Estado de arte

With two notable exceptions, the Canadian experience is very different from the countries discussed to this point. Whereas in South Africa, Uganda, England and Sweden the trend has been to decentralize authority from the state, the tendency in many Canadian provinces appears to be exactly the opposite. Federal governments in Canada seem bent on the creation of larger units through consolidation, (Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan), limiting the use of local fiscal powers (the exceptions being British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec and Saskatchewan), increasing the central control over curriculum and authorising central evaluation processes (All provinces) (Bezeau, 2000:2-3).

While Britain and South Africa were endorsing reforms that established some form of individual school committee and increased their real decision making power, the majority of Canadian provinces did not place such school committees in actual decision making roles.

The prevalent role for Canadian school councils or committees is strictly advisory to the school Principal. In Ontario, the government’s own Education Improvement Commission called for a clear role definition of such bodies but to date their (committees) brief has not been forthcoming. Exceptions to the general trend are found in British Columbia and Quebec where school committees have been created with real decision making power. The British Columbia legislation specifically refers to the importance of parental involvement in how schools function. Quebec has made the greatest progressive strides in terms of reform of all the Canadian provinces. Bill 180, an act to amend the Education Act (1997), gave schools specific meaningful responsibility (Bezeau, 2000:4). The Bill aimed to create a partnership between parents and professional school personnel. Possibly the most radical Canadian experiment with school committees transpired in New Brunswick. In 1996 the province abolished eleven school boards and these Boards were replaced with Parent committees

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(Bezeau, id). Due to problems, such as widening the divide between the education system and taxpayers who did not have children in school a new, more regional level of school board has been introduced. These regional boards are much smaller than the number of original local school boards (Bezeau, ibid).

In Canada part of the inconsistency between provincial tendencies and those of the other countries discussed in this chapter is due to the political situation from which governance models were evolving. Prior to the need for provincial governments to limit or reduce educational expenditures, Canadian school boards had been amongst the most powerful municipal level governments in the Western world. The increase in the number of municipal boards meant an increase in the central governments’ control of school governance (Bezeau, 2000:8). In these cases it predictably meant decreasing the power of local school boards. Similarly, while most provinces advocate for active, strong, school councils or committees, they have not had their powers increased because to do so meant an increase of funding from the central government which was not forthcoming (Bish, 2001:18).

Canadian provincial education governance reforms show that many provinces have resorted to the creation of larger school boards through mergers or amalgamations in order to realise savings from a reduction of duplication (Bish, 2001:19). In Ontario, the education experience has been described by Williams (2003:10) as that the provinces of Ontario and Quebec are considering the possibility of legislation to enable ‘de-merging’ of previously merged municipal governments. Ontario recently received a recommendation to increase the level of school funding by 2.1 billion dollars (over post-amalgamation levels and as a result of funding cutbacks) from a Task Force that it established. (Education Equality Task Force, 2002:2).

Historically, governance of social organisations like hospitals, prisons and schools in Canada was firmly placed in the hands of strong leaders who it was assumed possessed a good understanding of their environment. The main challenge for an incumbent leader was relatively easy: do not upset the applecart, instead develop established and well-defined goals so that the institution would arrive at its desired destination. Clemens and Veldhuis (2002:89) explains the dedicated efforts made by social democrats to reform the education system over the past two decades because schools were largely oblivious of the political orientation of the current government which was of grave concern to the state. Bedard and Lawton’s (2000: 253) suggests that governance concepts under various ruling parties reveal the latter’s ideology, he discloses how Liberal government’s approach to collaboration, consultation, and consensus building, were markedly different from the Conservatives

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politically mandated administrative agency. Like in S.A. SGBs are generally oblivious of the states’ ideology, so to in Canada school boards are rarely aware of the political objectives of the government (Bedard & Lawton, id).

This form of governance namely that is aligned to the ideology of the ruling party be it conservative, liberal or social capitalist like in South Africa, had attained massive public confidence and because of that no one sought any alternative. As Weber explains Canada followed a global trend which was defined by “deterministic, well-behaved mechanical processes where causality was simple because the whole was the sum of the parts”

(Clemens & Veldhuis, 2002:19). Clemens and Veldhuis (2002:20) maintain that in Canada, the education system and educational reform is decided upon by the individual province and territory. In the 1990s Canadians expressed a desire for change and the result was widespread reform (Clemens & Veldhuis, id). These reforms involved in particular:

• A new form of governance emerged: a number of school boards merged to improve efficiency.

• School councils were established to encourage parental involvement.

• The disappearance of course streaming up to year 9 or 10.

• Monitoring and efficiency with educational expenditure.

• An optional national science framework

The reforms also heralded the ‘foundation system’ a system which offers all districts a guaranteed minimum amount of support per student from government financial sources but still allows each district the power to tax themselves should they wish to supplement this guaranteed amount (Fernandez & Rogerson, 2006:862). While the foundation system is being used, governance arrangements tend to reflect a distribution of decision making authority where the state decides major revenue levels (supplemented by local levies), curriculum policy and teacher credentials while local decision makers distribute finances, according to district education needs, employ the teaching staff and negotiate teacher’s contracts (id).

There were differences in governance practices which developed when states, because of monetary exigencies, curtailed local tax raising powers and attempted to transfer control of the overall levels of money spent on education to the central government (Fernandez &

Rogerson, 2006:865).

Ontario differed from the other states, where the pattern has been to re-centralize financial control at the provincial level and lessen it at the local board level while leaving individual

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schools as minor partners. Researchers questioned whether in Ontario there was a viable role for locally elected boards of trustees in the province and governance arrangements do or do not have an effect on variables such as student achievement (Bedard & Lawton, 2000:253).

This centralist mentality spread through Canada, and manifested itself in the election of ‘right wing’ governments in Alberta and Ontario from the 1990s to 2010. Over this period, educational governance was defined by greater centralization, standardization of curriculum, results-based education, and increased accountability for student performance through standardized testing – regardless of the political ideologies of governing party. According to Anderson and Jafaar, (2007:102) and Ungerleider and Levin, (2008:23) this centralist philosophy defined school governance throughout this period.

Canada, Britain, America, Sweden and Germany are the key players in the global community that have subscribed to the increased pressure for accountability, marketisation and competition which are key elements of Neo–liberalism. Bedard and Lawton, (2000:253) contend that when neo-liberalism is the political ideology, election campaign and platform of the governing party; the repercussions are concrete changes in approaches to governance structures and the implementation of accountability mechanisms, this implies transparency both downwards to parents and communities and upwards to the central government. These structures will because of the need for public support and acceptance have to be decentralised in character (Bedard & Lawton, id). This was also the initial driving force for the ANC government opting to distribute school governance to local role-players, as mentioned above.

An analysis of the various ruling parties in Ontario reveal how their ideologies influence school governance. Firstly the analysis shows how the National Democratic Party’s’ (NDP) efforts to re-mould governance by providing “a strong tutelage role for the centre” were theatrically pre-empted by the Conservatives‟ shift to a highly politicized Federal administrative agency much like Provincial Departments of Education in S.A. (Trent, Young

& Lachapelle, 2003:317). Trent, Young and Lachapelle (ibid) further maintain, that although there was some overlap in their policy implementation, the Harris approach was qualitatively different from the NDP‟s monarchical vision directed at ensuring "greater accountability and standardisation to the education system, not to intrinsically alter the scales of power in favour of the centre” (Bedard & Lawton, 2000:253). This same finding is particularly apparent in comparisons between the Conservative and Liberal approaches to governance. The Conservatives governance changes were embedded almost entirely in monetary terms, with

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centralised funding being the weapon used to control school board spending rather than a means of achieving equity (Bedard & Lawton, id). On the other hand the Liberals have insisted that the onus is on school boards to display fiscal prudence, they are toying with broader concepts of accountability and assessment for learning – what Jafaar and Anderson (2007:225) term “ethical-professional” accountability instead of “economic-bureaucratic”

evaluation. Since 2003, the Liberals have traversed away from administrative agency and rapidly progressed toward a tutelage model of Education Governance Reform in Ontario:

Neoliberalism in Context 22 education governance, providing resources and institutional supports from the centre to strengthen district efforts to improve student learning (Levin, 2008:56). Researchers such as Jafaar and Anderson (2007:215) also purport that Neo-liberalism, favours the government of the day fulfilling a patriarchal role towards state-appointed bodies in “a political-economic imperative in the formation of government policy”

(Fallon& Paquet, 2008:28-36).

3.19. SUMMARY

In general, while decentralisation is an espoused common aim of South Africa, Uganda, Britain, Sweden and Canada the extent to which it has been implemented has so far varied widely. Whereas decentralisation is still a work in progress in South Africa and Uganda, countries such as Britain, Sweden and some Canadian provinces are now facing demands for an increase in central measures to avoid the disintegration of quality standards feared as the outcome of an overly decentralised system. This global penchant for neoliberalism (market related outcomes therefore standards) has been the oracle for governance for the ANC led government in South Africa (Fedderke, de Kadt & Luiz, 2000:634). Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2000:645) further contend that many ideas to eliminate waste of human effort in schools were undertaken in the spirit of scientific management, as state funded school education became conceived of as a business. They included:

 Cost accounting – concern with analysing the financial cost of providing education for learners reaching a particular grades;

 analysing measured learner development across schools in the district to determine their relative efficiency;

 calculating expenditure on teaching different subjects which was required for learners to reach a specific grade, as a basis for decisions on which subjects to offer and which to cut;

 reducing costs by increasing class sizes;

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 introducing comprehensive record keeping, from the consumption of basic materials to measured learner outcomes;

 employing university assistance to assist with developing materials to train Principals -ACE

 rating teachers [Integrated Quality Management System-(IQMS)] learner progress curriculum delivery record keeping community and extra-curricular activities and student results] together with Principals and even school cleaners;

 design schools on the basis of the ‘factory system’ where learners circulate

between specialist areas so that all spaces are in constant use; The school day was lengthened increasing the workload for teachers;

 maximising savings on school premises and operating costs (Hoyle & Wallace, 2005:75-76)

It becomes apparent that Education governance in Britain, Sweden, Canada and South Africa is based on scientific principles as found in the corporate world. In Uganda the motives seem more selfish given that it is a one–party state namely to ensure continued donor funding and political legitimacy. In South Africa the Institutional Development Support Officers’ (IDSO–like Britain’s’ school inspectors) choose to market their well–managed schools and to ‘sell’ these schools to the public on whose taxes goodwill and votes they depend (Parry & Moran, 1994:48). This metaphor has taken schools to the point of absurdity and very often they (officials) are unaware of the functions of the SGB and because of this, they tend to be dictatorial in instructions and decision-making, that are beyond their scope.

One of South Africa’s great constitutional scholars, Etienne Mureinik (de Vos 2011:1) spoke eloquently about the challenge that the new South African constitution (Act 108 of 1996) imposes on all government officials. The new constitutional dispensation virtually makes it mandatory and even demands that all decisions made by government officials be justified.

Particularly because of its past, there exists a culture of authority in S.A. where those in positions of power make decisions which rests on their position in the system. In Democratic S.A. the constitution demands a shift from a culture of authority to a culture of justification.

This argument suggests that government officials need to develop the skills of reasoned judgment as part of the culture of justification. Reasoned judgment assumes an adequate understanding of the rules governing the education system, including the constitution, legislation, regulations, policy and provincial circulars (Anderson, 2006:579). It assumes the systemic engagement with the facts of a particular situation or problem. It also assumes that government officials understand not only the letter of the rules, but in some respects equally

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important, they understand the spirit of the rules, what the drafters of the rules had intended by those rules (Sayed, 1999:141). Finally, and most importantly, government officials need to understand and this is where reasoned judgment comes in, that while most management decisions can be made with simple application of the rules, good management and leadership is measured by the successful application of reasoned judgment in complex and difficult instances or cases. Policies can be critiqued via appropriate consultative channels established for this purpose. However, such a process of consultation will not arise out of nothing like a “dark knight” as it necessitates that a dialogue be established between the various partners. Governance carries with it political connotations where the “who” says something is more important than the “what” is said. Thus if the school Principal echoes the words of the HoD of education then this is taken seriously. Any suggestion by anyone else is ignored. When this happens then some people are building power whilst others are losing power and hence there are” winners” and” losers” (Senge, 1997:273). This wielding of power over others is the essence of authoritarianism and in this sense a political environment is an authoritarian environment (Senge, 1997:274). Furthermore Senge (id.) says that such a political climate encourages game playing and blaming others. In order to build a non-political climate Senge (id.) states that we need to generate a climate where merit is the dominant force. In a climate where merit predominates, doing what is right also predominates over who wants what done. Furthermore Senge (id.) suggests that a climate where openness is present is essential. By openness he refers to both participative openness where one has the freedom to speak one’s mind but also reflective openness where one is prepared to challenge your own thinking.

This researcher is of the opinion that when distributed governance was initially mooted that this also implied a climate where dialogue between the partners could occur. Dialogue is unlikely to be stimulated in an environment characterized by hierarchical levels where legislation informs everyone what to do, when to do it and how to do it.

When provided with reasons or justification, role-players are less likely to believe that the manager is acting arbitrarily or simply acting on his or her authority (Aspin, 1995:30; Sayed, 1999:141; Karlsson, 2002:327). It is this researcher’s assertion based on personal experience that Education officials more often than not flout the constitution and are rarely if ever familiar with crucial established provincial policies at best they act as “fire-fighters” and only concern themselves with policies in as much as it affects their portfolios (Schumpeter, 1943:25).

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However, the ubiquitous use of the term governance in various lay circles has been such that it has been criticised as a ‘buzzword’, meaning anything and nothing, lacking a universally shared frame of reference as to its exact meaning. To exacerbate confusion, governance is used irresponsibly by many government officials (Habermas, 1922:43).

There are also some scholars who argue that achieving an intelligent and democratic policy making, calls for the involvement of different constituencies and especially those citizens who traditionally lacked the power to access the policy-making process (Elías & Alkadry 2012:876). Elías and Alkadry (ibid) assert that the public’s ability to participate is far from settled. Cronin (1989:9) argues that “there exists both an uncertainty about the ability of the average voter to make policy and about the desirability of having elected officials make unilateral decisions”. Cronin alludes to the State’s lack of confidence in the SGBs ability to make key decisions (see Ministerial Review Committee) which explains why they constantly reduce the SGBs power. Bureaucracy trivializes the awareness of the public on certain matters. In S.A. the documented political objective of the ANC government is to make sure transformation of the workplace and other spheres of society take place in order to ensure its acceptance (which would also be, of its ideology) by the majority of the South African populace (Pandor, 2006:1). The courts play an essential role in controlling unjust and unlawful administrative actions that infringe the rights of schools such as the rights of governing bodies. However, these remedies have not acted as restrictions to unlawful bureaucratic action. It seems that the traditional methods of bureaucratic control (Van Wyk, 2004:49-54.) such as political control, or management control by strict discretionary guidelines, supervision and disciplinary action, and judicial review have not addressed the undemocratic nature of the education system and therefore the erosion of distributed school governance. The underlying notion of this study is that education shapes democracy, and in turn, democracy inevitably shapes education (Dieltiens, 2000:5).If a multi-party democracy remains hypothetical, and regular alteration in government becomes unlikely, analysts of democracy predict a slide towards authoritarianism where democratic institutions are eroded, sometimes to the point where the system degenerates into a hegemonic one-party rule (Matisonn, 2004:1).

The next chapter will provide an elucidation of concepts tenets and theories that are associated with distributed governance in public schools.

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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter 3 dealt with a comparison of education governance structures in Uganda, Sweden, Britain and Canada. Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology and data collection technique as well as ethical considerations that were undertaken in this study. The design of a research study begins with the selection of a topic and a research paradigm. A paradigm is basically a world view, a whole framework of beliefs, values and methods within which research takes place. It is this world view within which researchers work. It was the researchers’ view that the Mixed method paradigm would elicit the data required, since to determine participants’ perceptions one needs to be observant of nuances in a conversation

Chapter 3 dealt with a comparison of education governance structures in Uganda, Sweden, Britain and Canada. Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology and data collection technique as well as ethical considerations that were undertaken in this study. The design of a research study begins with the selection of a topic and a research paradigm. A paradigm is basically a world view, a whole framework of beliefs, values and methods within which research takes place. It is this world view within which researchers work. It was the researchers’ view that the Mixed method paradigm would elicit the data required, since to determine participants’ perceptions one needs to be observant of nuances in a conversation