Establecer programas de apoyo al cuidador que proporcionen infor mación sobre servicios, recursos y materiales para el cuidado y que faciliten

Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II concluded with the traditional appeal from the States Parties to promote wider adherence to the protocol in their respective regions and for all states that had not yet done so to accede to the protocol.

4.4 Expanding the restrictions on anti-vehicle mines

General course of events

The CCW discussion on the humanitarian problem posed by anti-vehicle mines (AVMs) started in 1995, in the context of the First Review Conference. AVMs are designed to destroy or disable tanks and other armoured military vehicles. However, over the years, serious concerns have been raised with regard to the sensitivity of the fuses and activation mechanisms used in them.150 _{First, these mechanisms do not distinguish}

between military vehicles and civilian transport. That means that AVMs also pose a threat to civilian vehicles (buses, cars, tractors) in the post-conflict stage. Secondly, there is a wide range of different mechanisms by which AVMs can be activated, and some are so sensitive that they also can be set off by lighter vehicles, or even by people. Third, a proportion of these mines are made to be virtually undetectable by current metal detectors, which makes it more difficult and dangerous for the enemy or humanitarian demining organisations and mine action centres to find and remove them. Such mines therefore hinder the post-conflict reconstruction process. In this context, a number of States Parties to the CCW – including the Netherlands – became convinced that the stipulations restricting the use of AVMs in Protocol II (and Amended Protocol II) did not go far enough.

The consultations on AVMs in the CCW can be subdivided into two phases: informal deliberations on the possibilities of getting the issue of further restrictions on AVMs onto the CCW agenda (1995/1996-2001) and further exploration of the issue in the GGE (2001-2006). Since 1995 there have been various proposals regarding the strengthening of the CCW’s stipulations on AVMs. During the Second Review Conference, an open- ended GGE was established to address the issue of ERW and AVMs. Despite repeated calls for a ‘negotiation mandate’ by several States Parties, no consensus could be achieved on such a mandate. The work of the GGE on AVMs was ended during the Third Review Conference in November 2006. This marked the States Parties’ recognition that ten years of preliminary talks on further AVM restrictions had failed to produce relevant results.151

149 Fear of permanent loss of the appeal won these States Parties over.

150 The humanitarian impact of AVMs is especially documented in the papers, reports and fact sheets of the ICRC (2002), Human Rights Watch (2002, 2005) and GICHD (2004).

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Table 4.4 Dutch policies on AVMs 1995/1996-2001: Getting further restriction on AVMs onto the CCW agenda

Objectives Pursuing a pioneering role by pushing for a ban on non-detectable AVMs as

well as on dispersible AVMs without self-neutralising and self-detecting mechanisms in the convention or any other forum. Preferably, these new stipulations on AVMs should be laid down in a new protocol. In case of insufficient support for such a new protocol: preference for further research on the issue by experts.

Results In December 2001 States Parties achieve consensus on a limited mandate

for further consultations on AVMs in an open-ended GGE.

Interventions Active promotion of further restrictions on the use of AVMs during the First CCW Review Conference. Support for a US proposal to strengthen the AVM restrictions in Amended Protocol II, a US-Danish proposal for a new protocol specifically designed for a AVMs, and a revised version of this proposal. Participation in and adoption of the joint EU position to support a proposal for a distinctive AVM protocol, but to refrain from co-sponsorship.

Impediments Although the 2001 Review Conference demonstrated considerable support

for balanced restrictions on the use of AVMs, a large number of States Parties declared themselves publicly against the proposals at hand. The objections they raised were:

• Institutional: amending an amended protocol or the establishment of new landmine protocol might lead to legal confusion.

• Financial: the proposed measures might lead to a situation in which only rich countries could afford AVMs.

• Principled: outspoken opponents of further restrictions argued that the humanitarian impact of AVMs is to a large extent exaggerated.

Objectives

To date, the Dutch government regard AVMs as serving a distinct military purpose. Consequently – and in contrast to its changing position on anti-personnel mines – it has never become a proponent of a comprehensive ban on all AVMs. Nevertheless, in an early stage the Netherlands manifested itself as a supporter of further restriction on the use of AVMs in order to reduce the threat these weapons might pose to civilians. Already in April 1995 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence informed Parliament that together with the US, the UN, the ICRC and other NGOs, at the First Review Conference the Netherlands would plead for provisions requiring all mines (APMs and AVMs) to be self-destructing and detectable.152 _{In September 1995, Minister of Foreign}

Affairs Van Mierlo elaborated on the Dutch position. He indicated that aiming for qualitative restrictions on landmines was preferable to striving for quantitative restrictions, in view of the urgency of decision-making on the mine problem and the fact that non-detectable mines without a self-destruction mechanism were causing by far the most victims.153

152 TK, 23900, V, nr. 44. 153 TK, 24292, nr. 2:7.

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