of the People’s Republic. Premier Nagy, they contended, was not relieved of office by the Presidential Council, which in this case would have exercised the functions of Parliament, as this body was not in session 20(4). Furthermore, Premier Nagy had not resigned from office. Therefore, they concluded, the rightful government of the State remained that of Premier Nagy. The witnesses felt that this argument was reinforced by the fact that Mr. Kádár and the other members of his Government did not take the oath of office till the morning of 7 November - three days after the assumption of power.(20) They stated that since, in Hungarian constitutional practice (as confirmed by the communication of the Kádár Government to the Secretary-General of 4 February 1956(21) the oath is an essential prerequisite to the assumption of office, any action taken by such a Government prior to the fulfilment of this formality must be null and void, and
consequently the military action of the Soviet troops did not take place in response to a call from the legally empowered Hungarian Government.(22)
300. The Committee examined this contention and considered that, though these views had grounds for support, particularly if it could he shown that the Chair-man of the Praesidium had not relieved Premier Nagy from office prior to the announcement of the formation of the Kádár Government, it did not believe that it was of material significance for the purpose of this report to pronounce on these considerations. It suffices to call attention to the clear evidence of the circumstances in which the Government of Mr. Kádár came into being solely as the result of the military intervention.
F. Conclusion
301. Certain conclusions regarding the second Soviet intervention emerge from the evidence which the Committee has examined. In the first place, the Committee is satisfied that no well- placed observer could conclude that the Nagy Government was losing control of the situation during the first days of November. On the contrary, the formation of the Workers’ Councils and the Revolutionary Councils all over the country was fast providing a substitute for the discredited machinery of Communist control. In the second place, it was the conviction of the Committee that no well-placed observer could conclude that Mr. Nagy’s Government was in any serious danger from counter-revolutionary forces. The workers and students of Hungary had successfully destroyed Russian tanks from the days immediately following the demonstrations of 23 October. A week later they were in a stronger position than they had been to challenge any attack. Several days of intensive fighting had caused the emergence of popular leaders in many groups and had tested the hastily assembled formations of fighting workers.
302. In the Committee’s view, the evidence leads to one conclusion: The Soviet withdrawal during the last days of October was no more than a temporary measure, dictated by the desire of the Soviet Army to be in a position to launch a more powerful intervention with the least possible delay. Preparations for such an intervention had been going on continuously since the last days of October.
303. It was suggested to the Committee that the Soviet Union feared the consequences to Communism which would have followed the consolidation of Mr. Nagy’s reforms and were therefore anxious to attack his régime before the world could see the spectacle of a whole people united to maintain their socialist achievements without the terrors of Communist dictatorship. The Soviet authorities, it was also suggested, knew very well that an unveiled attack on the Hungarian people would call forth universal condemnation. They therefore discovered a Hungarian spokesman who would lend some colour of legality to their movements. This spokesman was Mr. Kádár. The Committee is in no position either to substantiate or to refute this thesis regarding the motivation of Soviet action. It is, however, significant that Mr. Kádár seemingly associated himself with Mr. Nagy until a late stage and the Committee has no evidence that he gave any hint of his alleged intention to break away from Mr. Nagy’s Government. When Mr. Kádár announced the formation of his own Cabinet on the morning of 4 November, it is doubtful whether he had any backing among Hungarians other than that of the handful of politicians mentioned in his radio broadcast and the unquestioned loyalty of the security police. It would seem that the question of constitutional propriety hardly arises in connexion with the manner in which Mr. Kádár’s Government was
formed, since he himself, having taken the step he did, would alone be competent to supply the facts justifying his claim that it was a Government at all. The Committee would again recall at this point that its two requests to visit Hungary, when such important questions would no doubt have been discussed, met with a point-blank refusal.
(1)Chapter III, paras. 106 and 109. (2)Document A/3546.
(3)See annex C to chapter IX. (4)Chapter XIV, para. 651. (5)Chapter XII, paras. 562-571. (6)Chapter XII, para. 573. (7)Népszava, 31 October 1956.
(8)Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt. Chapter XIII, para. 625. (9)Chapter XIII, para. 625.
(10)Chapter III, paras. 139-148. (11)Chapter XII, paras. 573-575. (12)Chapter XI, para. 537. (13)See para. 296 below. (14)Chapter XII, paras. 573-575. (15)Ibid., para. 589.
(16)Magyar Függetlenség, 3 November 1956. (17)Chapter XIII, paras. 603-639.
(18)Chapter XIV, para. 642. (19)Chapter XIII, paras. 597-600. (20)Szabad Nép, 8 November 1956. (21)A/3521.
(22)Between 20 October and 12 November, no issue of Magyar Közlöny - the official gazette of the Hungarian People’s Republic - appeared. The issue of 12 November contained two decrees of the Praesidium of the People’s Republic. The first was unnumbered; it relieved Imre Nagy and the ministers of his Government of their offices. The second, Decree No. 28 of 1956, elected János Kádár Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and also elected seven members of the Government. Neither of the decrees was dated.