As discussed in the preceding chapter, a central tenet of CBNRM is the devolution of power2 to the local level, and the initiation of community-level decision-making for natural resource management. This form of power devolution generally involves the conferment by the state of authority3 to local organisations. The local level becomes authorised in the management of natural resources and receipt of benefits from this therefore.
My focus is specifically upon programmes of devolution, and specifically the transfer of powers to community organisations. This is a component of the broader term decentralisation, which involves the transfer of powers to lower levels of political administrative and territorial hierarchy (Shackleton and Campbell, 2001; Larson and Soto, 2008). I use the term decentralisation as an umbrella under which several different processes occur, including democratic decentralisation4, deconcentration5 and devolution. Devolution is distinct from decentralisation in the level and types of powers transferred, with devolution
2Power is a complex term that is discussed further in section 2.3
3 Authority refers to compliance based on the recognised legitimacy of the decision-maker (Lukes, 2005).
4 The transfer of powers to lower level governments, for example district or regional level administrations, or to regional autonomous governments (Larson & Soto, 2008).
5 The transfer of powers from central ministries to branch offices outside of the capital or administrative centre (Larson & Soto, 2008).
18 representing the fullest and least restrictive type of power transfer to a community group (Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003).
Alongside the arguments made for the paradigm shift to community conservation and the integration of conservation and development objectives discussed in chapter 1, the justifications for the devolution of power to the local level in the natural resources sector are similarly based on the perception of local people less as a problem, and more as a potential solution (Larson and Soto, 2008). The handing over of authorisation to manage natural resources and channelling benefits from this to the local level was predicted to reduce costs for the state, whilst at the same time improving compliance with natural resource rules and creating incentives for long-term sustainable management of resources (Sundar, 2001;
Andersson and Ostrom, 2004; Brockington, 2008). There are two key assumptions within this conceptualisation of power devolution in natural resource management that have been crucial to the mixed results and disappointments with CBNRM discussed in chapter 1: the meaning and types of power in power devolution; and the assumption that local support can be fostered through providing incentives for conservation (Gibson and Marks, 1995).
Addressing these assumptions focuses research on the nature and politics of power devolution within specific CBNRM policies
Multiple examples across the community conservation spectrum have indicated that power devolution, even when central to objectives, can take many forms, incorporating different levels and types of power and associated management rights at the community level (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). The restriction of community management and ownership rights to that of implementation of an externally-designed system is seen as one of the biggest barriers to successful CBNRM (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Charnley and Poe, 2007). Such restrictions can result in communities receiving handouts from CBNRM activities, instead of achieving meaningful control and empowerment at the local level, and such handouts may result in the supplementation of livelihoods, rather than the instigation of long term development (Murphree, 1996; Murombedzi, 2003). Reviews of CAMPFIRE have often been critical on exactly this point, claiming that a lack of proprietorship rights for communities, and the lack of devolution to institutions at the village level results in income handouts rather than local management (Murphree, 1996; Murombedzi, 2003). Similarly, studies of community conservation projects in Tanzania have concluded that they fail to create empowered community managers and frequently result in handouts to local communities, who are passive recipients in a government project (Songorwa et al., 2000;
19 Brockington, 2002). An assessment of CBNRM initiatives therefore needs to carefully consider the ways in which power is devolved to local communities, the management rights they hold and the decision-making processes that take place at the local level. Such an analysis can usefully draw on the analysis of different ‘bundles of rights6’ associated with communally managed resources outlined by Agrawal & Ostrom (2001):
• Withdrawal rights that provide right of entry and attainment of resources or products
• Management rights that are characterised by the ability to regulate use of natural resources and to make decisions to transform the resources and make improvements
• Exclusion rights that allow the rights-holders to decide and implement a system of rules and eligibility for access and use of natural resources
• Alienation rights that refer to the rights to sell or lease resources or the rights to manage those resources (Campbell, 2007).
Rights of exclusion, associated with proprietorship of land is advocated as the minimum requirement for successful community management (see also 1.3; Charnley and Poe, 2007).
The transfer of authority to community organisations is clearly a sensitive matter. Just as the annexation of land and natural resources by the state has been described as an essential part of state-making (Ferguson, 1990; Neumann, 2001; Crook, 2003; Neumann, 2004b), states are often reluctant to relinquish control over these resources, and may curb devolution wherever possible (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). This reluctance is evident in Nepal, where two distinct types of community forestry have developed (Thoms, 2008). In areas where the value of forestry resources is low, the devolution of power to local communities has been celebrated as full and meaningful, whereas more valuable timber resources in the highlands remain under state ownership and control with compensation and alternative livelihood provisions for communities instead of devolved management (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).
The unwillingness of states to devolve power appears strongly linked to the political and economic value of the resources in question, therefore. Several examples of devolved natural resource management have indicated that recentralisation can actually take place within a programme of decentralisation or devolution (e.g. Pulhin and Dressler, 2009).
‘Recentralising whilst decentralising’ is a process of the extension of state control which occurs through the restriction of power that is devolved to the local level, or through the devolution of power to local level institutions that serve the interests of the central authorities
6 Categories of property rights and operational use rights. See Appendix 1
20 (Olowu, 1999; Schafer and Bell, 2002; Ribot et al., 2006). This may take place through the procedures that communities are required to complete in order to receive state approval of their rights to manage natural resources, for example through compulsory attendance of approved training schemes, and a lack of recognition of other forms of knowledge (Goldman, 2003). The resulting form of CBNRM is one where the local community is restricted to the role of beneficiaries within a discourse of empowerment (Goldman, 2003).
The second assumption that I wish to address is that of local support. This is often assumed to be both critical to the success of CBNRM, and to be created through the construction of appropriate incentive structures to prioritise sustainable management of natural resources.
However, Gibson & Marks (1995) argue that local support, seen as crucial to successful community conservation, is not necessarily created in this way. Instead they highlight the importance of different meanings of resources and conservation in different contexts and for communities, and point to community power issues as crucial to understanding local attitudes towards conservation, and the outcomes of projects. Similarly, in Songorwa et al.’s (2000) study in Tanzania they argue that local support for community wildlife management initiatives cannot be assumed, and that the nature of wildlife resources and the way they are perceived within local communities may make them inherently incompatible with rural development strategies.
CBNRM is being implemented in a reality in which the support of the state to devolve power, but also the willingness of the community to adopt the ideology of CBNRM and responsibilities it involves, must not be assumed. Empowerment of local communities to manage resources as envisaged by advocates of CBNRM necessarily involves a large risk that such communities choose to manage those resources in a way that is not in line with state priorities and models, and potentially not in line with conservation objectives (Redford and Sanderson, 2000). Murombedzi’s (2001) analysis of CAMPFIRE revenues showed disparities in the priorities of central authorities, conservation organisations and local communities, with communities preferring to use funds they accumulated for development opportunities, rather than investing in wildlife management. Empowering the community to set their own agenda and make their own management decisions is seen as a crucial component of meaningful power devolution, and local autonomy is critical to the construction of natural resource management systems that are adapted and appropriate to the local context (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). However, the risks involved with devolution has