Estrategias y tácticas

If materialist-rationalist theories of political behaviour still predominate in IR, this does not mean their assumptions are unchallenged. Interpretivist approaches such as international society and some liberal theories have always considered ideational and normative factors to be of influence in international relations, usually with the important proviso that states are always firmly in charge. Neorealists, though, remained

unconvinced they had found much evidence of these factors as constituting determinants of state policy and behaviour.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid end of the Cold War surprised IR theorists, as almost none had predicted these developments. It prompted rationalists such as Keohane and Goldstein to consider ideas as variables affecting the solutions to games, which they sought to incorporate into a neoliberal institutional framework (1993). Such attempts attracted a mixed reception. Ruggie and Kratchowil had already argued that insufficient attention was paid in regime theory to how actor expectations are formed, and that it is difficult to integrate principles and norms into rationalist analysis despite their significance (1986). Now, support strengthened for this view that the materialist assumptions of materialist-rationalist analysis, and neorealism in

particular, prevented it from explaining rapid changes observed in core national security issues for the kinds of reason discussed in the preceding section, among others

(Katzenstein et al., 1998 672).

Keohane famously described this fourth emerging “great” debate in IR theory as a conflict between rationalism and reflectivism (1988). By reflectivism, Keohane meant the rejection of rational choice methods and the positivist approach to knowledge generation dominant in the IR discipline, especially in North America. However, the debate is more finely shaded than such a positivist/post-positivist duality, especially as reflectivism encompassed many approaches including constructivism, culturalism, feminism, critical theory and poststructuralism (Dunne et al., 2010 349). These approaches vary widely in their postures on the possibility of knowledge and which research methods are appropriate.

One way in which to contrast these “post-positivist” approaches to international behaviour is to distinguish them as having either subjective or discursive conceptions of

security (Buzan and Hansen, 2009 32-25). Subjectivist approaches to security (typified by conventional constructivism) seek to supplement materialist security analysis by incorporating non-material factors like history, norms and actor (mis-) perception.

IR approaches treating security as a discursive concept are critical of the idea of any objective conception of security of the kind found in realist or neorealist analysis, and of subjective conceptions deriving from it. As Booth argued: “Mainstream strategic studies derive from a particular social context, the interests of a particular referent group, and the world-view of a distinct political theory. The resultant discourse is constructed from these ideas” (2007 150). It follows that the ways in which power is expressed in language and ideas has to be unravelled, as in the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on security as a contested concept (Buzan and Wæver, 1997), and other discursive approaches influenced by the post-Marxist theory of the Frankfurt School including “critical” variants of constructivism discussed below (Hopf, 1998 181).

Constructivism emerged as a prominent “reflectivist” approach, although it is unlike realism, neorealism and neoliberalism, which are theories about the structure of international politics based on rationalist-materialist ontology. In other words, these are attempts to explain both the behaviour of individual states and the characteristics of the international system as a whole (Krasner, 1992 39).9 Neoliberals in addition seek to explain whether institutions matter in explaining state behaviour, or whether the latter can be deduced solely from the material distribution of power (Griffiths, 1999 185).

9 _{Krasner added, “The ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are the}

In contrast, constructivism is a social rather than a political theory, and is broadly concerned with conceptualising the relationship between agents and structure (Farrell, 2002 50). Constructivism has three core ontological propositions. Firstly, it posits that normative or ideational structures are important, alongside material structures. Secondly, identities constitute interests and actions. Thirdly, agents and structures are mutually constituted.

In this way, constructivism is better contrasted with rational choice theory than neorealism and neoliberalism per se, which each subscribe to rational choice as an analytical framework but arrive at differing claims about patterns of conflict and

cooperation at the international level. In a similar way, constructivists adhere to the core observation that reality is a social construction, but there are many different varieties of constructivism drawing upon different analytical traditions. “Constructivists, for

instance, have different arguments regarding the rise of sovereignty and the impact of human rights norms on states. In order to generate substantive claims, scholars must delineate who are the principal actors, what are their interests and capacities, and what is the content of the normative structures” (Barnett, 2008 162). Constructivist

researchers can (and do) reach different views on these matters, which can lead to differing analytical outcomes.

Constructivists argue that norms are of particular significance because structures in international politics are socially and not just materially constructed. (Norms are defined in section 5.) Social structures are defined by shared understandings, expectations or knowledge, and include material resources. Material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which

they are embedded, mediated by norms, identities and practices (Hopf, 1998 174). For instance, British possession of nuclear weapons is less threatening to the US than North Korea’s nuclear weapons because Britain is a US friend and ally (Wendt, 1995 73).

While concurring with the English School that international anarchy is a social condition, constructivists argue in contrast that anarchy is not objectively defined. Instead, anarchy is constituted intersubjectively, with ideas and norms as dynamic factors alongside material power affecting, among other things, preference formation among states. States do not always do what is instrumentally rational, but usually act according to a “logic of appropriateness” in which what others think is important (Fierke, 2010 181):

“To act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalised practices of a collectivity and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity” (Olsen, 2007 3).

Thus, a contrast exists between the rationalist-materialist ontology of neorealism and neoliberalism, and that of constructivism. The former ontology is atomist and “bottom-up”: undifferentiated, individual state actors determine international politics within an anarchical international system. The constructivists’ social ontology is “top- down”, in which individual actors together both constitute their environment, and are constituted by it. Ideas and norms are important because these shape identities, notions of appropriate behaviour and, in turn, choices. Preferences only seem fixed if seen in snapshot.

Ontologically at least, rational choice theory and constructivist intersubjectivity are not directly opposed. In principle it is possible to model the evolution of actor preferences within a rational choice framework, provided it reflects the influence of ideas, norms and notions of actor identity (which, in such frameworks, would be treated as enduring—fixed—variables) (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). In practice, it can be difficult to assess appropriate weighting of these factors in some rational choice models, or even to keep these factors separated.

Another issue is that direct evidence of the content of the internal cognitive processes of actors and the course of their intersubjective understandings is often hard to capture in a way that explains causation in a positivist sense. This second issue, in particular, is a challenge for constructivists as well as materialist-rationalists. Indeed, the appropriate types of methods to analyse behaviour in a mutually constituted international system divide constructivists.