[email protected]
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a body-schema was introduced into the scientific debate in 1905 by the French neurologist Pierre Bonnier (de Vignemont, 2010). Since then this notion, roughly speaking referring to a form of representation of our own body, has become one of the most frequently used expressions among neurologists, philosophers (see Merlau-Ponty, Phenomenolgy of Perception, 1945) and also, among psychologists and linguists (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). The latter, in particular, developed the explicative role of body- schemas, also in relation to the metaphorical structure of our conceptual system. That is, body-schemas are the source domain of many bodily metaphors. Those bodily metaphors are often considered to be the building blocks of our conceptual system. But what precisely are body-schemas? The answer to this question is far from simple. In fact, as Frederique de Vignemont has recently suggested (2010), there have been different, and not always converging, definitions of this notion. This variety of accounts has inevitably led to a degree of confusion.
In order to clarify the picture, Shaun Gallagher (1986; 2005; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008), proposed a clear distinction between two notions: body- schema and body-image. Gallagher’s definition (2008: 164) states that a body-image “is composed of a system of experiences, attitudes, and beliefs where the object of such intentional states is one’s own body”. A body- schema, instead, “includes two aspects: (1) the close-to-automatic system of processes that constantly regulates posture and movement to serve intentional action; and (2) our pre-reflective and non-objectifying body awareness. So, the body schema is a system of sensorimotor capacities and activation that functions without the necessity of perceptual monitoring” (Gallager & Zahavi 2008: 165). Interestingly, empirical evidence in support of Gallagher’s distinction is provided by the existence of some neurological pathologies that can selectively affect the body-schema (deafferentation) or the body-image (personal neglect).
What can this distinction tell us about the processing of embodied metaphors? I propose that some embodied metaphors rely directly on body- schemas while other embodied metaphors rely on body-images. Thus, depending on the source domain, i.e. body-schema or body-image, our bodies play a different role in metaphor processing.
BODY-SCHEMA AS A SOURCE DOMAIN
The hypothesis that is proposed here is that the body-schema is the basic and ontogenetically primary source of metaphorical cognition via a mapping from sensorimotor abilities to the cognitive level. It has this role for two reasons. Firstly because our body-schema provides the structure to perception and, as such, to cognition; secondly, because by means of the mechanism of Embodied Simulation the processes involved in our body-schema can be exploited to structure our conceptual system (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Gallese & Cuccio, 2015).
Let us have a closer look at the first of these two aspects. Our perceptual abilities, touch or vision, for example, are partly constituted by the set of sensorimotor abilities that we call body-schema. This means that the way we see or we have tactile experiences depends exactly on the specific set of sensorimotor abilities we are endowed with. Perception is constituted by these sensorimotor capabilities (Noë, 2004). In the light of these considerations, it would be legitimate to say that our bodily capabilities, constituting our body schema, are the glasses through which we look at the world. They give structures to our cognition and, for this is reason, we can talk, at this level, of metaphorical cognition.
With regard to the second aspect, today neuroscience offers us extraordinary new tools to deeply understand the metaphorical nature of our cognition. According to Gallese (2008) there is a mapping from sensorimotor abilities to cognition that does not involve any overt action or movement. This mapping can be explained in terms of a process of exploitation. We reuse our sensorimotor system to structure cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons (di Pellegrino et al. 1992) and the identification of the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese & Lakoff 2005; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) have contributed to revealing the neural processes underpinning the embodied foundation of cognition.
BODY-IMAGE AS A SOURCE DOMAIN
In metaphors having a body-image as a source domain the source of the metaphorical mapping is our body as an object of representation and knowledge. Indeed, the source domain is now a body percept, body affect or body concept. As such, the metaphorical mapping is from concepts to concepts. For this reason, while in the case of metaphors having a body- schema as a source domain the contribution of the body to cognition can be considered direct, not being mediated by a representation, in the case of metaphors having a body-image as a source domain, the contribution of the body is mediated by our cultural, environmentally situated and linguistically structured representations of the body itself. Standard examples of metaphors having a body-image as a source domain are long-discussed conceptual metaphors such as “Love is a journey” or “Theories are buildings.”
CONCLUSIONS
Summarizing, it is here proposed that on the basis of the distinction between body-schema and body-image it is possible to identify two levels of metaphorical cognition. The first level is the level of primary metaphors. They have the body-schema as a source domain. The power of these metaphors can be explained, as Lakoff pointed out, by their function of
structuring our conceptual system. The power of these metaphors is silent and transparent because in this case our bodily capabilities are the glasses through which we look at the world. The body is not the object of our attention and explicit knowledge. It is, instead, the condition of the possibility of action and knowledge. This level of metaphorical cognition is realized by means of the mechanism of Embodied Simulation.
The second level of metaphorical cognition is the level of complex metaphors. They have the body-image as a source domain. The power of these metaphors can be considered audible and visible, in comparison with the silent and transparent power of metaphors based on the body-schema. The fact is that in this case our body, i.e. our bodily experiences, attitudes and beliefs about the body, becomes the object of explicit knowledge and attention. That is, the body is explicitly considered as an object of knowledge. In this second case the contribution of the body to thought and language is mediated by our cultural, environmentally situated and linguistically structured representations of the body itself.
References
Bonnier, P. (1905). 0 [Aschematia]. Revue Neurologique (Paris), 13, 605– 609.
Gallagher, S. (1986). Body image and body schema: A conceptual clarification. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 7, 541–554.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind. 2nd edition, London and New York: Routledge.
Gallese, V. (2008). Mirror neurons and the social nature of language: the neural exploitation hypothesis. Soc Neurosci, 3(3-4), 317-333. doi: 10.1080/17470910701563608.
Gallese, V., & Cuccio V. (2015). The paradigmatic body. Embodied simulation, intersubjectivity, the bodily self and language. T. Metzinger & J. Windt (eds.), Open MIND, Frankfurt: The Mind group.
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The Brain's concepts: the role of the Sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cogn Neuropsychol, 22(3), 455-479. doi: 0.1080/02643290442000310
Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). What is so special about embodied simulation? Trends Cogn Sci, 15(11), 512-519.
Lakoff, G., & M. Johnson, (1980), Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press., trad. it. Metafora e Vita quotidiana, Milano, Espresso, 1982.
Lakoff, G., & M. Johnson. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris:
Gallimard
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT. di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992).
Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Exp Brain Res, 91(1), 176-180.
de Vignemont, F.(2010). The body-schema and the body-image. Pros and Cons. Neuropsychologya.