Algoritmo 10.17. Definiciones de alcance basadas en la estructura.
10.12 ESTIMACIÓN DE TIPOS
In our post/neo-‐colonial society, the medical gaze and the disciplinary gaze can be subsumed under the broader colonial gaze. The colonial gaze is also embedded in the principles of the Enlightenment, on ideas of rationality, civilisation, and progress. For colonised peoples, the colonial gaze transfixes the Other identity as abnormal and savage, in need of saving/civilising, yet impossible to fully save/civilise (Bhabha, 1994; Fanon, 2008). In Aotearoa New Zealand, the colonial gaze places Māori as the target.
Colonization is a process of power/domination that functions through the gathering and interpreting of knowledge about the Other, and which subsequently reinforces the colonizer’s own self-‐image as civilized/superior (Bhabha, 1994). According to Bhabha, through “'knowing' the native population in these terms, discriminatory and authoritarian forms of political control are considered appropriate” and so Others are “then deemed to be both the cause and effect of the system, imprisoned in the circle of interpretation” (1994, 83). Bhabha draws on Césaire’s (1972) ‘thingification’ to articulate the disempowering and dehumanizing effects of colonization for Indigenous peoples.
The effects of colonization continue in Aotearoa New Zealand today, as in other ‘post’-‐ colonial nations. Continued social, health, and economic disparities between Indigenous peoples and non-‐Indigenous people are evidence of this, “despite political or individual rhetoric that may claim otherwise” (Biggs & Baird, 2009, 2). Young Māori mothers challenge cultural, social and medical norms by being non-‐Pākehā, by engaging in non-‐ normative (‘too young’) sexual (and social) activities, and choosing to mother ‘too young’. Young mothers (usually associated with being Māori) are often portrayed as a burden on the health and social welfare systems, and as incapable/negligent (Breheny, 2006). However, by drawing upon Bhabha, Foucault and Butler, and their theories of resistance, we can problematize these interpretations.
Cultural difference, the process of negotiation allowing self-‐identification, muddies the waters of colonial knowledge and in doing so changes the identity of both the colonized and the colonizer. By desiring, seeking, being more than a static given identity, subordinated peoples can re-‐appropriate themselves and their histories through the act of self-‐articulation (Bhabha, 1994). This takes place in the Third Space, between the speaker and the listener, where discursive conditions enable signs to “be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew” (Bhabha, 1994, 37). In the Third Space, the roles of the seer and the seen can be reversed (Bhabha, 1994). As with Foucault, Bhabha argues that the colonizing gaze of disciplinary apparatuses depends on surveillance for “strategies of objectification, normalization and discipline” (1994, 83). Bhabha offers a theory of resistance to this totalizing power, where “the look of surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the disciplined, where the observer becomes the observed and 'partial' representation rearticulates the whole notion of identity and alienates it from essence” (1994, 89).
The Third Space produces new forms of representation including mimicry, sly civility and hybridity (Bhabha, 1994). Mimicry, the partial representation of the Other through a mask of conformity, turns the gaze of the observer/colonizer back on itself. Sly civility, the performance of the Other as the good subject/object, thinly veils the Other’s contempt/mockery, a private joke on the colonizer’s authority. Hybridity appropriates and merges representations from both colonizer and colonized, producing identities that challenge the “rules of recognition” (Bhabha, 1994, 114), ambivalently “disciplinary and disseminatory” (Bhabha, 1994, 112). Mimicry, sly civility and hybridity elude resemblance, instead producing “a subversive strategy of subaltern agency that negotiates its own authority through a process of iterative 'unpicking' and incommensurable, insurgent relinking” (Bhabha, 1994, 185). Self-‐enunciation, talking-‐ back through iterative subjectivity, is a strategy of resistance.
Foucault also offers a theory of resistance to domination. Foucault opposes binary views of power, instead arguing that it “comes from below” (1980, 94). For Foucault (1980), resistance is present everywhere, even in those most downtrodden places. Foucault states “[p]ower is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (1980, 93). There are no relations, familial, sexual or
otherwise, exterior to relations of power. Power is both cause and effect of relations on every level (Foucault, 2009). Hence, individuals are subject to power, but also active agents of power. They shape and are shaped by power (Foucault, 1980). Power, once dispersed, is liable to a life of its own, to change, to be appropriated. Individuals are able to determine their own identities through ethical self-‐formation, the work that one does on oneself, to ‘know oneself’ (Foucault, 2010). This affords subjects agency, albeit within the matrix of power that is ever changing (yet ever-‐present), and offers endless possibilities for resistance.
Butler’s (2006) theory of signification and identity as performative is valuable when considering how subjects are formed. Identity, as a signifying practice, is “constituted by but perhaps not determined by discourse” (Butler, 2006, 195). For Butler (2006), the rules of signification are repressive and also productive, as they enable new forms of signification to be enacted. This is where agency can be found, “within the possibility of a variation on…repetition” (Butler, 2006, 198). Following from Foucault’s concept of power/resistance (1980), Butler argues that “it is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity becomes possible” (Butler, 2006, 198). For Butler, if we view identity as an effect (produced by repetitive performance), we can see new possibilities for agency, where identity is “neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary” (Butler, 2006, 201).
Using these complementary concepts of enunciation (Bhabha, 1994), power/resistance (Foucault, 1980), and signification (Butler, 2006), we can problematize dominant discourses that speak ‘of’ and ‘for’ young Māori mothers, and that (in doing so) interpret them as abnormal, as perpetually Other. Dominant developmental and medical discourses about adolescence and teen parenthood can be seen as certain games of veridiction, neither universal nor accidental. Through exploring the ways in which these young Māori mothers articulate/enunciate their own subjectivities we find a Third Space where self-‐enunciation/self-‐signification/self-‐formation resists cultural hegemony, subverts normative assumptions about appropriate life course/life choices, and problematizes stereotypes.
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I discuss resistance in the form of ‘taonga tuku iho’ (treasures to pass on), including the continuation of whakapapa (genealogy) and Mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge systems). Second, I discuss ‘mana motuhake’ (autonomy/self-‐determination), including resistance to social prejudices and stereotypes. Third, I discuss ‘ngā tūmanako’ (aspirations/hopes). Finally, I reflect on how these acts of resistance are situated in complex fields of power (Foucault, 1980), considering the works of Foucault, Bhabha and Butler, as well as critical youth theory and Indigenous perspectives.