ESTRATEGIA DUA

The use of driverless vehicles in several industries within the transport sector is emerging with the general acceptance of the travelling public, particularly in the rail industry. It has been possible to run light rail and subway-type systems in a driverless mode for decades. Partially automated trains using automatic train operation (ATO) have been used on passenger services on the Victoria Line in London’s underground service since 1968. In 1987, The London Docklands Light Railway opened – the first fully automated, light metro system featuring driverless cars. In 2012, then London Mayor Boris Johnson predicted that there would be driverless tube trains within 10 years (BBC News, 2012).

Whilst driverless train technology is being championed as a way of reducing human error and reaching new levels of efficiency, critics have expressed concern about entrusting public safety to a fully-automated system and doubt about whether the public would feel safe without a qualified human driver on board.

1.7.1 Other industries using driverless vehicles

In Australia, the mining company Rio Tinto have a well-developed plan called the AutoHaul project. Rio Tinto refer to their US$518m system as “…The world’s first fully autonomous, heavy-haul, long-distance railway system which is intended to transport iron ore from the company’s 15 mines in Australia’s Pilbara region”

(Briginshaw, 2016, p. 1).

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hub in partnership with Holden. Transport experts see driverless cars no longer as a vision of the distant future but as something that will become a reality in less than a decade (Dudley-Nicholson, 2016).

Kantowitz, Becker, and Barlow (1993) estimated that Advanced Traveller

Information Systems (ATIS) technology may require 20 years to be accepted by 40% of the population. Many of those who see beyond the doubts view automation in cars as vital to increasing safety on the roads. Where human error accounts for 94% of road traffic accidents, taking humans out of the loop could result in a significant reduction in road toll, much as automation in aviation has done (Cowan, 2017).

A fundamental difference between aviation and automated driving systems, however, is that in aviation the manufacturers are designing for a select group of individuals who are subject to mandatory training and proficiency in a highly- regulated industry (Parasuraman & Mouloua, 2009). This might influence the acceptance of single-pilot or pilotless aircraft.

1.7.2 The concept of remotely piloted planes in commercial operations

Learmount (2011), a veteran airline pilot and journalist, predicted that pilotless commercial aircraft will become a reality in the future. “The pilotless aircraft is no longer unthinkable” (Sandilands, 2013, p. 3). Airliners are already highly automated, and pilots increasingly perform a monitoring rather than a flying role. Meanwhile, unmanned or remotely-piloted aircraft are gradually taking over many military and general aviation tasks now performed by piloted aircraft. Also referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), drones or Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), these aircraft vary in both size and function, and their use has increased exponentially over the last decade. Originally deployed for military and special

operation applications, they are increasingly used in such fields as agriculture, real estate, security work, wildlife protection and firefighting. UAV range from individual “toys” to commercial vehicles that may be as large as an airliner. According to a

report published earlier this month by the Teal Group Corp., it is estimated that US$6.4 b will be spent on developing drone technology worldwide by 2025 (Finnegan, 2015).

Although drones are considered to be pilotless vehicles, the term is misleading. Defined by ICAO as an aircraft without an on-board human pilot, drones are remotely controlled either from the ground or from another vehicle, and as a result they are subject to Human Factors safety risks. For example, on September 30, 2016, New York’s La Guardia Airport ATC reported that Republic Airlines Flight 6230 was

almost hit by a drone as the passenger plane was descending to land (Whitlock, 2014). In August 2014, the New York Police Department alleged that a small drone nearly collided with a police helicopter over the George Washington Bridge, forcing the helicopter to change course to avoid a collision (McNeal, 2014).

In 2014, a near miss between a drone and a commercial aircraft in Perth, Australia, prompted a warning from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) about the dangers of drones. An aircraft heading towards Perth airport had to take evasive action to avoid a collision with a drone. The ATSB reported two incidents at other airports over subsequent days. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) reported rapid growth in commercial use of drones and urged regulations to avoid a

catastrophe (ABC News, 2014).

In New Zealand (NZ), as drone ownership soars, incidents reported to the NZCAA are increasing. 2016 saw 37 incident reports noted by the NZCAA, and there were 60

Chapter 1 : Introduction

more sophisticated, they are being recommended as a substitute for commercial operations.

Although it could be argued that the general public would not accept pilotless aircraft, Ballin (in Comerford et al, 2013) commented on the steady increases in the sophistication of aircraft technology over the past 100 years and “suggested that the younger generation would not have the same ‘hang-ups’ as us” (Comerford et al.,

2013, p. 11).

For pilotless airplanes to be accepted, however, the travelling public will need to be assured that there is no additional risk. If they are reluctant to ride in driverless cars, passengers will feel even less confident in a 3-dimensional environment (such as an aircraft) and would look for greater safeguards. Steven Rice of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (Rice et. al., 2014) admitted that it might be more difficult for the public to travel in pilotless aircraft than driverless trains or cars because of the perceived loss of control. If a train or car loses its autopilot, it will not necessarily crash, and the passenger feels some level of control as a result. When an airliner loses its autopilot, it generally “falls out of the sky” (Moskvitch, 2016).

The aviation community, who have a greater knowledge of the technology involved in automated aircraft, seem to have more confidence in the concept of remotely-controlled planes. During a debate at the Royal Aeronautical Society

(RAeS) Conference in 2016, the motion “There will be no need for pilots in 40 years” was carried by 60 votes to 40 (RAeS, 2016).

1.7.3 Safety of drones

When comparing crewed with un-crewed aircraft, it could be argued that un- crewed aircraft are safer. Accident investigators and researchers are currently

concentrating on HF as the predominant causal factor in aircraft accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2012). To improve safety, aircraft designers and manufacturers have responded by increasing the amount of automation on board to remove the pilot from the loop either somewhat or completely.

There is little doubt that such automation has markedly improved efficiency and productivity in highly-critical systems. For instance, the accident rate in modern automated aircraft is significantly lower than in previous generations (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). Other experts have noted that computers do not get distracted, do not fly drunk, do not get tired or emotionally affected, and fly precise trajectories and flight paths (Robinson, editor-in-chief of RAeS, 2016).

Computers, in other words, could have prevented the GermanWings tragedy by remotely locking out the pilot and landing the aircraft safely. They could also

intervene in the event of pilot incapacitation. Conversely, a computer could not have landed an aircraft on the Hudson River – a feat that required the skill, knowledge and decision-making qualities of an experienced pilot using unique problem-solving capabilities (RAeS, 2016).

1.7.4 Human factors elements of pilotless aircraft

Controlling an aircraft from the ground, whilst technically possible, involves a number of HF risks arising primarily from the fact that operator and aircraft are not co-located. Such separation of operator and vehicle imposes significant barriers to optimum human performance, including loss of sensory cues valuable for flight control, delays in control and communications loops, and fatigue, decision making, and cognitive workload issues. McCarley and Wickens (2005) posed the question: “What are the consequences for system safety of pilot judgment when the pilot no

Chapter 1 : Introduction

longer has a ‘shared fate’ with the vehicle? Will there be subtle shifts in risk taking that might affect overall airspace safety?” (p. 10). In an example that illustrates the legitimacy of this concern, Jeszka (2015) reports from a study with simulator pilots and neurologists undertaken by Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace in Toulouse which showed that a takeoff in a simulator did not raise a pilot’s heartrate to the degree that a real takeoff did.

This thesis explores HF in depth and examines ways in which human performance can be improved, in particular concentrating on the single-pilot and smaller

commercial operations that do not have the infrastructure or the resources of larger airlines.