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On top of the various limitations present in this thesis, there were some potential areas of study which are prominent in the literature on political power-sharing and strategies of survival that were omitted.

9.4.1 Electoral and Institutional Variation

Africa shows a wide degree of variation in the institutions or rules formally governing the limits of the leader’s power in creating their ruling coalition. Many countries in Anglophone Africa inherited the parliamentary Westminster model but with an empowered president, while many Francophone countries adopted the French semi-presidential system. Yet these de jure rules on presidential power have little impact on the de facto powers of African heads of state. Van Cranenburgh (2008) argues that:

“the conventional distinction between presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, besides being analytically inadequate, also tells us little about presidential power.” The main concern of this thesis – how leader’s and regimes adapt their ruling coalitions and power sharing strategies to adapt to political events – relies on the assumption that leaders have a degree of freedom in choosing their cabinet ministers. Van Cranenburgh (2008) finds that regardless of

institutional set up, heads of state exercise a high degree of de facto control over senior government appointments.

Furthermore, metrics from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset show that in 70 percent of the country-years covered by ACPED, the Head of State has de facto power to appoint the cabinet

without requiring the approval of the Head of Government or the legislature (Coppedge et al., 2017). Only in 20 percent of observations was explicit or tacit consent from the legislature a factor in cabinet appointments (ibid.).

Another form of institutional variation across the continent is the electoral system. Electoral systems are widely believed to impact the number of parties, opposition coordination and the political expression of subnational identities (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003).

This thesis looked at the impact of elections on the composition of the cabinet: firstly, as a threat to be anticipated in chapter 5; secondly, as a source of information on the relative strength of the regime vis-à-vis the opposition in chapter 6. In both chapters, what is under examination is whether elections

cause leaders to adapt their coalition to deal with the threats posed by external political rivals. In this case, how electoral systems impact regime patterns of dominance may be important.

To test this possibility, I examined the VDEM data and looked at how ruling party dominance of the legislature varied across electoral systems - single-member district (SMD), PR/multi-member districts and mixed systems (MMD/PR) – for the countries and time period covered in this thesis. Table 9.1 shows the results of parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests along with pairwise comparisons between systems. Over half (62 percent) of included countries use a single-member district electoral system, a quarter use a multi-member district or proportional representation system while around 13 percent use a mixed system.

Table 9.1 – Legislative dominance against electoral system

Parametric (Tukey) significance Non-Parametric (Dunn) significance

MMD/PR vs Mixed 0.16 0.09

SMD vs Mixed 0.76 0.26

SMD vs MMD/PR 0.19 0.2

Overall ANOVA – 0.12 Kruskal-Wallis – 0.07

Overall the results show that electoral systems do not significantly impact regime dominance. This supports the claims of theorists such as Bogaards (2000) and Schedler (2013) who argue that pre- existing patterns of dominance impact the threat posed by opposition parties and external political rivals. It is certainly the case SMD systems can include strong dominant regimes (such as those seen in Uganda or Botswana) and more competitive fragmented party systems (such as those seen in Kenya or Malawi). Similarly, MMD/PR systems can include strong regimes (South Africa or Rwanda) and fragmented regimes (post-Ben Ali Tunisia). Only mixed systems seem to be associated with solely dominant regimes, being used in Cameroon and Ben Ali’s Tunisia.

The impact of both institutional and electoral variation appears to be limited, which is why an in- depth study of these factors was omitted in this thesis.

9.4.2 External Factors

Another potentially important factor that is not studied in this thesis is the impact of external factors located outside of the country, particularly the influence of foreign allies or security guarantors. For a number of African leaders, Cold War superpowers or former colonial rulers have been an important source of material resources and regime security. This is particularly seen in Francophone countries

where potential political and military rivals are aware that France will use its military might to defend the incumbent from non-democratic challenges (Decalo, 1989).

This type of foreign sponsorship greatly empowers an incumbent leader against potential elite and popular threats (excluding electoral losses). The importance of an external sponsor was shown when France reinstated Gabonese president Leon M’ba after an attempted coup in 1964, aided Chad in an interstate conflict against Libya and supported the Malian government against rebellions in the North. Outside of Africa there are examples of the importance of security guarantors. For example, the Bahraini Royal Family held onto power despite widespread popular demonstrations due to military assistance from Saudi Arabia (Josua and Edel, 2015).

There are other foreign sources of security such as regional organisations and powerful neighbouring countries. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has proved to be an important source of security, playing an important role in enforcing regime security in Mali, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This force is propped up the comparative military might of Nigeria, while post-apartheid South Africa similarly plays the role of regional sheriff in southern and central Africa (Flemes and Wojczewski, 2010).

The historical record suggests that the presence of external guarantors in an important factor in regime security. However, the presence of multiple levels of external security – regional actors such as ECOWAS, international organisations such as the UN, and former colonial rulers – along with informal ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, mean that it can be hard to isolate when a regime is ‘sufficiently’ supported by external actors. Secondly, it is hard to accurately interpret the strength of foreign

security guarantees. While the leadership in Bahrain was saved due to its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, many of the autocrats who were deposed during the Arab Spring were not saved by their regime’s close ties to the United States (Selim, 2013). Lastly, an external guarantor may be a double- edged sword for regime survival, protecting rulers against non-democratic threats but also enforcing their adherence to the democratic process. This was shown when ECOWAS intervened to oust Gambian president Yahya Jammeh after he lost the 2016 election or the involvement of France in ousting Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to cede power after losing the 2010/2011 election.

These complexities and ambiguities meant that time constraints prevented me from addressing these potentially significant factors in depth. Nevertheless, I consider it a potentially influential variable in informing a leader’s strategic calculus, and therefore an interesting area for future study.