The world has changed around China’s no-first-use policy. This policy was technologically sound into the late 1990s. However, the advent of two weapons advancements in particular - precision weapons and missile defense - make this policy outdated and unable to provide for adequate Chinese protection. From a political point of view, the no-first-use policy is a source of pride and positive press for the Communist Party. General Pan explains the problem from a different angle, “For one thing, from an operational point of view, China’s no-first-use pledge seems to have greatly bound its hands to maintain flexibility in seeking the optimum options.”163 As it stands now, no
options are available to Beijing until it is able to engage and overcome 1) precision weapons and 2) missile defense.
Precision weapons may one day make nuclear weapons obsolete. The ability to launch a precision weapon against a moving target may provide enough deterrence to make the collateral damage inherent to nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits. David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director, China Policy Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, explains how precision weapons are changing the way Beijing is preparing for future conflict:
The opening days of the Gulf War convinced PLA analysts that they were witnessing a revolution in military affairs…the allied naval armada sat comfortably offshore in the Persian Gulf, well outside the range of Iraqi
defenses, launching wave after wave of air strikes and cruise missile attacks. The surgical bombing substantially degraded Iraqi air defenses.164
Precision weapon attacks against China’s nuclear forces have to be a cause of great concern for Beijing. Currently, mobile nuclear missiles may still have an advantage over precision strikes, maintaining the ability for a quick launch after a short setup. However, as the technology behind western precision missile continues to evolve and the efficiency in missile employment rises, mobile missiles will become more vulnerable.165 Some
analysts, including Shen Dingli, deputy director and professor, Center of American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, question the validity of the no-first-use deterrence policy when faced with precision weapons.
If China’s conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, rather than use them as true means of deterrence.166
Regardless of Beijing’s actual response when they are nearly defeated or faced with a step toward Taiwan independence, China must consider the effect precision weapons will have on their ability to launch nuclear counterattacks. This launch ability is a step progress that can be attacked at separate critical junctions. Precision weapons are able to target nuclear weapon systems, communications grids, as well as decision makers. These weapons may make even a well-hidden SSBN useless, leaving them without launch command and control. Regardless, as it now stands, if conventional precision attacks are made against China’s nuclear weapons and their control, China, cannot respond with nuclear weapons and remain true to a literal reading of the no-first-use policy.
164 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2004), 1.
165 It is important to note that the Chinese have very limited experience launching nuclear weapons.
On the contrary, in the last decade the United States has made great use of precision weapons in the Persian Gulf, making their operators and tactics battle tested, greatly increasing their effectiveness and efficiency.
166 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), 13.
Missile defense is another recent western advancement that threatens the no-first- use policy credibility. While precision weapons threaten nuclear weapons prior to their launch, missile defense attacks nuclear weapons after launch. Although they loudly oppose it, Beijing has no tactical answers for missile defense.167 As discussed in
Chapters I and II, missile defense systems are driving China to acquire the Type 094. General Pan explains this phenomenon in larger terms:
Given the deployment of missile defense systems, China should perhaps realize that the present minimum nuclear arsenal is inadequate to meeting the new challenges, and therefore should greatly expand its nuclear force to the extent that it can be actually used in different scenarios.168
Beijing can meet the challenges posed by missile defense system in two ways. They can expand their nuclear forces (the development of the Type 094 fits this argument), and they can change their no-first-use policy to better utilize their existing nuclear forces. With a missile defense force in use, if China has any nuclear weapons in operation after initial precision attacks, the response force will likely be destroyed.169
Overall, the no-first-use policy does not match the threats posed to China’s 2nd Artillery. China’s nuclear forces lack the ability to overcome precision weapons or missile defense. Upgrading to an undersea platform may revive the no-first-use policies credibility; however, this argument is limited. Precision weapons, targeting the Chinese communication infrastructure, may prevent the Type 094 from receiving launch commands, negating its deterrence.170 This has led many to believe that China may
update their no-first-use policy. According to Mulvenon and Finklestein, “Following the release of the 2000 National Defense White Paper, some Chinese privately indicated that during the drafting process there were internal discussions about whether to
167 There limited discussion of MIRV and dummy technology in U.S. and Chinese press. However
these tactics are meant to overwhelm missile defense structures, not defeat them. It is unclear how effective China would be against multiple missile defense batteries.
168 Pan.
169 Except for the Type 094, which may be able to launch weapons close to their targets, limiting the
time available for missile defense systems to engage. Chapter 2 examines ability in terms of the survivability of the Type 094 in an operating environment dominated by western submarines.
170 If the Chinese decide to launch a nuclear attack as the result of communication failure, it will
conditionalize China’s NFU commitment.”171 A published change to the no-first-use is
not likely to occur anytime in the near future. However, behind closed doors, there must be a heated discussion occurring on how China can change their policies to match current technology.