Esfuerzos admisibles en la estructura de suelo cemento

I have now argued that truthmaker theory and deflationism about truth form a consistent pair. That conclusion is less striking once we recognize that truthmaker theory itself is not any kind of theory of truth. Nevertheless, I have gone to great length to show that the two theories are compatible. In this section, I want to argue for what is perhaps a more shocking thesis: truthmaker theory actually undermines substantive theories of truth. Not only is (a certain kind of) deflationism consistent with truthmaker theory, it is actually the only rationally compelling view about the metaphysics of truth to which the truthmaker theorist should subscribe. In the last chapter we saw how truthmaker theory undermines the

motivation for accepting correspondence theories by better accounting for the basic

motivations that favor correspondence accounts over their competitors. The argument of this section has even wider implications: any theory of truth that posits a metaphysically robust

property of truth is undermined by truthmaker theory. Hence, I shall be arguing that adopting truthmaker theory gives us sufficient reason for rejecting MS1 through MS4 above. Truth is

not among the sparse properties.

As always, I adhere to methodological neutrality, and do not wish to tackle the problem of universals on its own terms, or even take a stand. Our object is to argue in favor of metaphysical deflationism, so as to show that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth, regardless of how we might understand that thesis. Accordingly, I take our present task to be the one of refuting MS1 through MS4. Metaphysical deflationism is the

view that there is no substantive property of truth, which we now can take to be a denial that truth is any of the various things philosophers mean when they discuss the nature of

properties.38 Now, it should be evident that if we adopt the most extreme form of nominalism, then metaphysical deflationism is secure. If there is no metaphysical notion of a property at all, then a fortiori there is no metaphysical notion of a property of truth. So we could argue

for metaphysical deflationism by arguing for extreme nominalism about properties (sans any

account of naturalness). But that is not our project. Thinking directly about truth can lead us to reject theses MS1 through MS4; we do not need to import any controversial assumptions

about the metaphysics of properties. Let us turn, then, to the refutation of our four theses. The argument will run in two different directions. First, I shall argue that there is no theoretical need to posit any such substantive property of truth. Doing so is gratuitous. Then I shall

38_{Cf. O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price 1996: 278 on “substantial” or “thick” truth, and Azzouni’s notion of}

argue that even if we do posit such a property, we are led to some disastrous metaphysical conclusions.

3.3.1. No need for truth

The first step to arguing against metaphysical substantivism involves appreciating the

truthmaking role that properties play. Those who embrace the existence of universals or

tropes do so not only because such things account for the resemblances between objects, but also because they are able to serve as truthmakers for contingent predicative truths. Suppose, for example, that Smith is six feet tall. Smith himself is not a truthmaker for the truth that Smith is six feet tall, since the existence of Smith himself does not guarantee that the proposition is true. It is possible for Smith to exist and not be six feet tall. Something else is needed to account for the truth of the claim. Someone who accepted universals would hold that what makes it true is a state of affairs—the compound object composed of both Smith and the six feet tall universal (e.g., Armstrong 1997). Someone who accepted tropes would

hold that what makes it true is a particular six feet tall trope that uniquely belongs to Smith (e.g., Lowe 2007).

Notice, then, the truthmaking powers that belong to tropes and universals. For any object x that instantiates some universal F, it will be true that x is F, and the state of affairs

composed of x and F will make that claim true. For any object x that possesses a trope of type T, it will be true that x is T, and the trope will make that claim true. Now suppose that truth is

a metaphysically substantive property, such that there is a universal truth or collection of

truth tropes. Any time a truth bearer is true, it will instantiate that universal, or possess a truth trope. Just as all green things instantiate green, or possess resembling green tropes, all true

things—so says the substantivist about truth—instantiate truth, or possess resembling truth

tropes.

We may now notice how the substantivist about truth has abundant truthmaking resources for contingent predications. For ease of exposition, suppose there are propositions. The proposition <Smith is six feet tall> is true, and true in virtue of either a six feet tall trope that belongs to Smith, or the state of affairs composed of Smith and the universal six feet tall.

But the proposition itself instantiates truth (thereby creating a new state of affairs), or

possesses a truth trope. Those entities themselves are also truthmakers for the proposition, as their existence guarantees the truth of the proposition. The realist now has two states of affairs that serve to make the proposition true (Smith’s bearing six feet tall, and the

proposition’s bearing truth), just as the moderate nominalist has two tropes available to serve

as truthmakers (a six feet tall trope, and a truth trope).

Now, it is no objection to a view that it provides redundant truthmakers for truths. There is no one-one correspondence between truths and truthmakers. What is important to realize now is how the two truthmakers available to the substantivist are distinct entities.

Two objects are distinct just in case the existence of at least one does not depend upon the existence of the other. Two objects are fully distinct just in case neither depends on the

existence of the other for its existence. Fully distinct objects are distinct objects between which no necessary connections obtain. Suppose, for example, that some particular a

contingently instantiates the universal F. The state of affairs (a, F) composed of the two

objects is a distinct existence from its components a and F because its components could

exist without the state of affairs existing. Such would be the case were a to exist but not be F,

distinct from them. States of affairs are necessarily connected to their components: (a, F)

depends upon its constituents, for it cannot exist unless a and F both do.39

Consider now the two truthmakers that the realist has available for <Smith is six feet tall>.40 One is a state of affairs composed of Smith and six feet tall. The other is a state of

affairs composed of the proposition and truth. I contend that these two objects are most

plausibly understood as being fully distinct entities.41 As I shall now argue, they do not depend upon one another for their existence.

If there are necessary connections between the two states of affairs, then those connections ought to be traceable to other necessary connections obtaining between their components. Otherwise we will be forced to take the connection to be brute. Consider a familiar case of necessarily connected states of affairs: imagine a length of wire L that instantiates the two universals made of copper and electrically conductive. The state of

affairs of L’s being made of copper is necessarily connected to the state of affairs of L’s being electrically conductive. What explains the necessary connection between the two states of affairs is the necessary connection between the two universals: conductivity necessarily accompanies copper. That sort of connection is not to be found in our case. The two

universals—truth and six feet tall—do not depend upon each other for their existence; they’re

just separate, unique universals. They are instantiated by very different kinds of objects: very few, if any, true truth-bearers are six feet tall! Further, the connection we are looking for cannot be accounted for by finding a connection between universals, because we don’t have

39_{It is just these sorts of necessary connections between distinct existences that lead Lewis (1992, 2001b) to find}

fault with Armstrong’s realism.

40_{Exactly parallel marks apply for the moderate nominalist here.} 41_{Similarly, I contend that the}

truth trope belonging to <Smith is six feet tall> is a distinct existence from the six feet tall trope belonging to Smith.

one single object instantiating two universals. We are trying to account for a connection between a proposition and a certain universal on the one hand, and a person and a very different universal on the other. Our two states of affairs don’t even share a common component, and so accounting for their mutual dependence is all the more difficult.

The usual channels for accounting for necessary connections between states of affairs do not seem open to the realist about truth. Even so, it might still be thought that,

nevertheless, the states of affairs themselves are necessarily connected. The view is that the proposition <Smith is six feet tall> cannot bind to truth unless Smith himself binds to six feet tall. One might just bite the bullet here and accept the necessary connection as brute, and

thereby forswear giving any account of the connection. After all, states of affairs themselves may well involve some sort of brute connection to their components, so perhaps there is no more harm in admitting some further necessary connections between different states of affairs.

While such a view may be defensible, it does come at a cost. Accepting that there are necessary connections between distinct existences is tantamount to restricting the free recombination of distinct existences. When two universals are very different in their nature, they ought to be able to freely recombine, irrespective of what the other is doing. Other universals like green and red may well impose constraints on one another—objects that are

green can’t be red. But such failures of recombination are due to the intrinsic

incompatibilities in the universals. It’s not obvious that the same can be said for truth and six feet tall. As we’ve already seen, they don’t even tend to instantiate the same kinds of objects.

Failures of free recombination, of course, worry some philosophers—Humeans and Lewisians, for example—more than others. But even those who are untroubled by the

presence of necessary connections between distinct existences must recognize that the substantivist about truth takes on an extra explanatory burden that the deflationist does not. The substantivist posits the existence of two very different states of affairs that are composed of very different sorts of things, and holds that these two distinct states of affairs nevertheless necessitate the existence of each other. If a view posits the brute existence of necessary connections between distinct existences, it incurs a theoretical cost. Such views impose greater structure on the world—things of type X can’t exist unless different things of type Y also exist.

Such costs can indeed be justified. Armstrong (1983), for example, posits the existence of necessary connections between distinct universals in order to give an adequate account of the laws of nature. Further, as we have already seen, Armstrong grants the existence of states of affairs—despite their own inherent necessary connection to their components—because he employs them as truthmakers for contingent predications. So positing such necessary connections is not in and of itself fatal to a view. Still, positing brute necessary connections should not be done lightly, and should be done only to serve a greater theoretical purpose. The very same can be said for positing entities (or a notion of naturalness) at all with respect to the metaphysics of properties. Universals, tropes, and natural properties are not posited without cause; one need not believe that for every predicate there is a

corresponding universal or set of tropes, or that every property is natural. Not every property deserves to be sparse. What reasons, then, can justify these various metaphysical posits, such as universals, tropes, naturalness, states of affairs, or necessary connections between them?

The answer is threefold. Here is David Lewis, describing Armstrong’s moderate realism: “universals are sparse. There are the universals that there must be to ground the

objective resemblances and the causal powers of things, and there is no reason to believe in any more” (1983: 345). Lewis here identifies two of the sources of justification for

metaphysical positing in the theory of properties. We posit universals (or tropes or

naturalness) when we need them to account for the genuine resemblances between objects. What separates the collection of green objects from the collection of grue objects is that the former all share a single universal (green), which cannot be said for the various grue objects.

We also posit universals (or tropes or naturalness) when we need them to account for the causal properties of objects. The thought here is that objects have their causal powers in virtue of the properties they enjoy. The sparse properties are, in Armstrong’s phrase, “the ontologically significant properties of objects, those in terms of which the world’s work is done” (2004: 17). Armstrong often refers to the “Eleatic Principle”, according to which nothing exists except that which has causal powers (e.g., 1997: 41-43; see Oddie 1982 for discussion). Being massive or charged or conductive are the sorts of properties that account

for the causal order of the world; it is these properties, and not being three feet from Obama

or being either in Alaska or Madagascar that figure into the causal laws of nature.

A third and final reason for positing universals and tropes involves, as before, their use as truthmakers. Objects and their properties, whether understood in terms of universals or tropes, are needed to serve as the ontological grounds for the truths about the world. Truths are true in virtue of the existence of both objects and their properties.

There are three sources of justification, then, for positing that a particular property belongs among the sparse properties. The sparse properties are those that account for the genuine resemblances between objects, have causal powers, and are needed as truthmakers. We should posit such properties (and any necessary connections between them) only if doing

so serves those needs. Our next question to consider is whether treating truth as a sparse property will fulfill any of these metaphysical purposes.

First consider the topic of resemblance. Sparse properties are those that account for genuine resemblances between objects. Objects resemble one another in virtue of

instantiating the same universal, possessing resembling tropes, or belonging to the same natural class. Now, not all classes exhibit any real resemblance—such is supposed to be the distinction between the class of green objects and the class of grue objects. Our question is whether the truths are more like the green things or the grue things. Notice just how diverse is the collection of truths. It’s true that snow is white, that Obama is president, that hobbits don’t exist, and that if I were to drop a piece of chalk it would fall to the floor. The class of truths is one remarkably heterogeneous collection. Indeed, each truth seems to be its own individual affair. The proposition that snow is white is true in virtue of snow’s being white, the proposition that Obama is president is true in virtue of Obama’s being president, and so on. The idea on hand here is one familiar to deflationists—the truth of <Snow is white> does not “consist in the same thing” as the truth of <Obama is president>. Sure, they “resemble” one another in that they are both true, but the resemblance stops there. They are both true, but for entirely separate reasons. The shared greenness of two things, by contrast, may well admit of a common explanation, due to a genuine property shared by both. The class of truths, it seems, is a great candidate for being a perfectly unnatural class. If so, there is no need to

promote truth to the status of a sparse property on the basis of shared resemblances between truths, for there are none.42

42_{Azzouni writes that ‘true’ belongs to the set of “words that needn’t even be seen as candidates for being}

It also seems unlikely that anyone would posit truth to serve any genuine causal role. We may posit mass and charge so that they may discharge their causal duties, but truth

seems to be an altogether different beast. It is strange to think that truth would be the sort of thing that contributes to the causal order of the world studied by empirical science. By what mechanism would truth interact with the other universals in order to bring about various

effects?43 Why does truth not figure into any physical laws or equations?

Still, it may seem natural to make causal judgments involving truth, as in ‘The truth of my beliefs caused me to ace my exam’. Deflationists have a metaphysically innocuous account of what is being said here, and it doesn’t involve a causally active truth property.44 Suppose the exam has a single question: which U.S. president was succeeded by his own predecessor? Because I believe that Benjamin Harrison was succeeded by his own

predecessor, that belief in part causes my hand to write the answer, which in turn causes the instructor to give me full credit. What is crucial is that I believe that Benjamin Harrison was succeeded by his own predecessor, and that Benjamin Harrison was indeed succeeded by his own predecessor. Nowhere are we forced to posit a causally active universal truth to account

for my success. The appeal to truth in the initial causal judgment is nothing but another instance of the useful anaphoric and abbreviatory features of ‘truth’ and ‘true’. Rather than saying that my belief that Benjamin Harrison was succeeded by his own predecessor when