3.2 3 Búsqueda de transparencia
3.5. Estrategias comunicativas
stake in the negotiations and is not associated with a strong viewpoint on the issue’.32
This observation was generally true as far as Australia’s mediatory role was concerned
although on occasions (such as the EEZ) Australia did attempt to play a mediatory role
where it was directly concerned with the outcome.
181 In Committee One, Australia had few direct interests at stake apart from protecting its metal exports as no Australian mining interests were seeking to participate in seabed exploitation. Australian policy was basically to ‘steer a middle course between the aggressive demands of W estern mining interests and the ideologically opposed developing states with Australian delegates Mott, Bailey, Harry and Keith Brennan seeking to bring about compromises between the main parties’.33 ln NG1, 2 and 3 and later in the Working Group of 21 Australia consistently adopted middle ground positions. Apart from a strong desire not to see the collapse of the conference (see next section), Australia’s mediatory policy in Committee One was also based on tactical considerations: a conciliatory policy on seabed mining was seen as useful in building support for Australia’s margin claim in Committee Two. In the end of course Australia could not determine the outcome of the seabed regime, for other states basically set the agenda. Australia played an active role in two of the most important compromise groups o f the conference— the Evensen Group and the Castaneda group (where A ustralia’s Keith Brennan became the Chairman after Castaneda became the Foreign Minister of Mexico). These groups played an extremely important role in the conference in getting compromise solutions to a number of difficult issues in Committee Two and Three. A ustralia’s participation in the Evensen group inter-sessional meetings allowed Australia to have an opportunity to contribute to the work of the group. On the EEZ issue A ustralia was concerned that a final solution on its legal status not compromise navigation rights but this did not prevent the delegation from pursuing a mediatory role between the more extreme territorialists in the Coastal States Group and the United States. To what extent Australia was successful here is difficult to say as there is nothing on the public record concerning the details of these negotiations, although Australia’s proposal on the EEZ at the fourth session was not pushed for lack of support from both camps. The m ost that can be safely said with respect to Australia’s mediatory efforts on the EEZ issue was that it played a ‘prom inent’ part in the work of the Castaneda Group34 whose product was incorporated in the ICNT at the end of the sixth session.
On the MSR issue Australia played a leading role in promoting a settlement. A ustralia’s goals were to some extent conflicting here. On the one hand Australia had lim ited capabilities to conduct MSR and therefore argued that the coastal states should have adequate power to control and regulate activities in its offshore area with regard to resources and the preservation of the marine environment. On the other hand from the scientific viewpoint A ustralia’s interest was as much that of a researching state. In the past many Australian scientists had worked in foreign waters and for an understanding of important aspects of Australia’s marine environment it was necessary for research to be carried out in foreign waters (in particular waters adjacent to Indonesia, PNG and New
C aledonia).35 These two concerns led Australia to take a middle of the road stance on MSR as a solution acceptable to the researching states and coastal states was always likely to be acceptable to Australia. Australia at various times throughout the conference proposed compromise texts and initiated private meetings of moderate states to find solutions to the problems surrounding M SR.36 The latter course was tactically not without risk: in forming private groups the reputation of the Chairman and his delegation were at stake. Compromise texts could result in criticism not only of the proposal but also the Chairman.37 Australia’s efforts in the MSR did not appear to have attracted any adverse reaction even though efforts late in the conference to meet some of the concerns o f the US on the MSR issue saw Australia adopt a more accommodating position than some of its allies in the Coastal States Group. In adopting such an attitude it appeared that Australia’s emphasis early in the conference for a fairly strong coastal states rights orientation with respect to MSR shifted slightly at the end towards a greater degree of support for the value of freedom of scientific research.
On the marine environment issue Australia’s position shifted from a fairly strong coastal state position to a more middle of the road view that sought to reconcile the interests of shipping with adequate protection of the marine environment.38 The best example here was A ustralia’s compromise proposal (included in the final Convention) on the issue of coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea relating to vessel source pollution that had been on-going from the second to the sixth session.39
In the area of navigational issues Australia generally sided with the maritime powers but did play a role in group discussions which sought to clarify the circumstances where innocent passage could be suspended.40 In the area of dispute settlement Australia participated in the private group on this issue which saw Australian actors Harry and Lauterpacht play active roles (Harry being a co-chairman of the group). Australia was one o f eight members of the group that submitted a working paper to the conference containing alternative texts on basic provisions of a chapter of the Convention on dispute settlem ent.41 The working group in fact made a ‘significant contribution towards the evolution of the disputes settlement part of the final convention’.42 In the mediatory role A ustralia’s proposal at Caracas on procedures for the conference contributed to the compromise solution that was reached on the rules of procedure 43