Capítulo 4.Variables personales implicadas en la orientación en el
4.2. Estilos y Estrategias de Afrontamiento en el contexto universitario
The Chemical sector is comprised of three main functional areas: manufacturing plants, transport systems, and distribution systems. This sector produces a diverse range of products which are incorporated into everyday essentials such as pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and water management chemicals. The Chemical sector deals with a vast array of chemicals that present unique security challenges. These challenges are based on the potential consequences of weaponization, diversion, or unavailability of the chemical. The expansive nature of the Chemical Sector complicates communications amongst public safety response and planning personnel and the large number of chemical facilities throughout the Commonwealth make this sector a cause for concern.
Potential Trend(s) Impacting Sector
As with many other sectors, current or potential trends of interest to law enforcement pertain to physical, cyber, or human vulnerabilities. While various aspects of Terrorism Tradecraft can be used to probe physical and human vulnerabilities, cyber attacks on SCADA systems could result in major damage. Physical efforts to weaponize or divert chemicals could be used in the planning or execution of a bioterrorism incident.
Potential Threat Group(s)
The Chemical/Hazmat sectors could potentially be targeted by a number of international and domestic groups. International groups like al-Qa’ida could view an attack on a chemical manufacturing plant as a viable means to create significant human casualties as well as economic damage. Targeting from domestic groups could come from environmental or animal rights extremist groups. Environmental groups may view chemical plants as harmful to nature. Animal groups may target this sector due to some chemical suppliers providing materials to animal research labs.395
Sector List Criteria
The Sector List for the Chemical Manufacturing Sector will be determined, in part, based on data submitted by facility owners and operators through the Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS). DHS will work directly with the sector and relevant federal government agencies to address those CIKR not subject to CFATS. The result will be a Sector List that combines high-consequence CFATS and non-CFATS chemical facilities.
2009
VIRGINIA TERRORISM
THREAT ASSESSMENT
Domestic Incidents
Sporadic nationwide reporting of potential surveillance of chemical and HAZMAT facilities and transport systems continues. Most of the reported incidents involve suspicious videotaping or photography of facilities with no apparent scenic or tourist value. Some incidents involve potential probes of security by individuals claiming to be lost or confused. Of particular interest was a recent report regarding a potential threat to the petrochemical infrastructure advising that an “inauthentic safety survey request” had been received by several American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) members.396 A number of association members reported receiving calls from a group claiming to represent AIChE or Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) asking them to participate in a survey about process safety. Neither organization was conducting such a survey. The Virginia Fusion Center does not have a full picture of how many members may have been contacted or how their information was obtained. The individuals who reported this survey expressed concern that this may have been a social engineering attempt to determine security vulnerabilities regarding chemical processes.
Virginia
While white powder incidents are the predominant form of HAZMAT type situations for Virginia law enforcement, a number of suspicious incidents involving chemical sector infrastructure have occurred within the past three years. Incidents of concern have included:
• suspicious facility photography • chemical theft
• suspicious chemical possession,
• possible tampering of transportation lines397
Although none of these incidents have been conclusively linked to terrorist activities, additional information is needed to identify the individuals involved and their motivations for engaging in these activities.
2009
VIRGINIA TERRORISM
THREAT ASSESSMENT
Intelligence Gaps
1. What groups represent the largest threat to Virginia’s Chemical sector? 2. Have any Virginia facilities received suspicious inquiries about employment? 3. Have any Virginia facilities experienced potential surveillance activities?
4. Have any Virginia facilities experienced solicitation regarding facility access or tests of security measures?
5. Have any facilities experienced incidents of unauthorized access or break-ins to facilities, either physical or cyber related?
6. Have any institutions received threats against facilities or members?
7. Have any Virginia facilities experienced a loss of official uniforms, identifications, vehicles, or property?
8. Have any companies experienced potential issues of insider threat from current or recently separated employees, contractors, or vendors?
Projections
While physical breaches or attacks of a Chemical/HAZMAT sector facility will always be a primary concern, cyber attacks will likely play an increasing role in potential threats to this critical infrastructure. Although most facilities and plants are difficult to access remotely, the sector could be compromised by an insider either for individual malicious reasons or as part of an international terrorist group attack.
Interest as Target: Remain Constant – No intelligence suggests any change in interest; however, an attack on Virginia's Chemical / HAZMAT sector could result in significant physical and financial losses, as well as have a major psychological toll. Number of Virginia-based assets: Possible Decrease - Virginia has reported steady production in many of the subsectors within the Chemical / HAZMAT industry in recent years; the impact of the current economic recession may cause a decrease in total assets in the short to midterm.
Interdependencies: The Chemical/Hazmat sector has interdependencies with most of the surface transportation subsectors, energy, IT, and wastewater facilities.