A. INTRODUCTION
Singapore, the second submarine operator in Southeast Asia, is an interesting case study for undersea proliferation. Singapore’s small size makes it curious that in the new millennium it procured a total of seven submarines from Sweden and two from Germany—acquiring more hulls than its much larger neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, combined.92 Although Singapore negotiated for and took delivery of its first submarine well after the end of the Cold War, its defense psychology and patterns of military spending prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union provide clarity into its submarine purchases
B. BACKGROUND/COLD WAR ERA
According to a Ministry of Defense publication, the first exploration of submarines was modest at best: “Singapore embarked on its submarine journey when eight RSN officers were sent to Eckernforde in Germany for a three week course in the late 80s.”93 Yet, the training failed to lead to any negotiations during the Cold War. The lack of submarine-seeking behavior by Singapore during the Cold War, save sending a handful of officers to Germany, is likely a result of multilateral security guarantees and the subordination of the RSN to the air force and army, both in its role and in the defense budget. Despite these constraints to submarine purchases, the defense environment established during the Cold War enabled the military to explore, and eventually purchase, submarines as part of the RSN fleet in later years.
First, like its neighbor, Malaysia, Singapore was party to the implicit security guarantees afforded by the 1971 FPDA, which allowed the state to spend its military
92 Massimo Annati, “Asian Submarine Forces Taking Shape,” Military Technology, no. 5 (2009): 30;
“Singapore Buys Two New Submarines,” Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, December 2, 2013,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1463080791?accountid=12702.
93 “Backpaddle,” Navy News, no. 3 (2009): 13,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/navynews/2009/_jcr_content /imindefPars/0127/file.res/Navy3.pdf.
budget on other assets, namely for the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). The FPDA provided a multilateral forum, including the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand as the other parties, for a political-military dialogue in the event that Singapore or Malaysia faced an external threat.94 The FPDA did not guarantee that the other parties would intervene militarily on behalf of Singapore, however, the involvement of major powers ensured that they would be consulted and engaged in the event of crisis and prevented submarines from gaining prominence as a necessary defense asset for the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). According to one analyst, the FPDA’s significance in this regard was that “the FPDA was an important construct and confidence building measure for the continued involvement of Commonwealth forces.”95
Second, aside from multilateral engagement, the FPDA created the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) as part of the agreement, which provided for an Australian presence in Singaporean and Malaysian airspace under the command of an Australian Air Force officer stationed in Butterworth, Malaysia.96 Under the agreement, member states would contribute personnel and assets for general air defense, although not explicitly to defend Singapore, which likely contributed to Singaporean defense planners’ decision to invest heavily in the RSAF as part of the agreement. Undeniably, Singapore boasted the most capable air force within ASEAN in the span of a decade after IADS came into force—with more aircraft than Malaysia and Indonesia combined—and showed no signs of slowing investment in the RSAF.97 Thus, the necessity of the RSAF and the spending required to increase its capacity left the RSN as a secondary defense service and its meager budget left little room to entertain submarines as a possibility.98
94 Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements,” 1–5; Philip Bowring and Patrick Smith, “Cooperation is the New Name of the Game,” Far Eastern Economic Review (January 13, 1983): 31.
95 Johan Saravanamuttu, “Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defense Arrangements,” in
Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty, ed. Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2011), 36–37.
96 Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements,” 5–6.
97 Bowring and Smith, “Cooperation is the New Name of the Game,” 31–2. 98 Goldrick and McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia, Kindle edition, chap. 8.
The security situation of Singapore during the Cold War, however, was delicate because its former security guarantor, Great Britain, retreated from the region and was replaced with a loose guarantee of security built on engagement. Yet, the emergence of the RSAF reflected the state’s commitment to defense that is significant for later naval developments and shaped its defensive philosophy—the poisonous shrimp. Accordingly, the poisonous shrimp mindset required that “Singapore’s forces should be sufficiently powerful to deter any regional power from trying to eliminate Singapore, simply by making the price too high.”99 The sentiment was echoed by former Minister for Defense Yeo Ning Hong: “we are going to make absolutely sure that anybody who attempts to swallow us is going to get a fishbone that will perforate their throats.”100 In short, Singapore was committed to building its own military and would avoid relying completely on its partners for defense, and the result was clear: by the end of the Cold War, Singapore was estimated to have allocated 6 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense—almost double that of most NATO members.101 The poisonous shrimp would become deadlier after the Cold War ended.
C. POST–COLD WAR ERA
Singapore’s failure to acquire submarines prior to 1991 was accompanied by statements from defense officials and spending during the era that predicted that submarines would likely be pursued in the future to promote seaward defense hundreds, or even thousands, of miles from Singapore’s coast because “if the enemy has reached the causeway it’s too late.”102 In light of the realization in the 1980s that a coastal defense force was insufficient, the RSN decided to expand its reach in the post–Cold War period with assets that could perform missions farther from the Singaporean coastline and immediate sea lanes. In 1997, then-Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Richard Lim explained the new environment the RSN found itself in: “the end of the Cold War has
99 Bowring and Smith, “Cooperation is the New Name of the Game,” 30. 100 Ibid.
101 “The Shrimp With Teeth,” Economist (January 12, 1991): 29.
102 Quoted in Bowring and Smith, “Cooperation is the New Name of the Game,” 30; Edmond Dantes, “Naval Build-Up to Continue Unabated-Part II,” Asian Defence Journal, no. 5 (1992): 54.
given rise to a new strategic situation…that is beyond our control; so we do not, we cannot, simply wring our hands and hope—we have to go out there and grab it by the horns.”103 Admiral Lim was speaking roughly two years after Singapore signed its first submarine deal with Sweden, and reflected the Singaporean position that it must continuously find ways to improve its security via the military and make the poisonous shrimp philosophy relevant in a more uncertain environment.
In the early 1990s, Singapore again sent naval officers to Germany for training, but this time also entertained offers for submarines from Australia, Germany, and Sweden.104 By the summer of 1993, Australia appeared to be in the lead to sell Singapore its Collins-class, Type 471 submarines built by the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC); however, Swedish submarine builder, Kockums, which owned the majority stake in the ASC, blocked the move on the grounds that the ASC had negotiated without the consent of the Swedish government.105 In 1995, Singapore publicly expressed that it wanted submarines for research purposes and considered a German proposal for a submarine-training program and possibly second-hand hulls, coming close to a deal for four submarines.106 Responding to July 1995 reports that a German deal was imminent, Minister for Defense Dr. Lee Boon Yang argued, “it’s still quite a long time off.”107 Lee’s statement was accurate in that the German deal never materialized; however, his
103 Quoted in “In Pursuit of Excellence—An Interview with the Chief of Navy,” Special Issue, Naval
Forces, no. 2 (1997): 4.
104 “S’pore Navy Studying Need for Submarines,” Straits Times (Singapore), June 1, 1995, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJD-PDC0–0058- X0TK&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
105 Tim Satchell and Sheryl-Lee Kerr, “Sweden Key to Submarine Sales to Asia,” Advertiser, June 25, 1993, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4B41–9Y70–01S8– 84G7&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true; Martin Daly, “Swedes May Scuttle Sub Sales to Asia,” Age (Australia), June 25, 1993, late edition, LexisNexis Academic, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4P7G-Y270-TXN5- S2FT&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
106 “S’pore Navy Studying Need for Submarines”; Tan Yong Meng, “Purchase of Submarines a Long Way Off: Boon Yang,” Straits Times (Singapore), July 26, 1995, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJD-PB60–0058- X2SN&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
timeline was a bit off and scarcely two months later his successor as Minister for Defense announced that Singapore agreed to terms of a submarine deal with Sweden.108
In September 1995, Singaporean minister for defense Dr. Tony Tan formally outlined the submarine deal with Kockums that included training for approximately 40 Singaporean sailors in Sweden and a second-hand Sjöormen-class submarine to be used in the training process.109 Singapore touted the deal as exploratory and undertaken with the express purpose of “learn[ing] more about submarine operations and how they add to the capabilities of the RSN’s fleet.”110 Less than two years later, and after the success of its training efforts in Sweden, Singapore purchased three more of the Sjöormen submarines as an “opportunity buy” according to Tan, later classifying the submarines as the Challenger-class in the RSN.111 A fifth hull was also procured for spare parts.112
The RSN has since made two submarine deals to replace its Challenger hulls and agreed to terms for two second-hand Västergötland-class boats from Sweden in 2005— later renamed the Archer-class—and two new-build Type 218SG submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Germany in 2013.113 The four newest boats were equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), which allows the submarines to stay submerged for prolonged periods of time and thus increase the range and sustainability of the platforms.114 In less than twenty years, Singapore managed to
108 Raoul Le Blond, “S’pore to Buy Second-Hand Submarine,” Straits Times (Singapore), September 24, 1995, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJD-P7V0–0058- X4B3&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
109 Le Blond, “S’pore to Buy Second-Hand Submarine”; “Big Task for Small Sub,” Straits Times
(Singapore), September 24, 1995, LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJD-P7V0–0058- X4B2&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
110 Quoted in Le Blond, “S’pore to Buy Second-Hand Submarine.” 111 Ibid.; “Singapore Submarine Capabilities.”
112 Annati, “Asian Submarine Forces Taking Shape,” 30.
113 Ibid.; “Singapore Submarine Capabilities”; “Singapore Buys Two New Submarines”; Jon Grevatt, “Briefing: Island intent,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 21, 2014),
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++ +1598908&Pubabbrev=JDW.
114 “Singapore Buys Two New Submarines”; Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 56.
purchase a total of nine submarines after the RSN had never submerged a submarine of its own.
Motivations during each stage of submarine acquisitions have evolved from an exploratory study into the development a capable fleet with an advanced propulsion plant and combat systems suite that could hardly be deemed experimental. Beginning in 1995, the rationale for entertaining the purchase of or training on submarines was presented as benign and straightforward by then-Minister for Defense Lee: “submarine warfare is something that is so new to the RSN that we won’t even know where to begin in terms of specifying or identifying what submarine is suitable for us.”115 Two months after Lee’s statement, his successor, Tan clarified that if submarines were integrated into the RSN down the line then it would be to balance the force to better respond to a variety of roles—which could include deterrence and enforcement of its critical waterways.116 Echoing Tan’s statement, RSN Head of Naval Plans Colonel Simon Ong stated in 1997 “the RSN is evaluating the possibility of developing a submarine capability in the long term, as part of our efforts to build a navy with all-round capabilities.”117 Taking these statements together, it is difficult to determine the rationale for the purchase of Singapore’s first hulls—the Challenger-class—and the purchase added an undersea element that was previously absent. Submarines are a deterrent when they are known or suspected to be lurking but could also be an enforcement platform in Singapore’s case because of the proximity and significance of its waterways. Lee, when discussing the purchase of the Challenger hulls, added: “the economy is doing well and it is a cheap sub [and] its purchase will still be within the 5 per cent of GDP assigned to defense; so why not use it for some training?”118 The purchase and maintenance of a submarine—or four—even for training, is quite an expensive training aid. Nevertheless, Singaporean defense planners decided that the cost was worthwhile.
115 Quoted in Meng, “Submarines a Long Way Off.” 116 Le Blond, “S’pore to Buy Second-Hand Submarine.”
117 Quoted in “Building Tomorrow’s Navy – an Interview with Head of Naval Plans,” Special Issue 2/97, Naval Forces 18, no. 2 (1997): 20.
118 “Why S’pore Bought Submarines,” Straits Times (Singapore), October 11, 1995, LexisNexis Academic, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJD- P730–0058-X37C&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
The RSN evolved into what Singapore deemed its 3G Navy, whereby the RSN modernized and added hardware to its fleet to cover the spectrum of missions that Singapore required of its military. Speaking on the RSN and submarines in 2009, Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Chew Men Leong explained that “the RSN is currently in the midst of realizing its capabilities as the [3G] navy” and that submarines, in this context, “have enabled the RSN to build a Navy with balanced capabilities, particularly in the underwater dimension.”119 When asked why AIP, a significant advancement from traditional diesel-electric submarines, was necessary for the Archer-class submarines, Admiral Chew deflected the question and spoke more generally about adding more advanced hulls: “When integrated into the RSN, they will form the sharp edge of our strike capability and strengthen our deterrent edge.”120 Thus, it can be argued that the purchase of AIP submarines, specifically the Archer-class and the latest German Type
218SG hulls, are intended primarily as deterrence platforms when considering the stealth
and endurance capabilities of AIP and Admiral Chew’s statements.
D. CONCLUSION
The purchase of AIP submarines, and submarines more generally, best fit into the category of deterrence purchases for Singapore. The Cold War geopolitical position eased after the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the rise of other state and non-state threats in its place supports Singapore’s poisonous shrimp deterrence philosophy of yesteryear that arguably continued into the new millennium, packaged as building a 3G Navy that can both deter enemies and combat disruptions to commerce. Using either name, the bottom line is that the strategic vulnerability of Singapore has not changed over time—the borders are still the same, its neighbors still large, and its geographical significance has only increased since independence in 1965. Indeed, Singapore still needs to be a poisonous shrimp, and the deterrence that a robust submarine fleet provides may very well be the fishbone to an enemy’s throat that Minister for Defense Yeo described.
119 Quoted in “The Republic of Singapore Navy: Interview With Rear-Admiral Chew Men Leong, Chief of the RSN,” Military Technology, no. 5 (2009): 27–28.