Estadística inferencial – Prueba de Hipótesis

association set forth in articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant.

3.2.4 Denial of crimes against humanity and advocacy of hatred

The permissibility of denying crimes against humanity was raised in the case ofFaurisson v. France, which concerned the author’s conviction by French courts on the basis of the so-called “Gayssot Act”, which amended the 1881 Freedom of the Press Act to make it an offence “to contest the existence of the category of crimes against humanity as defined in the London Charter of 8 August 1945”. In an interview the author had “reiterated his personal conviction that there were no homicidal gas chambers for the extermination of Jews in Nazi concentration camps”.108

This restriction on the author’s freedom of expression, as guaranteed by article 19(2), had to be examined in the light of article 19(3), according to which, as seen above, any restriction must cumulatively meet the following three conditions: (1) be prescribed by law, (2) be imposed for one of the legitimate purposes enumerated therein and (3) be necessary for one or more of those purposes. The Committee accepted in the first place thatthe principle of legalityhad been respected in that the

restriction was prescribed by the Gayssot Act, on the basis of which the author was convicted for “having violated the rights and reputation of others”.109 _{It next agreed} that the restriction was imposed for alegitimate purpose, namely to ensure respect for

the rights or reputation of others under article 19(3)(a) of the Covenant. It pointed out in this regard that “the rights for the protection of which restrictions on the freedom of expression are permitted [by article 19(3)] may relate to the interests of other persons or to those of the community as a whole.” As the statements made by the author, “read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-Semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-Semitism”.110

The final question to be decided was, however,whether the restriction was necessary for this legitimate purpose.In the absence of any argument undermining

the validity of the Government’s submission that “the Gayssot Act was intended to serve the struggle against racism and anti-Semitism” and the statement by a former Minister of Justice characterizing “the denial of the existence of the Holocaust as the principle vehicle for anti-Semitism”, the Committee was satisfied that the restriction of

108_{Communication No. 550/1993,R. Faurisson v. France(Views adopted on 8 November 1996), in UN doc.GAOR, A/52/40} (vol. II), p. 85, paras. 2.3 and 2.5.

109_{Ibid., pp. 95-96, para. 9.5.} 110_{Ibid., p. 96, para. 9.6.}

Mr. Faurisson’s freedom of expression was necessary within the meaning of article 19(3) of the Covenant.111

In a case concerning the freedom of expression of teachers, theRoss v. Canada

case, the Committee likewise concluded that article 19 had not been violated. The question that had to be decided was whether the author’s right to freedom of expression had been restricted contrary to article 19 of the Covenant by virtue of the decision of the Human Rights Board of Inquiry, upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, as a result of which the author was placed on leave without pay for a week and subsequently transferred to a non-teaching position.112_{It appears from the assessment} of the Board of Inquiry that statements made by the author in his various books and pamphlets, which were published outside the framework of his teaching activities, denigrated the faith and beliefs of Jews.113

Disagreeing with the State party, the Committee was of the view that “the loss of a teaching position was a significant detriment, even if no or only insignificant pecuniary damage was suffered” and the removal of the author from his teaching position was therefore a restriction of his freedom of expression that needed to be justified under article 19(3).114 _{The Committee then accepted that the measure was}

provided for by law, namely the New Brunswick Human Rights Act as subsequently

interpreted by the Supreme Court. On the question whether it also pursued a

legitimate purpose, the Committee confirmed its Faurisson ruling that the terms

“rights or reputation of others [in article 19(3)] may relate to other persons or to a community as a whole”. It added that:

“restrictions may be permitted on statements which are of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-Semitic feeling, in order to uphold the Jewish communities’ right to be protected from religious hatred. Such restrictions also derive support from the principles reflected in article 20(2) of the Covenant. The Committee notes that both the Board of Inquiry and the Supreme Court found that the author’s statements were discriminatory against persons of the Jewish faith and ancestry and that they denigrated the faith and beliefs of Jews and called upon true Christians to not merely question the validity of Jewish beliefs and teachings but to hold those of the Jewish faith and ancestry in contempt as undermining freedom, democracy and Christian beliefs and values. In view of the findings as to the nature and effect of the author’s public statements, the Committee concludes that the restrictions imposed on him were for the purpose of protecting the ‘rights and reputations’ of persons of Jewish faith, including the right to have an education in the public school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance.”115

111_{Ibid., p. 96, para. 9.7.}

112_{Communication No. 736/1997,M. Ross v. Canada(Views adopted on 18 October 2000), in UN doc.GAOR, A/56/40} (vol. II), pp. 72-75, paras. 4.1-4.6, and p. 83, para. 11.1.

113_{Ibid., p. 73, para. 4.2.} 114_{Ibid., p. 83, para. 11.1.} 115_{Ibid., p. 84, paras. 11.3-11.5.}

Lastly, with regard to the question of the necessity of the restriction, the

Committee stated that “the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. These special duties and responsibilities are of particular relevance within the school system, especially with regard to the teaching of young students.” The influence exerted by schoolteachers may thus “justify restraints in order to ensure that legitimacy is not given by the school system to the expression of views which are discriminatory”.116_{The Committee took note of the fact}

“that the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable to anticipate that there was a casual link between the expressions of the author and the ‘poisoned school environment’ experienced by Jewish children in the School district. In that context, the removal of the author from a teaching position can be considered a restriction necessary to protect the right and freedom of Jewish children to have a school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance.”117

The Committee noted, furthermore, that “the author was appointed to a non-teaching position after only minimal period on leave without pay and that the restriction thus did not go any further than that which was necessary to achieve its protective functions.” It followed that there had been no violation of article 19.118

The exercise of freedom of expression carries with it special duties and