ESTRUCTURA COMPETITIVA DEL SECTOR DE AUTOPARTES

Fredrick J. Long gives a summary of Aristotle’s descriptionof forensic rhetoric: “Forensic rhetoric essentially consists in someone formally accusing an individual or the state with a wrongdoing,” so at a basic level the system allowed for settling disputes and maintaining the general peace (2004). Actors, if they knew the rules, could perform accordingly. There was comfort in the security of deterrence, and it ultimately built confidence among the populace. Furthermore, if there was a disagreement and there was some outlet to resolve this disagreement without conflict, then some pacification of the population had been accomplished. Nevertheless, forensic rhetoric formed as an institutional extension of the already privileging legal system.

Rhetoric formed as a kind of conduct literature, explaining how one should behave, and constrained one from acting in a manner against what was predetermined. Legal scholar R. A. Posner explains that although some people do not perform criminal acts because of “moral repugnance,” they also act out of “fear of an external penalty.” Uncertainty, the growing belief

that a perpetrator will get caught in the act of a crime, keeps non-criminals from acting. The perpetrator has a “freedom from encumbrances of uncertainty” (136), thus lessening the

likelihood of deviance.16 No matter the motives, law helped increase confidence in right action. Following the establishment of direct democracy as a governmental form in Athens and the earlier codification of law, elite male citizens could receive a higher education, which included forensic rhetoric, so that they could write and perform their own oratory in civil trials. For example, Aristotle lectured at the Lyceum, an Athenian temple dedicated to Apollo, and these lectured coalesced into a school and library. T. J. Morgan reveals the comingling of literate and non-literate education in this period, though access to written texts was prohibitively

expensive for the non-wealthy (48). Rhetorical training privileged those allowed to participate, partly because it was expensive and so separated the upper classes by their education, and partly because the politically powerful sponsored non-Athenian sophists who taught and practiced for them.17 Plato used the term sophist critically to refer to those rhetoricians who were paid to teach virtue (Corey 16). Those without the specialized training were at a distinct disadvantage within the law courts. Isocrates, the fourth century Attic rhetorician, advised society to educate its youth in rhetoric: “It behooves all men to want to have many of their youth engaged in training to become speakers” (qtd. in Litfin 73). Morgan insists both Isocrates and Aristotle promoted an elite system of education: “The effect of both their prescriptions is to limit access to education, and to limit it on the twin grounds of ability and wealth (57). For example, Aristotle discussed at

16  _{Similarly,  Adriaan  Lanni  explains  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes’  “bad  man”  theory  of  law,  “Holmes  described  the}   function  of  law  by  imagining  a  ‘bad  man’  who  viewed  the  law  purely  instrumentally  and  planned  his  behavior   based  on  what  he  predicted  he  could  (and  could  not)  get  away  with  under  the  existing  rules”  (132).  

17  _{According  to  David  D.  Corey,  the  Peloponnesian  Wars  (431-­‐404)  led  both  Aristophanes  and  Plato  to  vent  their}   discomfort  with  foreign  influence:  “In  the  charged  political  atmosphere  of  war,  tolerance  of  foreigners  often  runs   thin,  and  the  sophists  may  well  have  appeared  as  a  group  of  outsiders  teaching  potentially  subversive  ideas  to   Athenian  youths  at  the  worst  possible  time”  (20).  

great length the concepts of emulation and virtue that directly explains one process of privileging elites: “wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For believing it their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them” (Rhetoric 243.) Both men were concerned with access to political power through advanced education and literacy (58). Sons of citizens went to school from age seven or eight to age fifteen or so from just after sunrise to just before sunset, in the care of a household slave called a paedagogos. Girls were formally excluded, typically trained in domestic arts and married off for family connection as young as age thirteen (Isbilen/Karaduman 42). Although, Anne Meade Stockdell argues that women were able to participate in rhetorical debate within religious ceremonies and cults (4).18

An even smaller group of wealthier students went on to private higher education in rhetoric, among other subjects. At this level of education, further prejudices towards ability emerged. Some students were considered by nature to be better at forensic rhetoric. Isocrates argues: “But let no one think, that I imagine justice can be taught; for I do not think there is any such art which can teach those who are not disposed by nature, either temperance or justice; tho' I think the study of popular eloquence helps both to acquire and practice it” (21). He seems education and specifically rhetoric as training for participation of gentlemen to participate in politics, which improved the democracy (Mehdi 15-16). Isocrates envisioned inborn skill to work hand in hand with education:

18  _{Stockdell  also  emphasizes  the  funereal  domain  of  duty  for  women:  “Since  the  female  relatives  of  legitimate}   citizens  were  restricted  in  their  access  to  public  spaces  their  noticeable  presence  at  public  funerals,  particularly  the   well-­‐attended  ceremonies  for  aristocratic  figures  or  soldiers  fallen  at  war,  would  have  been  disturbing  to  the   dominant  class  of  citizen  men,  ultimately  undermining  their  total  regulation  of  public  spaces”  (6).  Women’s   pronounced  influence  in  this  sphere  highlights  and  contrasts  their  absence  from  the  official  rhetorical  spaces  they   could  navigate.  

For men who have been gifted with eloquence by nature and by fortune, are governed in what they say by chance, and not by any standard of what is best, whereas those who have gained this power by the study of philosophy and by the exercise of reason never speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action. (Antidosis qtd.. in Benson 51)

Both Isocrates and Aristotle promoted the purpose of political participation for education.

Aristotle also saw the strengthening of virtue as a goal, and he relied on a foundation of inductive reasoning (Moseley xi). Both saw the influence of fortune as an advantage in education.

Rhetoric was taught orally before the increase in literacy as an educational requirement. Handbooks like the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, of contested authorship, were used as textbooks. Aristotle was innovative with his full treatise on rhetoric, which was also designed as an

educational tool. Systemization of rhetoric as an ars was first required in order to teach it. Eugene Garver points out how Aristotle wanted to show that civic activities, namely rhetoric, could be “subject to rational analysis and to presentation as an art,” so as he did in other fields, he did seek to systematize rhetoric (7).19 There had been no division into three species of rhetoric in the fifth century. Sophists did not divide their categories of rhetoric in the same manner. Schiappa reminds us that applying that schema to the Sophists would be anachronistic. He goes on to say that the sophist Protagoras, for example, might have thought of forensic oratory, in general, as part of a person’s “civic arête,” but Protagoras had no special theory of forensic rhetoric. Rather, Schiappa claims each Sophist had his or her own idiosyncratic theoretical focus rather than prescribing to common schematizations (42). Aristotle’s divisions of rhetoric were all

19  _{Aristotle  also  wrote  on  Physics,  Poetics,  and  Politics,  to  name  a  few.  He  focused  efforts  on  artistic  endeavors  as}   well  as  on  scientific  pondering,  often  crossing  between  philosophy  and  application.  

for the purpose of applying skillsets to domains of public life, a formalization which stunted the areas to which the creative and personalized theories of former rhetoricians were applied; systemization was practical, useful, certainly innovative, but more restrictive. Isocrates as well had written of conformity: “And for those sophists who have lately sprung up, and fallen into this arrogance, tho' numerous now, they will be forced at last to conform to my rules” (“Against the Sophists” 19). Here Isocrates speaks to the accused sophist intent of selling training to learn virtue; rather, Isocrates believed virtue was innate but eloquence could be taught. The

formalization of rhetoric also set up a historical precedent to further define and control the means of persuasion, to tighten the reins on speculative thought, processes that continued in the

millennium to come.

In mythos, Pistis was the goddess of faith, trust, and reliability. Forensic rhetoric relied on the concept of pistis as a central persuasive element of forensic rhetoric, what a judgment was based on, but pistis is not such a simple concept. George A. Kennedy discusses the many types of pistis, “The problem with pistis is that it can have at least three different meanings in … [Aristotle’s] … text: ‘proof,’ in the sense of logical demonstration; ‘proof’ as a formal part of a speech; and ‘means of persuasion,’ including not only logical demonstration but the

trustworthiness of character that a speaker can project and the emotion he conveys” (60). Joseph T. Lienhard argues that one meaning of the word pistis, or proof, is “the state of mind produced in the audience,” so rhetoric purports suggestibility if not control of the mind of the hearer (450). Much of the content of handbooks on rhetoric as well as Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric focus on creating enough proof in the mind of the jury in order to win the trial.

Logos in the fifth and fourth centuries, before the use of the word rhetoric, could be used to mean words, language, knowledge, persuasion, and writing. The actual Attic term for logic is

“logismos.” Within Aristotle’s theory, logos indicates proofs or pistis, knowledge, but especially the idea of artistic proofs, or those that could be invented by the orator, using language, drawing on enthymemes, examples, maxims, and also special topics for each branch of rhetoric along with the common topics/commonplaces. Christopher Carey points out that within forensic rhetoric, logos does not directly translate to all the facts of a case; rather, the facts, such as written contractual documents and laws, even depositions from witnesses, were read out by a clerk. Logos was a way to appeal to the jury’s rational minds and intellect in order to win a case. Effective appeals to logos were invented by the orator. Premises could lead to a provable

conclusion or state. Aristotle relied on non-contradiction, wherein one could show rationally how something could not be a certain thing and not be that same thing at the same time. Lastly, logos could still also refer to the facts within the orator’s constructed narrative of his side of a case, recounting events that occurred and facts in a particular sequence (95).

Proof did not translate directly to truth, though. Plato and other philosophers had feared rhetoric had the power to deceive. Participants in trials aimed to win their cases, by any means necessary, and forensic rhetoric created a means by which to sway a jury, regardless of the truth. Plato describes the potential trickery behind rhetoric in his Gorgias:

At some points, he emphasizes rhetoric’s universality or subject-neutrality: rhetoric differs from the specialized crafts precisely in that the rhetorician can be more persuasive about anything than anybody else. And this subject-neutrality is consistently associated with what I have termed the manipulative conception of rhetoric, on which it is

essentially a tool of enslavement” (Barney 103).

Barney creates what she calls conceptions of deceptive rhetoric and terms the action of getting someone to work against his or her own interests, as the manipulative conception (101). Barney

then describes Socrates’ cooperative conception of rhetoric, “…this specialized conception fits better with a cooperative conception of rhetoric, on which it involves a genuine expertise in questions of justice—an expertise deployed on behalf of the community, as the doctor deploys his expertise in medicine” (103). Though these conceptions can be either deceitful or altruistic in motive, both demonstrate the falsehood inherent in the outcome of the application of rhetoric. By nature of forensic rhetoric being taught for use in law courts, Aristotle clearly promoted the cooperative conception of the art of rhetoric by creating his school and lecturing at the Lyceum as he wished to prepare selected youth to better perform in civic life for the good of the polity, resolving to create new theoretical improvements in the field on top of the more conventional instruction of better practices through handbooks. Barney further exposes internal and external standards of correct usage of rhetoric, internal refers to using something incorrectly for what it is not intended, while external refers to more nefarious, intentional misapplication (102-103). Again, internal and external standards of correct usage demonstrate yet another way rhetoric, whether applied correctly or misapplied, innately competes against or complicates veracity in practice.

Aristotle inherited a drive to cultivate good and virtuous men, and this tradition would carry on into Roman rhetoric as well. Socrates and Plato had accused the Sophists of promoting dissoilogoi as a technique that could be exploited in an amoral way by a skilled rhetorician. Nevertheless, Aristotle argued that being able to argue both sides of a case did not make the rhetorician an advocate for evil or falsehoods, but rather it prepared the rhetorician to defend against someone who did argue for evil. Further, he also said being able to argue both sides of an issue helped the rhetorician fully understand his own argument (Rhetoric I). Additionally,

injustice,” but he understood orators could use it to influence either side of a legal claim (qtd. in Smith 17). Clearly, Aristotle was ambiguous on this subject despite his intent. George A. Petrochilos says that Socrates had first aimed to teach his pupils to possess kalogathia. He explains:

The word kalogathia menas the character and conduct of kalos kagathos, that is, of the perfect and just man; thus it could mean kindness, uprightness, and honesty, attributes that finally lead to happiness. In classical Greek, the meaning of the word kalos is linked with the human physique rather than human character; thus, kalos has to do with the beauty, harmony, of the body, attained through physical exercise. The word agathos means the good and virtuous man, who is wise, brave, and just. (606)

Certainly, morality was an intended Aristotelian component of forensic. Morality, though, was not the object of the legal system in practice; rather, law maintained the order of the state, protected higher classes from intrusion by lower ones and foreigners, and secured property and wealth for those fortunate enough to be able to fully participate in the system.

Through the creation of his theoretical work on rhetoric, Aristotle attempted to shape argument into a system that was objective, predictable and scientific. Science can be described as “a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws” (“Science”). However, such an endeavor is

impossible. Though Aristotle said, “The True and the Just are naturally superior to their opposites” (Rhetoric I.i), legal scholar Richard A. Posner details the ambiguity inherent in “problems of jurisprudence”: “… if science does establish certainty, still its methods and domain are so different from those of law that one exactitude of science cannot be translated into

foundation for or model of legal certainty” (67). Furthermore, Lanni points out how

circumstantial flexibility outweighed consistency, for a broad array of information was provided in Athenian courts, “… both extralegal and legal information were considered relevant and important to the jury’s decision because Athenian juries aimed at reaching a just verdict taking into account the particular circumstances of the individual case rather than applying abstract rules and principles provided by statutes to the case at hand” (42). Rhetoric could certainly be taught as a skill, but it was never capable of being constructed into a science. Rhetoric’s lack of legal certainty stems from law’s ambiguous and restrictive relationship with knowledge.