Especificación de las clases

Some others, having come across certain words such as

“existence” (wujud), “non-existence”(adam), “temporality” (huduth) and

“pre-eternity”(qidam) and so on in Nahjul-Balagha, have been led to assume that these terms entered the Muslim intellectual world under the influence of the Greek philosophy and were inserted, intentionally or unintentionally, into the discourses of Ali (x). Had those who advocate

this view gone deeper into the meanings of these words, they would not have heeded such a hypothesis. The method and approach adopted in the arguments of Nahjul-Balagha are completely different from these of the philosophers who lived before Sayyid al- Radi or during his time, or even those born many centuries after the compilation of Nahjul-Balagha.

Presently, we shall not discuss the metaphysics of the Greek or of the Alexandrians (the neo-Platonic) philosophy but shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical views propounded by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Undoubtedly, Muslim philosophers introduced new challenges into philosophy under the influence of Islamic teachings which had not existed before, and in addition to them, introducing radically original ways of demonstration and inference to explain and argue their points with regard to some other problems. Nevertheless, what we learn from Nahjul-Balagha is obviously different from this approach. My teacher, allama Tabataba`i, in the preface to his discourse on the traditions of Islamic scholarship, writes the following: “These statements help resolve a number of problems of theological philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not acquainted with these notions, and they were incomprehensible to the Arabs, basically there is no trace of them in the writings and statements of pre-Islamic philosophers whose books were translated into Arabic and, similarly, they do not appear in the works of Muslim philosophers, Arab or Persian. These problems remained obscure and unintelligible, and every commentator discussed them according to his own conjecture until the eleventh century of the Hijra (17th century A.D.). Only then were they properly understood for the first time, that is, the problem of the True Unity (al-wahda al-haqqa) of the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud) (a non-numerical unity); the problem that the proof of the existence of the Necessary Being is identical with the proof of His Unity (since the Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, His Being implies His Unity);

the problem that the Necessary Existent is the One known-in-His-Essence (ma`lum bil dhat); the Necessary Being is known directly without the need of an intermediary, and that the reality of everything else is known through the Necessary Being, not vice versa.”³⁷

The arguments of early Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, such as the discussions on the Divine Essence and Attributes like Unity, Simplicity (basata),

Self-around the conception of the necessity of existence (wujub al-wujud), from which all of them are derived, and the necessity of existence itself is indirectly deduced. In this fashion, it is demonstrated that the existence of all possible existent beings (mumkinat) cannot be explained without assuming the existence of the Necessary Being. Although the argument used for proving the truth of this argument cannot be called a demonstration of the impossible (burhan khulf), in view of its indirect mode of inference, it resembles burhan khulf and, hence, it fails to provide a completely satisfactory demonstration, for it does not explain the necessity of the existence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina, in his

Al-‘Isharat, claims that he has succeeded in discovering the “Why?” (lima) of it and, hence, chooses to call his argument Aburhan al-siddiqin (burhan limmi, i.e. causal proof). However, the latter philosophers considered his exposition of “the Why?”(lima) as insufficient.

In Nahjul-Balagha, the necessity of existence is never used to explain the existence of possible beings (mumkinat). That on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of the necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and the pure being of the Divine Essence.

Allama Tabataba’i, in the above-mentioned work, while explaining one hadith by Ali (x), found in Al-Tawhid of Shaikh al-Saduq, says the following: “The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that the Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever. Because Allah, the Most Exalted, is the Absolute Reality from Whom the existence of all other beings is derived within the ontological limits and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and their existence depends on that of this Absolute Being.”³⁸

In Nahjul-Balagha, the very basis of all discussions revolving on the Divine Essence rests on the status that Allah is the Absolute and Infinite Being Who transcends all limits and finitude. No point of space time, or anything at all is devoid of Him. He is with everything, in everything, yet nothing is with Him or in Him. Since He is the Absolute and the Infinite, He transcends time, number, limit and proximity (all kinds of quiddities). That is, time and space, number and limit are applicable to a lower stage, i.e. The stage of the Divine actions and of creation. Everything is from Him and returns to Him. He is the First of the

38Ibid. p. 126.

first and the Last of the last. He precedes everything and succeeds everything.

This is the idea that forms the axis of all discourses of Nahjul-Balagha and of which there is no trace in the works of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.

As pointed out by allama Tabatabai, these profound discussions of theology proper (ilahiyyat bil-mana al-akhass) are based on a series of inter-related problems which have been posited in metaphysics (al-umur al-ammah).³⁹ An elaborate discussion of those theological problems and their relevant issues mentioned above is outside the scope of our present discussion.

There are two reasons for rejecting the claims that the theological discussions of Nahjul-Balagha were inventions of later writers familiar with philosophical notions. Firstly, the kind of problems discussed in Nahjul-Balagha were not at all raised by any philosopher till the time of Sayyid ar-Radi, compiler of Nahjul-Balagha. That the Unity of the Necessary Being is not of the numerical kind and that the Divine Essence precedes number, that the existence of the Necessary Being implies Its Unity; the simple reality of the Necessary Being; His immanence and other such notions were not known to philosophy during or before Sayyid ar-Radis times. Secondly, the axes of arguments presented in this book are altogether different from the axes of philosophical discussions which have been prevalent throughout history until the present day.