Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was ―railroaded.‖ They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano‘s motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo‘s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: ―There being none, approved.‖ At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, ―What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?‖
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader‘s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano‘s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken.
There is no rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
SG pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice.
Majority Leader Arturo Tolentino: The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
The session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo‘s question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo‘s question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. Rep. Arroyo‘s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
Where there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
o As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
Petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. They are simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
The due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day.
o The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. The bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
IN SUM, It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
SEPRATE OPINION Romero, J.
1. The enrolled bill theory should not be discontinued, but its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION Puno, J.
1. Concurs: does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondents in granting the petition 2. Dissents: the court has jurisdiction over the petition and the issues are justuciable
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ―x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.‖ This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubeity that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons or our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
2. Dissents from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine.
Recent case show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that ―no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute.‖ I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine.
There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance.
o For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme.
o For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism for the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking.
o And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
* I didn‘t include Vitug‘s concurring opinion.
d. Discipline of members Alejandrino v. Quezon
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Facts:
1. A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924 for disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District.
2. Petitioner contends that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons.
3. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.
4. this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
Held: NO Ratio: