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One of the primary goals of the Pilot Test was to evaluate the data collection instruments and methodology prior to the initiation of a larger scale study.

5.5.1 Crash Data Collection

The crash investigation portion of the Pilot Study successfully collected data and pro­ vided an opportunity to evaluate both the instruments that were developed and the study protocol.

The selection of crash investigators was an asset. Each of the three newly hired crash in­ vestigators had long-term motorcycle riding experience. This experience rendered them very familiar with the mechanical design of motorcycles and with the dynamics of riding. The basic knowledge of these investigators enhanced their ability to grasp what would be challenging information to quickly learn for a non-rider. The investigators also had some crash investigation-type experience such as former police work or as an insurance adjus­ ter. Again, this was helpful, although the research perspective had to be emphasized ra­ ther than the investigators’ attempting to assess culpability as they had previously been trained for prior employment.

Basic data collection techniques long used in NASS were adapted for the Pilot Study. These time-tested techniques allowed for the efficient collection and recording of data and were in concert with the structure of the data collection forms, e.g., all interview questions for a motorcycle rider were on a specific form, while all questions for a motor­ cycle passenger were on a separate form. Systematic approaches to the inspection and documentation of vehicle and scene data were used successfully.

The team found it difficult to respond to crashes “on-scene” or while the involved ve­ hicles were at their final rest positions and rescue efforts were ongoing. This difficulty could be attributed to several causes: (1) less than prompt notification by police dispatch­ ers, (2) police concerted efforts to quickly clear the scene and restore traffic flow, and (3) incorrect information provided to dispatchers as to the scene location. Although oppor­ tunities to obtain breath tests for BAC were lost when the team arrived after the crash scene had been cleared, there was little or no loss of environmental data. Police photo­ graphs and scene measurements, engineering data, and satellite photographs were used to augment information collected by the investigators at the scene.

Attempts were made to conduct interviews in-person. However, telephone interviews were obtained for most cases. This was the preference of the motorcycle riders and was honored by the team.

Some attempts to inspect motorcycles that were located in certain tow yards proved to be challenging. The tow yard operators often wanted the owner of the motorcycle to be present during the vehicle inspection. Also, some police agencies simply placed a hold on motorcycles rather than formally impounding them pending trial. If the bikes had been impounded, only police permission would have been needed to secure a vehicle inspec­ tion. When motorcycles were being held, the owners were still responsible for the ve­ hicle. The team believes that continued interaction with many of the tow agencies and salvage yards will help to overcome these difficulties because the tow yard operators will have a better understanding of the inspection process. Also, letters of introduction from the local police agencies to the tow yard operators could help circumvent problems with the team gaining access, since tow yards operate under contract to the police agencies. The Pilot Study data collection forms included 1,689 data elements. Of these, only two were coded as “unknown” more than 50% of the time. These were the blood alcohol level for Other Vehicle drivers (BAC tests were not administered by the police) and the condi­

tion of the Rear Swing Arm Pivot Bearing (motorcycles must be dismantled in order to evaluate this bearing). Thus, the Pilot Study was able to demonstrate that virtually all data elements could be completed using the field data collection protocol adopted for the study.

There were a number of data elements where (98) Other, Specify was used with some frequency. These “other” attributes should be examined for inclusion as coded attributes in the future. For example, nearly 20% of the riders were wearing some sort of armor as motorcycle safety gear. This should be considered as a new attribute under clothing type. The number of times “Not Applicable” was coded seemed appropriate for the data ele­ ments. There were no fires, no work zone crashes, no pedestrian involvement, and none of the motorcycles were equipped with ABS, so these received a code of (97) Not Appli­ cable in every case. Also, when a data element allowed for multiple answers (such as having more than one operator’s license or more than 1 year in which safety training was taken), code (97) was often used for the second and succeeding responses.

The question of whether all data elements should be included in a subsequent study should also be examined. It is difficult to imagine the analysis plan for some of the data elements retained from the OECD protocol. Although such information can be collected, there is a cost associated with having a data element on a data form, in a coding manual, in a database, included in training, gathered, and subject to QC review. The cost per case is driven by the amount of information required. Suggestions for the revision of data ele­ ments and the coding manual are included in Section 6.1.

Although included in the OECD methodology, helmet testing was not included in the Pi­ lot Study. It was determined that the testing method was non-controversial, and so this module was eliminated in order to reduce costs. It is expected that helmet testing, using the information from the OECD forms, will be included in a subsequent study.

5.5.2 Control Data Collection

Although the investigation protocol called for control data to be collected immediately following the initial crash response, or 1 week post-crash at the same time of day and same day of week, this generally proved to be impractical. In order for a crash to be re­ tained as an active case, it was necessary to locate and inspect the subject vehicle. If the motorcycle was not at the scene (which often was the case), the investigator had to obtain a copy of the PAR, locate the motorcycle, secure the owner’s permission, obtain the tow yard permission, secure police permission, or any combination depending upon the loca­ tion and impoundment status of the vehicle. From a management perspective, a control stop should not be conducted until the crash becomes an active case, so there may be long gaps between the crash date and the control date.

The reasons for delays in collecting control data according to a prescribed schedule also include the need to respond immediately to new cases and the demands of collecting field and interview data when they become available. Crashes do not occur according to a schedule; thus an investigator who may have planned to collect control data on a Tuesday

at 2 p.m. may have been notified of yet another crash or an interviewee had returned his call and was ready to provide an interview and vehicle inspection right away.

There are four possible control stop outcomes: (1) an in-person stop is secured, (2) a digi­ tal image/stop is made, (3) no motorcycles pass the control stop location, and (4) a no- control decision is made. A no-control decision might include no reasonable location could be found or, as was the case in one investigation, the crash occurred off-road and there would be no motorcycle traffic. In those cases where no control data were obtained, the first variable on the Control Motorcycle Mechanical Form was completed, and the Control Rider Form was not submitted.

There are two additional control data issues. The first is that there were quite a few free­ way crashes in the Pilot Study. For those, the team located an off-ramp that was down­ stream from the crash site and found a safe location to set up for the stop. This approach reduced the potential number of controls to just those who happened to take a particular exit, but was the most reasonable approach from a safety perspective. For cases that oc­ curred on surface streets, the process seemed to work much better. We believe the gas card incentive can still be effective. However, if the control stops were conducted by someone specifically hired and trained to do control data collection rather than full inves­ tigations, it would eliminate the time conflicts and allow for more consistent planning and scheduling.