Capítulo II Marco Teórico
2.4. Estado del arte de la innovación en México
If the Epicureans allowed interspecies agreements, this would have some
interesting consequences from a modern perspective. It would imply that the
Epicureans truly extend justice to animals and that on their view, human beings would have ‘contractual obligations’ towards them, which could be seen as an important step on the way of arguing for the interests of animals and so perhaps even their ‘rights.’66 I will argue in what follows that the textual evidence suggests that animals cannot form agreements on the Epicurean view, although some passages in Lucretius suggest that there are ‘understandings’ between human beings and animals, which at least in some way resemble the agreements that lead to the existence of justice. However, I will argue that the passage in Lucretius reflects a change in the Epicurean position over time rather than in Epicurus’ teachings.In KD 32, Epicurus leaves open whether there may be a group of animals that is able to form agreements. To decide this issue, one therefore needs to first examine whether animals on the Epicurean view have the cognitive capacities to form agreements. After all, only if they are capable of forming agreements, that is, if they have the requisite capacities to form agreements, is it possible that they are also able to form agreements, that is, they are in circumstances that enable them to form agreements. Let us turn to the Epicurean description of animal psychology. In looking at what the
66 For a contemporary attempt to use the idea of contracts to argue for animal rights, see
Narveson 1977 (see also the reply in Reagan 1977). For the ancient debate, see especially the discussion in Sorabji 1993: 153ff. On the usage of the term ‘rights’ in an ancient context, see Miller 1995: 87ff.
Epicureans think about cognitive capacities of animals and humans, we will see that the Epicureans have quite a nuanced appreciation of animals,67 especially compared to other schools of the time.68 Furthermore, there is some debate among Epicurean authors on what exactly animals can do. Nevertheless, I will argue in what follows that Epicurean animal psychology makes it likely that animals were not able to form agreements, even if there is some evidence in Lucretius that human beings and animals can form understandings that share some of the features of contractual justice.
Let us begin with Epicurus himself. In On Nature XXV,69 a notoriously cryptic text that is not only lacunose but also contains much unexplained technical vocabulary, we read:
We sometimes reproach it [that is, an animal capable of having ‘developments’] all the more, but in an admonitory mode – and not in the way in which we exonerate those animals which are wild by combining their developments and their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.70
67 See Annas 1992: 134ff. and Annas 1993b: 67ff. 68 See Sorabji 1993: 116ff. and Dierauer 1977.
69 The passage is still listed under “Deperditorum librorum reliquae” in Arrighetti, but Laursen
identified the text as belonging to On Nature XXV. While I quote Long and Sedley’s translation in what follows, the critical edition of the text that has been provided by Laursen is invaluable, since it also includes a detailed commentary on the text. For a more recent reading of this difficult text, see Masi 2006.
70 ἔτι µᾶλλον ἐνίοτ[ε κ]ακίζοµεν, ἐν νουθετητ[ικ]ῶι µέντοι µᾶλλον τρόπω[ι], καὶ οὐκ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ
ἄγριατῶνζώιων [καθ]αίροµεν µὲνὁµοίωςαὐτὰτὰἀπογεγε[νν]ηµένα [κ]αὶτὴ[ν] σύστασινεἰςἕντι συµπ[λέ]κοντες, οὐ µὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῶι νουθε[τ]ητ[ι]κῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῶι οὔτε τῶι ἁπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποι[η]τικῶιχρώµεθα. LS 20j = fr. 34.25 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified; on this passage, see especially Huby 1967, Laursen 1988, and Verlinsky 1996. Laursen translates: ‘We occasionally criticize even more – that is, not in the primary blaming way and not as wild animals do, we rinse, in that we plait together the products themselves and the composition.” Arrighetti, in turn, translates: “Per di più talora gli muoviamo delle accuse: sotto forma di rimproveri, e inverno, secondo una certa misura; e non come per le bestie selvagge, quando facciamo una cosa sola dei moti psichici e della constitutione atomica scusiamo ugalemente sia l’una che gli altri. Non usiamo certo né del sistema di rimproverare né di correggere e nemmeno di esser troppo severi…” Note that the gamma in ‘agria’ is no longer legible in the original papyri and one of the two 19th century facsimile has aeria tōn zōiōn (air animals). Furthermore, Long and
While many details of this passage are unclear,71 Epicurus here seems to claim that wild animals are in some way significantly different from non-wild animals. It could Sedley translate ‘sumpleō’ as “conflate,” but this suggests a deliberate confusion on the part of those who ‘weave together’ constitution and developments, which need not be the case. Citing Aristotle’s On the Soul 428a25 and Parts of Animals 643b16, the LSJ lists the specific meaning of sumplokē as the “combination of mental acts so as to form one entity,” which is intended here; Epicurus also uses the term in this way at Letter to Herodotus 72 and 73. Better is Laursen’s translation “plait together,” which may signal a deliberate or non-deliberate act.
71 A key notion needed to make sense of the passage is the idea of a ‘development’
(apogegennēmenon). According to one reading of the passage, the difference between wild and non-wild animals lies in the relationship between what Epicurus calls the ‘developments’ and the make-up or constitution (sustasis). What Epicurus means by ‘apogegennēmena’ is not very clear, yet these seem to decide whether an animal is worthy of praise or blame. Unfortunately, the technical term ‘apogegennēmenon’ is not defined anywhere and the best explanation is perhaps found in the following passage: “So when something develops which takes on some distinctness from the atoms in a differential way – not in the way which is like viewing from a different distance – it acquires responsibility which proceeds from itself [οὕτως ἐπειδὰν ἀπογεννηθῇ τι λανβάνον [τι]νὰ [ἑ]τερότη[τα τῶν] ἀτό[µ]ων κατά τινα πρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου δ[ι]αστήµατος, ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴνἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν].” LS 20B = fr. 34.22 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified; see also the discussion in Masi 2005. Without context, it is difficult to make sense of what this exactly means. However, it could mean that an entity may consist of the atoms that make it up – also referred to as the constitution (sustasis) – and something that is acquired in the course of time that is distinct from the atomic make up, the apogegennēmena. Apogegennēmenon is the perfect participle of apogenaō, which means ‘to beget’ or ‘to produce.’ The apogegennēmena are hence the “developments” that come to be over time and that are distinct from the atomic constitution of an entity. Unfortunately, how and by what process the apogegennēmena are different from the atomic constitution is quite mysterious. The analogy to seeing an object from two different distances that is offered later in the text is puzzling rather than illuminating (see also Laursen 1988: 12f.). In any event, the point that is above all important here is that Epicurus (somehow) argues that there are developments distinctive from the atomic constitution and that this prevents that any entity, insofar as it has developments, can be reduced to its atomic constitution. What is important in this context is the function of the developments: The text claims that the developments (as opposed to the atomic constitution itself) are key when it comes to evaluating ‘responsibility:’ “But many naturally capable of achieving these and those results fail to achieve them, because of themselves, not because of one and the same responsibility [aitian] of the atoms and of themselves. And with these we especially do battle, and rebuke them, <hat>ing [them] for a disposition which follows their disordered congenital nature as in the case of all animals. For the nature of their atoms has contributed nothing to some of their behavior, and degrees of behavior and character, but it is their developments which themselves possess all or most of the responsibility for certain things. It is as a result of that nature that some of their atoms move with disordered motions, but it is not on the atoms that… [Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδ[ε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεγραστικὰ [γί]νεσθαι δι᾽ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίγνεται ἀπ[ε]ργαστικὰ, οὐ διὰ τἠν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τεἀτόµων καὶ ἑαυτῶν·οἷς δὴ καὶ µάλιστα µαχόµεθα καὶ ἐπιτιµῶµεν, µ[ι]σοῦντεςκατὰτὴνἐξἀρχῆ[ς] ταραχώδηφύσινἔχοντακαθ[ά]περἐπὶτῶνπάντωνζώιων. Οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ µεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἡ τῶν ἀτόµων φύσις, ἀλλ᾽αὐτὰ τὰἀπογεγεννηµένατὴνπᾶσα[νἢ] τὴνπλε[ίσ]τηνκέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτίαν τῶνδέ [τι]νων. ἐκδ᾽ ἐκ[ε]ίνης [ἔν]ιαιτῶν [ἀ]τόµωνκινήσειςταραχώδε[ις] κ[ινο]ῦνται, οὐχὶδὲτὰςἀτ[όµου]ς…].” LS 20B = fr. 34.21 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified. There are some textual problems
follow from this that the Epicureans distinguish between wild animals and tame or domestic ones and that this difference overlaps with the distinction between those animals that are able to form agreements and those who are not. However, deducing any firm conclusion from this passage seems problematic, given the state of the text and a lack of context. Let us therefore turn to a different and perhaps more conclusive piece of evidence to address the cognitive capabilities of animals in Epicureanism.
In On Irrational Contempt for Common Conceptions, Polystratus, the third head
of the Garden, who is perhaps one of the last Epicureans to have studied with the school founder himself (which would make doctrinal continuity between his views and Epicurus’ own views more likely) explicitly discusses the cognitive capacities of animals. Unfortunately, much of Polystratus’ argument is lost due to the poor condition of the papyrus scroll it was preserved on, and the passages that are relevant in this context are too dispersed to quote in full. Nevertheless, in his treatise, Polystratus is concerned with demonstrating that human beings and animals crucially differ in regard to reason (logismos). Animals, Polystratus claims, “do not share in reason or not in one like
Sedley suggest, but this has been challenged by Laursen who argues that this does not fit the lacuna preceding the text and that it should rather be the developments themselves that are the subject of the sentence (1988: 10; see also Annas 1992: 131, fn. 25). Second, the root of the present participle in the second sentence is not preserved in the manuscript. ‘Hating’ is Long and Sedley’s interpolation. Be this as it may, the key Greek term in the above passage is ‘aitia’, which is most commonly translated as ‘cause’ (which bears the problem that the modern understanding of causality is different than that of the ancients). The idea is that only action that is produced by the developments can be praiseworthy or blameworthy action. This means that animals cannot be held accountable for their atomic make-up, either. For instance, we cannot blame a cat for scratching the new couch if this scratching is necessitated by her atomic make-up. What is interesting, then, is that the text acknowledges that developments may also take place in animals and that these developments are the cause of blame. Unfortunately, Epicurus does not offer us any more detail here as to which behavior in animals is part of their atomic constitution and which is not, which would be the first step in developing a classification of animals.
ours.”72 Polystratus does not outright deny reason to animals, but he insists that there are certain cognitive operations that animals cannot perform and that these distinguish animals from human beings. More explicitly, Polystratus names the following, related differences:73 he points out that animals are not able to remember past events74 and he even denies that animals are able learn; animals on his view only live in the present.75 Furthermore, he explicitly claims that animals do not have the ability to grasp the beautiful and shameful and other such things or to understand signs (sēmeia), omens (oiōnoi), and tidings (klēdones).76 On this view, animals take in sensory information, but that they are not able to process this information as human beings are. To make this point, Polystratus uses several verbs that stress understanding and comprehension,77 claiming that this ‘understanding’ is unique to human beings; it distinguishes human beings from animals.
The ability to form agreements is not explicitly discussed in the text. However, it seems that it could be added to the list. After all, the description of the cognitive capacities of animals in Polystratus is enough to indict animals. Without memory, the ability to learn, and a grasp of things that are beneficial,78 animals are unlikely to be able
72 τὸ µὴ κοινωνεῖν λογισµοῦ ἢ µ[ὴ οἵ]ου ἡµεῖς. On Irrational Contempt, col. VII.5ff. Indelli;
emphasis added.
73 See also Haussleiter 1935: 286f.
74 [οὔτετὰπαρελθ]όντα µνη[µ]ονε[ύειν]. Col. IV.1f. Admittedly, the text is here very uncertain. 75 Col. IV.2f.
76 Col. VII.1ff.
77 See sunoraō at col. I.2 and VII.4f. and eulabeomai at col. III.4f.
78 This does not mean that an animal (or in fact anyone) has to have fully formed views about
justice in the sense of a fully articulated theory in order to form agreements. It only means that whoever forms agreements needs to have some beliefs about what is beneficial, so that the coordination with others (the agreeing) about what is just is possible.
to form agreements. Given how animals were described, any other conclusion would be very odd.
This overall impression is confirmed in Hermarchus, Epicurus’ immediate successor as head of the Garden. His view of animals on the whole is less nuanced than that of Polystratus:
Now if people had been able [edunato] to make a kind of agreement with the remaining animals [ta loipa tōn zōōn], as with human beings, over not killing and not being killed indiscriminately by us, it would have been fine to push justice up to this point; for it would tend to security. But since it was impossible [tōn amēchanōn ēn] to associate with law creatures that lack reason, it was not possible [ouk hoion te] to use such an instrument as the means of providing for utility in our security from other living beings any more than from lifeless things. That is why the only way to achieve such security as possible is to take the licence which we now have to kill them.79
According to Hermarchus, agreements with animals would be desirable because they extend security for human beings to the animal kingdom: Natural threats would 79 Εἰ µὲν οὖν ἠδύναντο ποιήσασθαί τινα συνθήκην ὥσπερ πρὸς ἀνθρώπουςοὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰτῶνζῴωνὑπὲρτοῦ µὴκτείνειν µηδὲπρὸςἡµῶνἀκρίτωςαὐτὰκτείνεσθαι, καλῶςεἶχε µέχρι τούτου τὸ δίκαιον ἐξάγειν· ἐπιτεταµένον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν ἀµηχάνων ἦνκοινωνῆσαι νόµου τὰ µὴ δεχόµενατῶνζῴων λόγον, διὰ µὲν τοῦτοιούτουτρόπου τὸ συµφέρον οὐχ οἷόν τε κατασκευάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐµψύχων ἀσφάλειαν µᾶλλόνπερἢτῶνἀψύχων, ἐκδὲτοῦτὴνἐξουσίανλαµβάνειν, ἣννῦνἔχοµεν, εἰςτὸκτείνειναὐτά, µόνωςἔστιτὴνἐνδεχοµένηνἔχεινἀσφάλειαν. Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.12.5ff.; Translation by Clark, modified. Alberti uses this passage to argue for four claims: (1) that there are laws without agreements, (2) that there are regulatory laws and laws of justice, (3) that regulatory laws are useful, but not just, (4) that laws that concern animals are regulatory laws (1995: 167f. and fn. 12). In response to this, one first may say that ‘echousia’ need not be an entitlement conferred by the law, as Alberti claims; it can also be one that agents naturally have. See, for instance, Democritus’ claim that “the laws would not prevent each to live according to her own echousia [οὐκἂνἐκώλυονοἱνόµοιζῆνἕκαστονκατ' ἰδίηνἐξουςίην].” 68 DK B 245. If this is so, then the text does not provide an example of a law without agreements (pace (1)). Second, as Alberti herself explicitly acknowledges, laws concerning the behavior towards animals could be agreements between two human agents about how to treat animals. It is therefore unclear why a law concerning animals cannot be just, especially if it concerns refraining from harm (pace (4)). The passage discusses a scenario, in which animals are contracting with humans, and this hypothetical scenario is dismissed as unrealistic because animals cannot form agreements according to Hermarchus. However, it still follows that if it were possible for animals to form agreements, these agreements would also have the character of being just. Finally, then, since Alberti does not provide other evidence for regulatory laws, the distinction she draws with the help of Hermarchus’ text seems dubious (pace (2) and (3)).
greatly diminish.80 Yet Hermarchus also claims that such agreements are impossible because non-human beings do not possess reason (ta mē dechomena tōn zōōn logon), varying Polystratus’ claim that animals do not have reason like ours. Without reason, animals will easily violate the terms of the agreements and the end for which the agreements (security) were originally formed will not be obtained. Forming agreements in such a situation indeed seems futile. Thus, Hermarchus seems right to insist that animals do not have reason and hence cannot partake in justice – at least not in the way being discussed here, namely, in forming agreements with human beings. However, Hermarchus also speaks about “the rest of the animals” (ta loipa tōn zōōn), which – on an alternative reading – could again imply that only certain animals are unable to form agreements, while others indeed are able to do so, even if such a reading is unlikely given the evidence about the cognitive capacities of animals according to Epicurean psychology.
The case against agreements with animals in Epicureanism thus seems quite compelling. However, Lucretius also discusses their cognitive capabilities and their relationship to human beings in detail. First, note that throughout The Nature of Things, Lucretius diverges from other Epicureans in what he thinks animals are capable of;81 of all Epicurean authors whose work on the subject is extant, Lucretius grants animals the most extensive cognitive capacities. Most significantly, Lucretius claims that animals have animus, which is the Epicurean technical term for a rational soul.82 And as we
80 Note that the argument is wholly anthropocentric: Animals are not to be protected and included
in the sphere of justice because of themselves, but because this would mean that human beings would be exposed to less threats.
81 See Sorabji 1993: 28f.