ESTABILIDAD

the self-respect of the members of any social system, the central claim is that the hierarchical labour structure is unable to give individuals the control over their own labour activities, and the labour process generally which is a requirement for self- respect is to be a possibility. Doppelt cites Komhauser (1985), and the report of the HEW (1972) amongst others in support of his claim that the worker suffers from powerlessness, with associated feelings of hopelessness and lack of self-esteem in inverse proportion to their place in the hierarchy. Those who suffer most are lowest in the hierarchy, the worst-off are the unemployed.

It is not our task to argue against the findings of the cited studies, nor would we wish to contest their depressing contents, but Doppelt seeks to attack Rawls' theory through such inquiries by suggesting that Rawls' theory cannot deal with the inequalities of power which are identified by them. Inequality of power in this case is said to be present within the organisation of the labour process, but the implication is clearly that such inequalities threaten the viability of the task of securing equality of liberty and equality of opportunity and so a stable society based upon reciprocity.

Doppelt holds that the second principle is supposed to deal with inequalities of power, in addition to inequalities of wealth and i n c o m e _ Although Rawls does

mention power in his discussion of'The Basis of Expectations', section 15 of A Theory o f Justice^ his suggestion there, that power is to be dealt with by the difference principle,

is not carried out - - the central discussion of the difference principle deals only with the worst-off group in terms of their position relative to others in income and wealth with the result that

...the second principle of justice sanctions whatever inequalities of power are required to maximise the income of the worst-off...Power as a

^ ^ Doppelt focuses upon power rather than income and wealth in this paper, and so power is our concern here. He acknowledges the equally damaging effects of the distribution of income and wealth, however, this was dealt with in chapter 1. That problem is returned to in chapter 3.

primary social good has dropped out of the picture. (Doppelt 1981: 269)

All of this affirms the hidden commitment to the ideals of bourgeois-democratic capitalism mentioned earlier, since Rawls assumes that the control of the labour process will remain in private hands, rather than in those of "the democratic state, the citizenry at large, or the workers." (Doppelt 1981: 270).

The terrain of power seems well mapped out by Doppelt, but he immediately goes on to inject an element of confusion:

To be sure, during the last century the political action of the working class have placed legal limitations upon the internal organisation of the internal organisation of the labour process by its owners: the elimination of child labour, the eight hour day, the right to unionise and bargain, some provision for health and safety on the job, worker's compensation etc. Nevertheless, such reforms within capitalism, valuable as they are, can never amount to public, democratic control over the core of the division of power and labour itself.

(Doppelt 1981: 270)

The reforms he mentions have clearly been pushed through by those favouring the worker, whether from concern to improve their lot or, to avoid the consequences of failing to accommodate the demands of the population of a country, and this seems at least potentially at variance with the history of the improvement in labour conditions as Doppelt understands it. For if aU these reforms have so far improved the lot of workers they have surely done so in a way which has increased the power of the workers to oppose those who seek to remove the conditions which are required for their self-respect. If these reforms have failed to secure a basis for self-respect, then the reason cannot simply be the power possessed by the owners of the means of production, since, in any given case, they have failed to prevent the legislation which has resulted in our current state of development, but, as he indicates, the structural

properties of capitalism itself; power is a feature of social structures rather than the individuals or groups which realise them^i.

At this stage we have been responding to Doppelt’s talk about 'power', without being very clear about what he means by this, or indeed what we should mean by it, assuming that there is anything like an exhaustive account of power which can be applied in the way Doppelt has attempted to doi2.

One of our tasks is to show how Doppelt's attack on Rawls fails, due to an inadequate consideration of the nature of power as it operates in Rawls, in his own work, and in the work of the social scientists upon which he draws.

IV

Each of the conceptions of power reviewed in this section has been or is being used to assess instances of power identified 'in the real world', but there is a tendency among empirical researchers to avoid involving themselves in complex theoretical arguments prior to conducting their research. This is a pattern which has been identified by Bachrach and Lawler:

Researchers typically proceed in an inductive fashion, deriving their formulations of power from its empirical manifestations. In effect.

11 Vogel (1982) makes a very good case for doubting the veracity of the simple view that businesses in