ESFUERZO ESTANDARIZADO

The second phase of the post-Meiji Restoration started with a very different psychological set-up. The objective of ‘climbing the ladder’ had been fulfilled and Japan saw herself at the top of a plateau, where it had more freedom for choices and options. But that free- dom was combined with a dilemma and a contradiction which made the Japanese implementation of foreign policy a more complex and intricate exercise. Six points are worth mentioning regarding the psy- chological make-up of the Japanese during this period:

(1) First, an inevitable inclination to the notion of ‘the Gospel of Power’ cannot be negated. Japan itself now became a much bigger country comprising Korea, which it annexed in 1910, the southern half of Sakhalin, Taiwan and the Pescadores. The primary area of its ‘sphere of influence’ now moved into the southern part of Manchuria.

(2) Second, an acute sense of realism stayed active among some of the government leadership and intellectuals and they knew well that victory came not only through military power, but also by a careful coordination of external relations to avoid isolation and to

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create allies. For them, it was essential to ensure a good under- standing among the major Euro-American powers on the conduct of Japanese policy in the East-Asian continent. In many instances, they were aware of the danger of a growing perception of ‘the yel- low peril’ theory, and therefore in some instances even carefully dis- tanced Japan from identifying itself with Asiatic values.

(3) Third, in the private sector, on the contrary, those views iden- tifying Japan’s future with Asia and Asiatic values gained further momentum against the background of the Japanese victory over Russia. A well-known statement by Tenshin Okakura, a philosopher and artist that “Asia is a single unity” was pronounced in 1902. There emerged harsh criticism from private sector intellectuals that government policy seeking understanding among Western nations was too compromising and void of ideals. It is also interesting to note that among those private sector views in support of Japan’s positioning in Asia, the voices emphasizing Japan’s specific and lead- ing role became more prominent than those who stressed the neces- sity of equal partnership with Asian countries.

(4) Fourth, in the new era of complexity, among the optimists there emerged a new concept that given the unique achievement Japan had made over the last 40 years, she might have a specific mission to fulfil to the betterment of the world, namely to act as a catalyst for the harmonization of Western and Eastern values. That concept was labelled as To-Zai-Yuuwa. To meant east, Zai meant west, and Yuuwa meant harmony or fusion: ‘Harmony of East and West’. As romantic and idealistic as it may sound in retrospect, this notion grasped the hearts of many intellectuals in the period after the Russo- Japanese War.

(5) Fifth, among the pessimists, however, the post Russo-Japanese War situation created a call for a new identity. Japan, which tried to catch up with the West, was still very different from the real West. She was obviously different and wanted to be different from the rest of Asia. What is Japan and who are the Japanese? What specific values can Japan introduce as a lone, new-born country from the Far East? Pessimists could not find an answer to this question.

(6) Last, in the area of domestic policy, it should be noted that the decades which followed the Russo-Japanese War until the Manchurian Incident were generally recognized as a lively period, in which various democratic movements gained strength. Within the rights and obligations of the Meiji Constitution, the first prime min-

prologue 11 ister from political parties was selected in 1918 and in 1925 a uni- versal manhood suffrage law was enacted.7

The foreign policy agenda after the Russo-Japanese War

The victory over Russia fundamentally changed Japan’s relationships with the major powers surrounding her in the Asia-Pacific region.

First and foremost, the United States, which acted as a mediator in concluding the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, began to harbour seri- ous concerns on the nature of Japan’s rapidly growing power.

In Eastern Asia the United States was concerned that the way Japan was expanding its influence to Manchuria and possibly China would go directly against American interests, embodied in the ‘Open Door Policy’ expressed by Secretary of State John M. Hay in 1899. In 1905, at the time the peace treaty was negotiated in Portsmouth, a leading railroad owner Edward H. Harriman visited Japan and made an agreement on the joint management of the southern Manchurian railroad, which Japan was going to gain from Russia. This agreement was later revoked upon the return of Foreign Minister Jyutaro Komura from his peace treaty negotiations at Portsmouth. Komura was convinced that the railroad, which was going to become the key element for the governance of southern Manchuria, had to be owned by Japan. In 1909 Secretary of State Philander C. Knox put forth a proposal to place all Manchurian railroads under inter- national control, but the proposal could not be accepted by Japan, which already saw Manchuria as a vital area under its sphere of influence.

In the Pacific it was the growing strength of the Japanese navy that troubled America. Admiral Heihachiro Togo, who commanded the historic victory at the Tsushima Straits over Russia, became more a symbol of a threat than of glory. America began serious efforts to expand and strengthen her own naval power. In 1907, the first American plan, called ‘the Orange Plan’ was drafted, the purpose of which was to counter a possible war against Japan in Pacific. In this newly emerging and tense situation, Japan also saw it as nec- essary to create an even stronger navy. It became the objective for

7 _{This period is also known as the ‘Taisho democracy’, after Emperor Taisho,}

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the Japanese admiralty to create fleets of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. To make the situation worse, discrimination against Japanese emi- grants, who established themselves primarily on the west coast of the American continent after the Meiji Restoration, erupted. In 1906 the city of San Francisco gave an order to segregate Japanese stu- dents from studying with other ‘white children’. In 1913 a law was enacted in California to exclude the first generation of Japanese emi- grants from land ownership. These developments confused and irri- tated the Japanese leadership and fuelled anger and strong emotion among the public.

Notwithstanding those emerging difficulties, the leadership of the two countries displayed a sense of realism that it was not in the interest of either country to go on a collision course. The 1905 Katsura-Taft Memorandum, which recognized Korea and the Philippines as within each country’s respective sphere of influence, was one example. The 1908 Takahara-Root Agreement, in which both countries agreed to preserve the status quo in the Pacific region and to observe in China the independence, territorial integrity and the principle of equal opportunity for third powers, was another example.

In contrast to the emerging tension with the United States, the relationship with Russia, with which Japan had fought a desperate war, improved phenomenally. The first accord was concluded in 1907, primarily based on the necessity for both sides to ensure post- war stability and the preservation of a balance of power in south and north Manchuria. That first accord developed into the second accord in 1910. It became clear that both countries shared a com- mon concern vis-à-vis the United States for their expanded economic activities in Manchuria. The third accord was concluded in 1912, and finally the fourth one in 1916. The fourth accord was even looked upon as an alliance between Russia and Japan.

The nature of the Japanese-British alliance also changed. From the European point of view, Germany rather than Russia emerged as a major threat to the status quo. From that point of view Britain had no objection to the enhanced relationship between Japan and Russia as outlined above, as well as the strengthening of the Japanese- French relationship, which came to be realized by the Japan-France Accord of 1907. Thus the alliance relationships of Britain, France and Russia, each supported by Japan, a newly emerging power in the Far East, took shape. These complex multilateral relationships,

prologue 13 rather than a narrowly defined bilateral relationship with Japan, came to be preferred by Great Britain. That arrangement also suited Japan well.

At the same time, Great Britain had another serious reason to distance itself somewhat from Japan. The growing tension between Japan and the United States increasingly put Britain in an awkward position. In the event that a crisis should occur between Japan and the United States, Britain did not want to put itself in a position to have to fight against the United States. Thus the third Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911 excluded America from the objective of the agreement.

World War I and the Paris Peace Conference

In August 1914 World War I broke out in Europe. There Japan saw a great opportunity to show her new role in global politics and to expand and strengthen her position, particularly in Eastern Asia. It cannot be denied that the notion of a ‘Gospel of Power’ gained further momentum.

When asked by Great Britain to join the war on 7 August, Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany on 15 August and declared war on 23 August. Given the alliance relationships with the British, French and the Russians, that was a natural choice.

The area where Japanese activities were expected to be performed was not in Europe but in the Far East. The first Japanese objective was to take over German interests in the region. Japan immediately attacked and occupied Chintao, a major German basis in the region located on the Shandong peninsula. The Japanese navy occupied some of the South Pacific islands which had been under German control as well.

The second, and probably a more important objective for Japan, was to establish her sphere of influence firmly inside China, where political turmoil had been mounting for years. In October 1911 a revolutionary movement exploded there, which led to the establish- ment of the Nanjing Provisional Government headed by Sun Yat- sen in January 1912. In Beijing, after reigning for 300 years, the Qing Dynasty resigned and in February 1912 a new republic led by Yuan Shi-kai, the leader of the northern warlords, was created.

The country was politically far from being united, but a strong feeling of nationalism united the people. The notion of the ‘sphere of influence’ on the part of outside powers was losing its traditional

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ground. But, in a situation where world power attention was directed primarily to Europe, Japan saw a unique opportunity to enlarge her traditionally accepted ‘sphere of influence’. In January 1915, Japan presented its 21 Clauses to the newly formed Chinese government. They included such clauses as Japan’s right to inherit German priv- ileges over the Shandong peninsula, to extend her special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia, and to dispatch her counsellors in financial or military administration to the Chinese government. The Chinese were violently opposed to the Japanese requests, particularly the last part, where Japan requested her right to intrude on inter- nal matters in China. After five months of bitter and thorny nego- tiations an agreement was reached on the basis of 14 clauses, excluding all parts related to Japanese intrusion to internal matters. Japan achieved certain policy objectives, but severe psychological damage was done to the Chinese government and people.

In 1918 the war was terminated and the Peace Conference was convened in Paris in January 1919. Japan was invited there as one of the five principal victor countries together with Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. It was the first occasion, where Japan was included in such a multilateral forum as one of the lead- ing countries of the world. It was an honourable occasion and the delegates to the conference went there with a strong sense of pride. However, as it turned out, the conference offered many opportu- nities for Japan to think seriously about the future of her foreign policy. How to ensure Japan’s right over the Shandong peninsula and the South Pacific islands, which she inherited from Germany, was, in a practical sense, the only area for Japan to speak out upon and defend her interests. After prolonged and bitter debates, par- ticularly with the Chinese delegation, Japan achieved her objective to secure her rights on the Shandong peninsula. But this in turn invited an outburst of anti Japanese feeling in China, as a result of which the peninsula was given back to China only three years later. Thus the 1919 Peace Conference resulted in enhanced anti-Japanese emotions in China, further complicating difficulties for future Japanese policy there.

On all other issues related to the question of global peace, secu- rity and justice which were of major importance for many delega- tions, such as the question of the establishment of the League of Nations, the Japanese delegation remained virtually mute and was even labelled as ‘the silent delegation’. From the point of view of substance, the foreign policy thinking of the delegation was ill-equipped

prologue 15 to follow major issues of future decades. The only exception, where Japan made a conspicuous proposal in relation to global issues, was the proposal to include a clause into the League of Nations Charter on racial equality, which was not adopted but is still remembered as a farsighted step towards the future.

There was also a huge vacuum of professional experience to par- ticipate in multilateral foreign policy. Thus the conference was instru- mental in assisting Japan to comprehend her fundamental weakness.

The Russian Revolution and Allied intervention

Another important world event occurred during World War I, namely, the Russian Revolution. Great Britain and France, in particular, became much concerned with the fate of this neighbouring country and decided to go ahead with intervention. The United States was more cautious in her approach but they decided to go ahead in July 1918, when they heard news that Czechoslovakian troops were caught by a Bolshevik surge in the central part of Siberia. Japan waited cautiously until the US decision was taken, but once the decision was taken, following the US, her activities became more conspicu- ous than others. In August 1918 Japan dispatched troops to Siberia. By autumn their numbers totalled 73,000, eight times more than agreed upon with the United States, occupying a tangible part of Siberia and Northern Sakhalin. The army stayed in Siberia until 1922, as the last troops to have occupied Soviet territory.

It took another three years, until 1925, before Japan and the newly born Soviet Union fully normalized their relationship based on the Convention of Basic Principles. Japan withdrew from Northern Sakhalin in the same year but acquired the rights for oil excavation in the northern part of Sakhalin.

The intervention left a deep scar in the mind of the Soviets about Japan’s actions in their homeland. Japanese casualties numbered 3,500 plus huge expenditure and brought relatively small benefits. It became a bitter lesson and a clear warning for Japan in relying too much on the ‘Gospel of Power’.

The Washington Conference and foreign policy under the Washingtonian order Now that the two major events of the 1910’s, World War I and the Russian Revolution were over, the major countries of the world gath- ered in Washington from November 1921 until February 1922 to

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discuss acute outstanding issues pertaining to the peace and security of the world. As the situation in Europe was basically resolved by the Paris Peace Conference, the outstanding crucial issues which remained were primarily those related to the Asia-Pacific region.

To this day opinions vary in Japan on the evaluation of this con- ference. Some maintain that it was a process of unwilling Japanese subordination to American pressure, which dominated the arena. Others argue that it represented serious efforts on the part of Japan to associate with and contribute to the emerging new values in inter- national relations. There are also views, that whether it was a will- ing or unwilling process, Japan managed to preserve her sphere of influence over Manchuria and keep her power base as she then intended. Whichever the evaluation, Japan took an important deci- sion to adhere to the conclusion of the 1919 Peace Conference, which set the basic tone of international relations during the 1920’s. The first agreement made was on naval arms reduction. The key issue was the ratio to be applied to battleships between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. Japan’s basic position was to achieve a ratio of 10:10:7, but it finally agreed to the proposal made by America, that of 10:10:6. There remained within the Japanese navy differing views on the adequacy of this agreement, but the majority in Japan accepted it as an unavoidable compromise. As a footnote, this agreement was supplemented later in 1930 at the London Naval Conference on cruisers and other auxiliary ships with a ratio of 10:10:6.97.

The second agreement was on China. A treaty was signed by all nine participants of the conference: the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. It was an incarnation of the traditional open door policy maintained by America. Those fundamental clauses such as respect for the sover- eignty, independence and territorial integrity of China, as well as the right to equal opportunities in trade and commercial activities for foreign countries, were included. The fact that the treaty did not derogate the existing rights of foreign governments over China nor include any clause on measures to be taken against a violation of the treaty, allowed Japan to maintain her sphere of influence in Manchuria and elsewhere. The treaty embodied, however, new prin- ciples of international relations which went beyond the traditional thinking of imperialism and the notion of respective spheres of

prologue 17 influence. It was not without importance to note that Japan abided with those newly emerging principles.

The third agreement was on the Asia-Pacific region in general. By that time, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had significantly lost its

raison-d’être, because both Russia and Germany, which could have

become their common threat, were fundamentally weakened. American uneasiness concerning the alliance had to be taken into account as well. Thus an idea emerged to restructure the alliance so as to include America. France was invited as a fourth partner with a view to soften an inflated impression of American participation. Thus a quadrilat-