Public opinion is considered by some scholars as fundamental to the development of public policy, and, indeed, a functioning democracy. Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien argue that ‘representation of the public’s policy preferences remains a – if not the – central concern in electoral and inter-electoral politics’.52 Given that (elected) politicians must satisfy the
the public and the seeming means to do so’; or at least they are better able to do so, following the development of more sophisticated tools for capturing public opinion.53 Soroka and
Wlezien’s model of ‘opinion-policy dynamics’ works along these lines: ‘a responsive public will behave like a thermostat […] adjusting its preferences for “more” or “less” policy in response to what policymakers do’.54 The direction of influence works both ways, that is, the
link between public opinion and policy is a reciprocal one – ‘policymakers respond to changes in public preferences over time’.55 After all, if it was not for voters’ responsiveness
to policy, there would be ‘little basis for policy responsiveness to public opinion. Politicians not only would have little incentive to represent preferences in policy; they would have little information to go on, as public opinion would be an essentially meaningless signal’.56
Other scholars also posit that there is a two-way transfer, or even a theoretical interconnection between the policy-makers and public opinion. In many ways, these concepts and models have much in common with the work of David Easton and Karl Deutsch on public responsiveness (or how processes can be applied to societies and governments) as an important part of modern democratic systems. Easton emphasises the idea of a ‘feedback loop’, or a connection between inputs and outputs, in which a system can take on preferences (or public opinion) and respond (with policy), perhaps ad infinitum.57 Deutsch’s 1966 text, The Nerves of Government proposes an equally mechanistic model. Feedback is ‘a communications network that produces action in response to an input of information, and includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behaviour’.58 Thus there exists ‘goal-changing feedback’ in which the goal can
change over time based on new information coming in. Of greater direct relevance to work on policy-making and public opinion is Deutsch’s concept of a ‘representative government’ and a ‘reactive public’ which exist in a system that involves both lag (‘whether governments react in a timely manner to preferences for change’) and gain (‘whether the extent of the change is less, more, or exactly what the public wants’).59
Such models make assumptions on the capacity of ordinary citizens to understand policies and policy development, and are open to the criticism that too high expectations are being laid upon the public. Soroka and Wlezien acknowledge this, and state that it would be an
‘extreme’ case if ‘voters [were] continuously monitoring the world, looking for evidence of policy activity’.60 In Page and Shapiro’s 1992 text, The Rational Public, ordinary citizens are
portrayed as individuals with sensible and coherent preferences, which change over time in response to events and information.61 In much the same way, Zaller’s ‘reception-acceptance model’ relies on a general public receiving and accepting new information and updating their preferences accordingly.62 This processing of relevant information regarding policy is critical if the policy-opinion thermostat model is to work properly.
Other scholars argue that the expectations on the public regarding policy changes are, in fact, rather low. After all, the thermostatic model is not a particularly nuanced or complicated one; it requires only ‘that people can tell whether policy has gone “too far” in one direction or “not far enough” given their preferences’.63 (Of course, they must be aware of their
preferences.) However, in their defence, Soroka and Wlezien refer to a ‘growing body of work [which] suggests that public responsiveness to policy is within the realm of possibility’.64 Despite these seemingly vague impressions of policy, relative preferences will
change over time. The model does not require a body of totally committed and informed individuals armed with a comprehensive knowledge of all policy areas either. Instead, all that is necessary is that ‘some meaningful portion of citizens have a basic preference for policy change in one direction or the other and that they adjust this preference over time in reaction to what policymakers do, based on the information those citizens receive’ (my italics).65
Some scholars suggest that elites make use of public opinion to use techniques which border on manipulation in order to further their agendas. Jacobs and Shapiro’s 2000 text Politicians Don’t Pander argues that elites do not follow the public’s policy preferences and that they follow public opinion in order to understand and change public opinion so that they may win support for their policies.66 Scholars such as Soroka and Wlezien refer to a kind of feedback involving political elites. So, it may not be the case that the public – at times – responds well to policy changes, or the cues that correspond to such changes. Instead, ‘politicians […] effectively mobilize opinion in advance of policy change, in effect to create the support that they then can represent’.67
The mobilising of public opinion is considered by some scholars in conjunction with the development of Western immigration policy.68 Gallya Lahav finds evidence that public
attitudes within Europe are both ‘informed’ and ‘stable’ and that there is ‘a predictable and systematic attachment to immigration issues that expose a fairly sophisticated European public and that are reflected in EU policy developments on immigration and asylum’.69 Lahav argues that there is a particularly nuanced relationship between public opinion and policy- making, one which other scholars may have been sceptical of for some time, given, as she puts it, that immigration policy has long been made ‘in the absence of public debate’.70 However, she finds evidence that public opinion, while not the ‘decisive factor’ in policy- making, may be used by leaders who can ‘convert’ and ‘translate’ issues such as immigration on to the agenda.71
Public opinion is cited to be a driving force behind the development of immigration policy in the UK. Looking at the Churchill leadership of the Conservative Party in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Andrew Roberts gives an account of the formation of immigration policy as a response to growing public concern about rising numbers of immigrants: ‘there was no premeditated political programme’.72 Instead, short-term expediency and constituents’
correspondence to MPs guided the 1950s Conservative governments on immigration policy.73 Some 20 years later, the situation had changed little; public opinion continued to influence immigration policy making.74 Studlar’s text, which looks at the 1970 general election, strongly suggests that the wholly unexpected victory of the Conservative Party was in part down to the public’s perception that the Tories were tougher on immigration than their Labour opposition. In fact, despite the British public finding clear differences between the two parties, there was little difference: the 1970 manifestos of the Conservatives and the Labour Party did not differ significantly.75 The public’s belief that the Conservatives were
tough on immigration reflected the impact of Enoch Powell’s hard-line speech of 1968; it did not seem to register with voters that the speech had led to his dismissal from the Conservative frontbench.
Referring to this episode, Studlar suggests that ‘people bring their perceptions of the parties and their opinions on immigration into line with their votes, rather than the reverse’.76
Memories of Powell’s infamous speech served to ‘reinforce the perception that the Conservatives, alone, understood the make-up of public attitudes on the issue’.77 So much so that the Conservatives became known by voters as the ‘party of Powell’.78 McLean suggests that it was ‘only because of Powell’ that the Tories were considered to be ‘the party most likely to restrict coloured immigration’.79 In fact, as Studlar puts it, ‘the events of the [1970] parliamentary campaign […] worked to associate Powell’s position with the Conservative party, however much the party may have balked at the notion’.80 McLean argues that the
unforeseen Tory victory at the 1970 general election was due to ‘the popularity of Powell’s view[s]’.81
More recent work has continued to argue that public opinion is critical to, and constrains, immigration policy-makers, despite evidence that there is a great deal of ignorance regarding immigrants and immigration.82 It is commonly reported that citizens consistently overestimate the actual number of immigrants living in their country.83 In Ipsos MORI’s report of 2013, the mean estimate of the proportion of foreign-born people in the UK was 31 per cent, compared to an actual proportion of around 13 per cent.84 Such erroneous perceptions have consequences – after all, ‘common majority sentiments identified in surveys’ consistently find that there are ‘too many’ migrants and thus ‘too few’ natives.85
John Sides and Jack Citrin, who undertook analysis of respondents in 20 European countries, find that opinion about immigration is unrelated to the economic or demographic circumstances of the country: citizens of countries with greater numbers of migrants or a worse economic outlook do not display more resistance to immigration.86 What does seem
to impact on public opinion are symbolic predispositions: there is a ‘significant relationship between a preference for cultural unity and opposition to immigration’.87