Estanterías Compactas o drive-in

a.k.a. ante mortem statement or statement in articulo mortis Requisites

1. That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of the fact

A declaration will be deemed as having been made under the consciousness of imminent death, in consideration of:

a) The words or statements of the declarant on the same occasion;

b) His conduct at the time the declaration was made (US v. Virrey); or

c) The serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily engender a belief on his part that he would not survive therefrom (People v. Avila, People v. Sarabia), especially where he died an hour thereafter (People v. Brioso, People v. Garcia, People v. Araja).

The

intervening time from the making of the declaration up

to the actual death of the declarant is immaterial , as long as the declaration was made under the consciousness of impending death (US v. Mallari) which is a question of fact for the trial court to determine (People v. Extra), and as long as no retraction was made by the declarant until his demise. Where the gravity of the wound did not diminish, the admissibility of the dying declaration is not affected by the fact that the declarant died hours or days later (People v. Devaras) or even 14 days later (People v. Jacinto). It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement was made , and not the rapid succession of death , that renders the dying declaration admissible . (People v. Sabio)

However, the time interval between the declaration and the death of the declarant may be taken into account where the declaration is ambiguous as to whether the declarant believed that his death was imminent when he made such declaration. Thus, where the declarant stated that he would not die if treated, such statement indicates an awareness of death and the nature of his wound and his death an hour later qualifies such statement into a dying declaration, or, at least, as part of the res gestae (People v. Antonio).

Where, shortly after he was wounded, the victim was asked as to whether he believed he would die and to which he replied “I cannot ascertain” and he died the following day, his statement is admissible both as part of the res gestae and as a dying declaration. (People v. Gueron)

Where the viction, when asked as to whether he thought he would die, replied:

- “I don’t know,” his declaration was not made under the consciousness of his imminent death and does not qualify as an ante mortem statement, although the same was admitted as part of the res gestae since it was made immediately after the incident. (People v. Laquinon)

- “It all depends,” and his condition had progressively improved, his statements thereafter cannot be considered as a dying declaration. (People v. Lanza)

2. That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death

Statements referring to the antecedents of the fateful encounter (People v. Bustos) or opinions, impressions or conclusions of the declarant (State v. Horn) are not admissible; but all facts relating to the cause of such death are admissible whether the same are in favor or against the accused (US v. Clemente, US v. Antipolo, People v. Martinez).

3. That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to

4. That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry

After a dying declaration is proved and admitted as such, its credibility and weight should be determined by the courts under the same rules used in testing the weight and credibility of any other testimonial evidence. (People v. Aniel, People v. Ola)

Such factors as where the facts narrated by the declarant have occurred under circumstances of surprise, rapidity, and confusion, should not be lost by oversight, because the accuracy of his observation of the occurrences before him could be blurred by such disorder and rapidity of events and, therefore, he could be mistaken in his identification of his assailant. Taking into consideration, too, that the source, accuracy and completeness of the declarant’s knowledge as to the facts by him asserted could not be tested by cross- examination, a dying declaration has to be accepted with utmost care and should be considered in light of all the facts proved in the case. (People v. Mallare)

A dying declaration may be oral or written or made by signs which could be interpreted and testified to by a witness thereto. The [spouse] of the declarant may testify to the same, either for the prosecution or as a defense witness, and this does not violate the marital privilege as a dying declaration is not considered a confidential communication between the spouses (US v. Antipolo). If the ante mortem statement was made orally, the witness who heard it may testify thereto, without necessarily reproducing the exact words as long as he can give the substance thereof, and if the deceased had an unsigned dying declaration, the same may be used as a memorandum by the witness who took it down (People v. Odencio).

A dying declaration may be attacked on the ground that any of the requisites for its admissibility are not present, and the same may be impeached in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness on the stand (US v. Castellon, People v. Malacon, People v. Aniel). American jurisprudence is to the effect that dying declarations are on the same footing as testimony of a witness on the stand and whatever would disqualify such witness would also make such declarations incompetent evidence (People v. Sanchez, Donnelly v. State) RIANO:

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus admissible, to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reason for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness (People v. Cerilla).

As presently worder, R130 §37 no longer places any limitation on the type of action in which a dying declaration may be introduced. As long as the relevance is clear, a dying declaration may now be introduced in a criminal or a civil action and the relevance is satisfied where the subject of inquiry is the death of the declarant himself.

A mere consciousness of death is not enough… the declarant must be conscious that the death is near and certain, and

what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence.

Apart from the statements of the declarant, consciousness of an impending death may be established by other circumstances such as the nature of the injury and the conduct of the declarant... the declarant’s belief that he is going to die soon may be shown circumstantially by the obvious fatal quality of the wound, by the statements made to the victim by the physician that his condition is hopeless, or by some other circumstances (People v. Silang Cruz, People v. Chan Lin Watt)

A dying declaration may be attacked in the same manner as one would do to a testimony in open court.

Cases: PEOPLE V . SABIO (1981)

It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement was made, and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

PEOPLE V . LAQUINON (1985)

• When the deceased was in doubt as to W/N he would die, his dying declaration is not admissible as an ante- mortem declaration.

• A dying declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae when the declarant’s statement was made immediately after the incident and he had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

PEOPLE V . DE JOYA (1991)

To be admissible, a dying declaration must be complete in itself – the statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.

PEOPLE V . COMILING (2004)

An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest order. It is doctrinal that when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced.

MARTURILLAS V . PEOPLE (2006)

The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.

2. Declaration against interest (R130.38)

Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)

2) DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST