Estrategias Mercantiles

It is a conceptual weakness of castle studies that there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a castle. Whilst everyone has a clear idea of what a castle looks like, the establishment of a consensus on a definition of this, apparently simple and common, archaeological feature has proved remarkably difficult. This terminological and conceptual chaos is paradoxical because castles have been subject to an intensive level of study, have probably never been more popular, and remain one of the most straightforward kinds of archaeological sites with which the public engages.

The theoretical position, known in history as post-modernism (LaCapra 1985; Somekawa and Smith 1988: 149-61; Ankersmit 1989: 137-53; Rosenau 1992) and in archaeology as post- processualism (Hodder 1986; Earle and Preucel 1987: 501-38; Shanks and Tilley 1987; Watson and Fotiadis 1990: 613-29; Watson 1990; Johnson 2002), has responded by simply abandoning the quest for a single definition, or meta-narrative, in favour o f a negotiated definition created by numerous local narratives. However, it is the contention o f this thesis that it is academically unsatisfying to abjure any attempt at objectivity in castle studies, as that leaves nothing more than a multiplicity of competing ‘narratives’ rather than a testable model (Himmelfarbe 1994:

131-192; Eagleton 1996; 2003; Evans 2000). Creating testable models was the original purpose of archaeological theory, which along with data is used to generate results and conclusions (Clarke 1968; 1973: 6-18). It is noted that there has long been a theorically coherant, empirical and statistically rigorous tradition in medieval studies (Welldon Finn 1967; Darby 1971).

An example of the current conceptual chaos is the persistence of the old definition of a castle as a ‘defensible lordly residence’ (d’Auvergne 1907: 1; Armitage 1912: 6 & 62; Davison 1967c:

39-48; Davison 1969a: 37-47; Brown 1969a: 1-14; 1969b: 131-48; Parsons 1978; Hollister 1998: 140-1). Saunders (1977: 1-10) was the first to point out that this definition is inadequate, which has been demonstrated by the identification of Anglo-Saxon ‘defensible lordly

residences’ called OE burhgeatas (Ekwall: 1947: 71; White lock 1955: 431-2; Williams 1992:

93-9; Renn 1994: 177-98; Coulson 1996: 172; Watts 2004: 99-100). It should be noted that the Domesday place-name Burgate occurs in Suffolk three times, in Colneis {buregatd), Hartismere (Burgatâ) and Plomesgate (Burgesgata) hundreds (Rumble 1986: 7,77;108. 35,5;7. 6,144.).

Therefore, this place-name occurs more frequently in the Suffolk Little Domesday Book than in any other county in England c .l086 (Dodgson and Palmer 1992: 41; Rumble 1986: 7,77; 108.

35,5;7. 6,144.).

Recent late Anglo-Saxon settlement studies reveal that settlements and manors were frequently surrounded by defined boundaries in the form o f ditched enclosures (Reynolds 2001: 98-136) and examples of Anglo-Saxon ‘defensible lordly residences’ have been excavated in the east of England, at Sulgrave, Goltho, Stamford, Exning, Bramford and Tasburgh (Davison 1977: 105- 114; Beresford 1987; Mahnay 1976: 223-245; Martin 1975: 24-38; Caruth 1995: 40-1;

Rogerson and Lawson 199: 31-58). The evidence of Anglo-Saxon ‘defensible lordly residences’

has led some to suggest that royal or manorial churches adjacent to, underlying, or within castles, are sometimes archaeological evidence of late Anglo-Saxon lordship centres (Mahany and Roffe 1982: 199-219; Drage 1987: 119). For example, at Clare, Framlingham, Freckenham, Haughley and Lidgate castles (Appendices 1.5; 10-11; 15 & 19).

Furthermore, the medieval moated-sites that occur from the 12* century and evidenced all over central Suffolk, could also be described as ‘defensible lordly residences’ (Jean le Patourel 1979;

Martin 1999e: 60-1 & 199).

It is argued here that ‘defensible’ is a relative concept and linked to an anticipated level of threat. Late Anglo-Saxon lordship complex and later medieval moated-sites were not designed to withstand a siege. They were designed to prevent their owners being murdered in their beds by local political rivals or their own tenants. By contrast, a castle has a different scale of

defensibility, being designed to withstand a siege. This required any potential attacker to: gain it by guile, mobilise overwhelming numbers to successfully storm it, required possession of a siege-train with the necessary technicians and technology to reduce it, or control of sufficient manpower, logistical and financial resources to maintain a close siege until the garrison was forced to surrender.

Liddiard (2000b: 6-9) points out that contemporaneous documents report that several different buildings were turned into fortifications in the 11* and 12* centuries, therefore, argues the role of fortification is not exclusive to castles. He goes on to claim that many castles of Norfolk could not have been military in purpose, because they are not constructed in the most defensible location in the landscape, which he defined as is the highest point in their local topography.

In 1138 Baldwin de Redvers (d. c.l 155) rebelled against King Stephen. Baldwin held Exeter castle against a royal siege over a hot summer, which saw his castle well to dry-up, which forced Baldwin to come to terms and surrender Exeter castle in return for his liberty. He then made his way to his second castle at Carisbrooke on the Isle of Wight, where he again defied King Stephen, but again the castle’s well failed when royalist force laid siege to it. As a result,

Baldwin was forced to flee into exile having lost both his castles in the course of a single campaign season (Bradbury 1992:79; Keats-Rohan 2002: 658).

Any fortification designed to be besieged must possess a water supply or its garrison will be forced to capitulate within three days, which is the maximum time that a human can go without water. Contemporary military manuals like Vegetius’ De Re Militari c.400 stressed the

importance o f a water-supply in fortress-building, noting the need to cut supply to a fortress laid under siege and need for a besieged force to guarantee its own supply. The first reference to the medieval use of Vegetius is c.l 151 in the Historia Gaufredi Ducis, which recorded that

Geoffrey (V) of Anjou referred to a copy and Abbot Suger of St Denis was also known to have read a copy (Halphem and Poupardin 1913: 218; Bradbury 1992: 3; Prestwitch 1992: 186;

Milner 1993: 116 & 119). However, water is never found in the highest point of the topography in Suffolk (Woodland 1946: 3 & 10).

Environmental conditions mean water-supply in a dry county like Suffolk was a constraint on all human activity until the introduction of mains-supply after World War II and before this date domestic water-supply for rural Suffolk was dependent upon a limited number of artesian or land springs, meres, watercourses, wells and cisterns. Cisterns could be stone, timber or clay- lined and were used to collect rainwater or run-off from buildings. Furthermore, frequently ponds, moats and lakes were also exploited as reservoirs to store water (Woodland 1946: 3;

Neaverson 1947; Ruckley 1990: 14-26; Burger 2001).

It is argued here and later that there is a long established relationship between castles and conflict. Therefore, the definition of a Suffolk castle offered here is functional: it is taken to be a specialist building constructed by members of a new elite based upon a continental model, which was designed to withstand siege by a real or potential enemy, and may or may not have been the principal residence of a lord and his family or the lordship centre of his fief. Using this definition it is possible to identify thirty-one castle sites in Suffolk (Appendices 1.1-31). Of these thirty-one, twenty-seven are dated before c .l200 (Appendices 1.1-27, Map 2.1).

Moreover, the Domesday Book entry for their respective vills provides an important base-line of information about the location and settlement where castles were built (Table 2.1^, Appendix 2.0).

^ Orford was part o f Sudboume manor and Red castle part o f Thetford in 1086 and therefore the Domesday data is excluded from Table 2.1 (Rumble 1986: 6,143. 8,25. 21,37 & n. 21,38.).