Espectroscopia fotoelectrónica de rayos X (XPS)

There are several competing models under which a family may operate when engaging in household decision making. Each has its own characteristics as well as policy implications for targeted cash transfer programs or other social

interventions. The games, which shall later be described in detail, test two main hypotheses relating to intrahousehold behavior as highlighted in these mod- els. The first experiment is a trust game testing Pareto optimality adapted from Iversen et. al. (2009). The second makes use of a Becker–deGroot–Marschak mechanism to examine if valuations for a child development toy change when the owner of the income changes. Using the results of these two games, in addi- tion to being able to classify some individual families, we can determine under which model a representative family may function and use this understand- ing as a basis for policy suggestions. I first discuss the alternative models and then explain the characteristics the games exploit to identify under which model the families operate, covering the general concepts and intuitive results of each model. I limit the discussion to one parent, since Brazil tends to be matriarchal: 31% of Brazilian families are headed by single women, and in my sample this figure is almost double (IBGE 2006).

Since we are dealing with parents and children, it is safe to assume that at one point in time the parent was making the decisions for the family. The uni- tary model holds if the parent remains in this dictatorial role now that the teen is grown, or if teen and parent are in such agreement that preferences are in consensus. Since consumption decisions are made with only one utility func- tion, Pareto efficiency is a characteristic of this family. When considering op- portunities to increase family income in the parent-child context, the Rotten Kid theorem explains how a Pareto optimal outcome could arise. Even though a child is self-interested, since the parent is making final decisions regarding in- come distribution for the household the child still finds it in his best interests to maximize total family income.2 _{This also implies that no matter who is earn-}

2_{Bergstrom finds a class of utility functions for which this does not hold and the child would} not maximize income. Without transferrable utility, a child can manipulate the utility possibil-

ing income within the family, consumption decisions remain constant, aligning with the dictator’s preferences. Given constant total income, there will be no reward for a family member who earns more than the others; likewise if the dictator suddenly earns less and the others more, all will still consume exactly as before. With regard to policy, a targeted cash transfer would have no impact in a family operating under the unitary model. To summarize, Pareto efficiency and constant consumption decisions across different income patterns will be the expected observed behavior for the unitary model.

If a family operates under a bargaining model, negotiation between mem- bers allows them to arrive at consumption decisions. The literature on husbands and wives suggest that most households bargain,3 _{and there is even some evi-}

dence that children and parents also engage in bargaining. Iversen reports that some adolescent boys in India pressure their parents to allow them to migrate (2002). Berry finds varying results in child reading outcomes when an incen- tive is directed toward a parent or a child (2009). The source of power in these negotiations has been a subject of much discussion (see Agarawal, 1997), but for economic purposes I focus on income, as I am examining this topic in light of a targeted cash transfer. When a family member has more income she has more say over how to spend it. Thus when the distribution of income is altered through a transfer, the recipient spends more on herself, disproportionate as to how prior income was used. This experimental outcome is predicted for both types of bargaining models as long as income is a determinant of bargaining power.

Bargaining models can be categorized based on efficiency. By definition, ities frontier in his favor. However, I do not include these with my definition of the unitary model, as the result falls well outside of the spirit of being “unitary.” (1989)

households are collective (cooperative) if efficiency is realized4 _{(Bourguignon,}

Browning, and Chiappori, 2009). Non-cooperative families still hold potential for an increase in utility without making anyone any worse off. In household analysis of married couples, Lundberg and Pollack (1993) and Carter and Katz (1997) suggest that inefficiency results when two individuals operate in sep- arate spheres: with the division of labor between men’s work and women’s work, some gains from comparative advantages are missed. Udry has found evidence against Pareto Optimality for farming couples in Uganda, again based on divisions of men’s crops and women’s crops (1996). Experimentally, Iversen also rejects cooperation to a certain degree in that surplus maximization is not always realized when couples in Uganda play a dictator game (2009). Yet these analyses are about relationships between different genders. We may find that women are more cooperative regarding childcare in the family. If Pareto opti- mality is found not to hold, some social work encouraging cooperation may be the appropriate policy response due to the concern that transfer money is not used efficiently.

The predictions of the models with the experiments are summarized in the quadrants below:

Trust Game

Outcomes P. Efficiency P. Inefficiency

Book Bargaining Collective Non-Coop.

Game No Bargaining Unitary Unexpected

4_{Basu (2006) has shown that inter-temporarily this is not necessarily true: if earned income is} a factor of bargaining power, one member may limit earnings of another so as not to lose future power. Yet again, this behavior is hardly in the spirit of “cooperative” so I shall not consider it to be so in this definition.

Classic intrahousehold analysis rejects the unitary model if the consumption of private goods change when exogenous private income changes (Browning et al 1994). To confirm that the family maintains Pareto efficiency, a more com- plicated test checks that ratios of the marginal propensities to consume a good with respect to the income of both spouses, at a constant family income, are the same across goods (Bourguignon et al 1993). Only recently has methodol- ogy developed to include simpler test of Pareto optimality, and even then these techniques are feasible only when two distribution factors (power variables in- fluencing how decisions are made) are observed (Bourginion, Browning, and Chiappori, 2009). Unfortunately not every data set of consumption goods and income will be appropriate for these techniques. Typical categories of private goods are men and women’s clothing. Yet because my population of interest is women, we cannot discern between clothing use when this category is consid- ered. I confirm that many families indeed share clothes, likely out of necessity, indicating that poverty may confound supposed observations of private goods. Furthermore, it is difficult to make a case that income is exogenous unless it comes from an external shock and there is an absence of selection bias. Finally, distribution factors are likewise not necessarily exogenous; my theoretical work illustrates how a parent’s choices when the child is young may influence the future bargaining power of a child (Reynolds, 2010). Yet since the principle be- hind the empirical technique that rejects the unitary model is an inspiration for experimental design, I continue the discussion as a reference for contrasts and similarities to my experimental methodology.

vey data on individually consumable goods and determine if a constant propor- tion of income is spent on a good no matter who earns the income (implying the unitary model), or if the proportion of income spent on a good fluctuates with respect to who is bringing in more wealth to the family (implying the collective model, or a non-cooperative model) (Browning et al 1994). It is this principle which is the motivation for the experiment which tests a change in consumptive behavior arising from a change in income. While the experiment is a contrived scenario, it is designed to parallel this standard statistical analysis.

The challenge for the researcher is establishing the exogeneity of the earn- ings. While one family member may be earning more, this may be the result of bargaining itself: perhaps one member takes advantage of the other by forcing her to work. Thus sudden changes in policy or income shocks can be advanta- geous to this analysis. The data has been often associated with natural exper- iments to ensure exogeneity. Legal changes in transfers is the obvious choice: the sudden, unexpected shift or increase in income to a certain group is pre- cisely the type of exogenous income needed to analyze the bargaining model. These analyses of natural experiments have been applied to changes in cash transfer programs around the world (Oportunidades (Bobonis 2004), Bolsa Fa- milia (Braido et. al. 2009), Romanian and British child allowances (Sahn and Gerstle 2004) (Lundberg et. al. 1997) among others). Since I find no such shocks available (nor have the funds to implement such a shock), I employ experimen- tal methodology to simulate such an event. In addition, the trust game sheds light on the efficiency of the family.