Current regional governance arrangements have been now in place for some 18 years. Despite apparent stability, underlying tensions and challenges remain that ultimately question the existing regional governance arrangements. As well, regional councils are operating in a geographical polity with other agencies and organisations that stretch the governance warp and weft.
5.1 New Zealand local government model
Regional councils are identified and identify as part of the New Zealand system of local government. Local government is remarkable in that it is locally accountable and financially autonomous in comparison with these entities and therefore warrants a closer examination. It is also a considerable component of the economy, contributing 3.5% gross domestic product with an annual operating expenditure of $3 billion, annual capital expenditure of $800 million and 40,000 jobs (Local Government New Zealand, 2005). New Zealand local government is remarkably autonomous compared to other western countries. Its relative autonomy stems in no small part from the sector‘s financial independence. This is based on a narrowly-based financing power under the Local Government (Rating) Act 2001 giving local governments ability to raise property taxes and user charges (Table 3-4).
Table 3-4: Local government revenue 2001/02
Category Proportion of total revenue (%)
General rates Water rates Fees and fines Sales and charges Investment Income
Grants, subsidies and levies Petroleum taxes 52.0 03.6 04.5 18.6 10.1 10.6 00.7
Source: Commonwealth Local Government Handbook, 2004.
Unlike other countries, there is no mandatory or automatic revenue sharing from national income and sales taxes. The allocation of revenue by central government to local authorities is limited to direct programme grants, notably for land transport purposes and various needs-based infrastructure subsidy schemes. In the 2004/05 year national government contributions were twelve percent of local government‘s income. In comparison, the share of council income contributed through federal and state contributions in Australia is around twenty percent, while in the United Kingdom the figure is close to 75 percent (Local Futures, 2006).
The lack of tied grants confirms the high level of fiscal independence enjoyed by local authorities. This, coupled with a tradition of very limited central government intervention in local authority administration, has allowed significant local discretion by international standards (Bush, 1995). However, this autonomy comes at a price; compared to other western countries New Zealand‘s local government has a very narrow task span. Functions commonly undertaken by local governments in other countries, such as policing, education, many social services and emergency services are funded and operated nationally. Thus New Zealand local government has autonomy over little.
Strategic community planning certainly seeks to reposition New Zealand local government from Norton‘s Anglophone to continental European model, making it part of a wider
community framework. However, this overlooks the underlying reasons for this ‗New Zealand model‘ of local government identified by W.B. Sutch over half a century ago:
Local government in New Zealand derives its form from English history and its feebleness from the short-sighted self-interest of the New Zealand ratepayer. Had New Zealand been a colony of Denmark, it would probably have had a logically knit system of provinces combining central administration with local control (Sutch, 1956: 12).
The Anglophone model is under pressure, in England as well as New Zealand. The Lyons Report on English local government has sought to re-position the strategic role of local government as one of ‗place-shaping‘ and seeking to avoid becoming fixated with the service delivery role that had become so important in the last century. Rather, Lyons sees three, inter-related sets of roles that government plays, as:
service provider
vehicle for public infrastructure
institution of government – a place for debate and collective decision-making. He suggests any analysis of the modern role of local government needs to take account of all three roles, while recognising the ‗appetite for self-determination is as much a part of local government‘s background as its role as a service provider‘ (Lyons, 2007: 1-2).
In New Zealand, the intent has been to broaden the scope for collective decision-making; it is unclear what inroad this initiative has had. Local government has historically been seen as a service provider and we see no significant change in this perception, either within the sector or by central government. Local government planning strategically for outcomes is difficult given the policy levers are largely held by central government agencies as are access to additional resources. The 2007 Independent Inquiry into Local Government Rates, established by the government in response to public concerns over local body rate increases, is also premised on a business as usual model and was not given the mandate to take a strategic overview of the function, structure and financing arrangements that are most appropriate for New Zealand local government (Local Government Rates Inquiry, 2007).. Local government is more restricted in its legislative powers, restricted to making and enforcing second-order legislation (regulations) within nationally legislated arenas, notably bylaws for ensuring public health under the Health Act 1956 and resource management rules under the RMA. Further, New Zealand local government, unlike most European and North American local governments, is a creature of statute (created under the Local Government Act), without any constitutional protection.
The role and response of the different sub-national agencies to these changed responsibilities provide a rich field for evaluating the efficacy of devolution and coordination. However, it is argued that the environmental management policy arena is particularly interesting given that the agencies involved have undergone the most devolution of any sector and highly structured institutional arrangements exist for regulatory intervention and policy review.
5.2 Challenges of territorial coordination
The current configuration is not uncontested; while calls for establishing unitary authorities from the provincial councils have died off, Auckland remains a contested arena. Rivalry between territorial and regional bodies has been a hallmark of Auckland local politics reaching back to the establishment of the ARA (see Memon et al., 2007). This stems in part
from the unitary nature of the metropolis with a need for services and infrastructure throughout the urban agglomeration. Arguments largely centre on whether unitary area- wide multi-functional authority or fragmented local-community based authorities are better suited to provide these services. These competing efficiency and voice arguments are canvassed more fully in the next chapter.
Matters came to a head in late 2006 with a play by the mayors of the four cities seeking to abolish the ARC and replace it with a super-city – essentially a metropolitan unitary authority. Although the attempt failed, Auckland‘s regional governance was again placed on the political agenda, leading the Minister of Local Government to promise a resolution in time for the 2007 local government elections (Minister of Local Government, 2007). This issue is unique to Auckland, reflecting its singular metropolitan composition, but it does serve notice that a ‗one size fits all‘ approach to regional governance in New Zealand may not be the most appropriate. At time of writing (September 2007), the Government with support from the opposition, has subsequently decided to refer the whole matter to a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Auckland Governance to report back in late 2008.
Discontent also exists in southern Canterbury, where there has recently been renewed calls for the southern districts to break away from the Canterbury Regional Council and to have their own South Canterbury regional council (The Press, 29 November, 2007; 3 December, 2007). These calls reflect both dissatisfaction with the regional council‘s performance and concerns that its small provincial-rural voice is lost within the Christchurch City dominated council and historical separate identity.
The other challenge facing some regions is the coordination of strategic planning to manage growth across territorial jurisdictions. This is perhaps most marked in Auckland and Canterbury and Tauranga where rapid growth is being experienced that spills across borders of more than one territorial authority. In each case the challenge is to coordinate the individual territorial plans, suggesting a sub-regional organisation.
Both the Auckland Growth Strategy and the Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy (GCUDS) have or intend to use a governance model approximating the former united councils with members appointed from and by the constituent councils. The membership is much smaller than the united councils: for example the GCUDS proposes to draw membership from the three territorial and one regional council, as opposed to the CUC‘s nine counties, borough and city councils that match the current growth strategy area. Nevertheless, the problems inherent with the united council model, identified above, must still remain.