As discussed in Chapter 5.4.2-3 above, the neural correlates of the non-verbal aspects of communication seem to demonstrate a strong System-1 presence. Again, both Lieberman’s account of verbally-expressed self-reflection and the Friths’ review of the neurophysiology of ToM show intriguing connections between aspects of language processing and neural regions with hypothetical connections to System-1 activity: the role played by the lateral temporal cortex (LTC), for example, in implicit semantic memory; that of the pSTS in watching the mouth of a speaker and thus aiding comprehension14; and that of the temporal poles in connection with wider aspects of semantic or pragmatic processing, such as script creation and retrieval. It is now time to narrow the focus and consider how far neural regions claimed to support System-1 processes have been shown to support speech production itself.
A substantial literature exists on the neural correlates of speech production,one example being Indefrey and Levelt’s meta-analysis (2004) of 82 neuroimaging studies of regions involved in the core processes of word production. This identifies 15 regions, four in the right hemisphere and 11 in the left. In addition to Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, they include a region activated during listening (part of the
13
And which may function differently at different stages of development. A recent fMRI study (Sebastian et al, 2011) of ToM duality – here, cognitive vs affective understanding – has shown more activation in the ventromedial PFC in adolescent participants during ‘affective ToM’ conditions than is elicited in adults. (Interestingly, the VMPFC is a region listed in the X-system category of Lieberman’s framework.)
14
Cf Haxby et al (2000: 230): ‘Lip-reading plays a large role in speech comprehension, even in
people with normal hearing. Lip-reading improves hearing accuracy and lip movements that are inconsistent with auditory speech can cause hearing errors… Perception of non-speech mouth movements is associated with activity in the [STS]. Lip-reading, in the absence of sound, additionally elicits activity in auditory areas in the superior temporal gyrus that are also activated by hearing spoken words. This indicates that the representations of speech-related lip movement involves the coordinated activity of visual regions in the [STS], which are associated with the visual analysis of lip movement, and auditory speech regions in the superior temporal gyrus, which are associated with the analysis of phonemic content.’
precentral gyrus) and one that is involved in both word and face recognition (part of the fusiform gyrus). Importantly, given the focus of this thesis on the
conceptualizing aspect of speech production, they identify one region – and one region only – as being involved in the conceptually-driven process of lexical selection: part of the left middle temporal gyrus, a region boundaried by the STS15. The Brodmann reference number for this whole area is BA 21, and here, perhaps, there may an indication of a possible connection with the neural version of dual- process theory, as this region is part of the lateral temporal cortex, hypothesised in Lieberman’s framework as being associated with automatic processing.
However, evidence that specifically connects the language-associated brain areas with dual-process theory seems hard to find, with a major challenge coming from the area once regarded as exclusively specialising in speech production: Broca’s (left- hemisphere BA 44/45). The challenge starts with the fact that the capabilities of Broca’s are now far from simple to characterise: as summarised in Nishitani et al’s review (op cit: 66), these have now gone ‘far beyond its classical language functions, [and contribute] to action planning, action observation, action understanding, and imitation.’ Speech production and comprehension, they continue, might be
considered a ‘highly developed’ form of action execution/observation matching, with Broca’s emerging overall as an orchestrator of time-sensitive perceptual and motor functions underlying verbal and non-verbal communication. They conclude, however, that a variety of questions still remain to be addressed in unravelling the ‘multitude of brain functions’ (ibid: 67) to which Broca’s contributes, including the temporal activation sequences and connectivity patterns involved.
There is also the question of how functions are distributed within Broca’s area, with mappings between tasks and the area’s internal regions being the subject of much debate16. For instance, there is an apparent overlap between BA 44/45, both of
15
However, they point out that research on process timing suggests that this region may be more implicated in lexical selection than in conceptual processing as such. ‘It seems plausible that tasks like picture naming and word generation [two of the word production tasks studied], which probably activate quite different concepts, should only converge and enter a common pathway from the point of lexical selection onwards’ (Indefrey & Levelt, 2000: 123).
16
The results of a comparative study by Heim et al of semantic, phonological and syntactic fluency (2008; 1362) give an illustration: ‘Phonological fluency activated BA 44 more strongly than semantic or syntactic fluency…. Semantic fluency did not elicit higher activation than the phonological fluency tasks in any part of Broca’s region. No differences were observed between syntactic and semantic
which lie within the prefrontal cortex, and the area suggested by Lieberman as one of the neural regions that support controlled social cognition. (Indeed, there is an
obvious connection here, as the PFC is an area concerned with executive functioning and control.) And it has to be acknowledged that connections between such an area and Broca’s are problematic for any model that seeks to explore the the automaticity of the mechanisms supporting relevant speech production.
This problem can be addressed, however, by considering the involvement of other areas besides Broca’s in language processing. For example, Lieberman’s list of regions associated with automatic processes includes the subcortical structural system of the basal ganglia, and it has been suggested (Ullman, 2006) that this is connected to a variety of cortical areas, including Broca’s. Furthermore, the connection with Broca’s is seen as being a double one, in which each linking
pathway serves a distinct function. Explaining his hypothesis, Ullman suggests (ibid: 481) that one of these parallel and ‘largely functionally segregated’ channels may involve the anterior part of Broca’s, with the other serving the area’s posterior regions. Each of these, he continues,
…is hypothesized to subserve functions that cut across language and non- language domains. The “anterior” channel may be characterized as subserving the retrieval of lexical and semantic information stored in declarative memory. This memory system has been implicated in the learning and use of both conceptual-semantic and lexical knowledge… The “posterior” channel may be profitably viewed as subserving aspects of procedural memory. This system underlies the acquisition and real-time expression of motor and cognitive skills, especially those involved in sequential knowledge… [and has] also been
implicated in grammar, in particular in aspects of the acquisition of grammar and in rule-governed grammatical composition.
Another approach to the potential role of automatic neural processes in linguistic processing is taken by Adolphs, continuing his focus on the amygdala as a key player in the social cognition field. Initially, he discounts any link between the amygdala and entities that are verbally represented rather than directly perceived. In a study of neurological patients with severe damage to the amygdala, Adolphs et al (1998: 470) demonstrate a contrast between reactions to ‘unapproachable and
fluence. Thus, the activation of BA 45 observed during verbal fluency tasks seems to be not restricted to semantic processing as suggested by the literature…’
untrustworthy looking’ faces, on the one hand, and verbal descriptions of these faces, on the other. While the subjects responded to the visual stimuli in an atypical way (judging them to look more approachable and more trustworthy than did neuronormal control subjects), they reacted normally to the verbal
descriptions – ‘perhaps because the stimuli provided sufficient explicit information such that normal task performance could result from reasoning strategies that did not necessarily require the amygdala’ (Adolphs, 1999: 473). However, as he points out, there is evidence of a possible connection between the amygdala and lexical representation, especially where the amygdala’s prominent role in processing threatening stimuli is called into play. For example, in a PET study by Isenberg et al, neuronormal subjects are asked to complete a modified version of the Stroop test, involving the colour naming of words that have either threatening or neutral connotations. The resulting PET scans show significantly greater amygdalar activation during the colour naming of the threat words than of the neutral words. Isenberg et al (1999: 10456) take this to demonstrate the amygdala’s role in the ‘processing of danger elicited by language,’ and add that the results confirm the amygdala’s role in modulating the perception of, and response to, emotionally salient stimuli. In their view, their study further suggests the ‘conservation of
phylogenetically older mechanisms of emotional evaluation in the context of more recently evolved linguistic function.’
A further indication of a relationship between the amygdala and language processing can be seen in Lieberman’s account of neural activity supporting social cognition. It has long been known, he states, that ‘putting feelings into words is an effective strategy for regulating negative emotional responses …[and] the benefits seem to occur whether one is intentionally trying to regulate one’s emotions or not’ (op cit 2007: 270). This process of ‘affect labelling’ (i.e. giving verbal labels to
emotionally evocative visual images) has, he continuesbeen shown by a number of neuroimaging studies to reduce the amygdala activity that such images would otherwise produce.
This negative reaction in a neural region of interest – a decrease, rather than an increase, in activity – is arguably as important a feature of neural mapping as its opposite and one to which I will return (see Chapter 6.4). And, more generally, the
whole area of automaticity in linguistic functioning could clearly be a rewarding one for further research.
5.8 Summary and conclusions
After summarising the arguments of the first half of the thesis, I have developed my hypothesis by suggesting that research into the control exercised by an Addressee over a Speaker (see Chapter 4) might help to explain not only why Speakers select the messages they do, but why, in doing so, they must succeed in achieving optimal relevance. Failure to achieve optimal relevance, I argue, impairs the processes underlying message selection. Speaker and Addressee are therefore linked in a feedback loop that enables dialogue – and communication itself – to function as a single, tightly-connected system of personal interaction.
The main part of this chapter explores how Speakers automatically play their part in maintaining this loop under the heavy time pressures of normal dialogue, with particular reference to resources contributing to their success at the level of social interaction.
The exploration begins by examining the core framework and some of the main variations of dual-process theory, described by Evans (2003: 454) as postulating ‘two minds in one brain’, with two associated processing styles. As generally conceived, one of these processing styles – ‘System 1’ – consists of a set of rapid, automatic, effort-economical, preconscious processes that work in parallel and are fed by a corresponding memory system that absorbs material slowly and retrieves it fast. The other – ‘System 2’ – works slowly and effortfully, carrying out consciously-
requested functions on behalf of its owner, and is capable of quickly absorbing new material but slow to retrieve it.
One point made in this chapter (Chapter 5.3.6) is that little detailed research seems to have been carried out on the place of language production in dual-process theory. However, there is some evidence from dual-process studies that many language processes indeed belong to System-1, and operate automatically and effortlessly: this
might help to explain how the hypothetical Addressee-Speaker feedback loop functions.
In Chapter 5.4, I consider evidence in favour of this suggestion derived from the rapidly-growing field of social cognitive neuroscience where, amongst areas
associated with automatic responses, one – the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex – is of particular relevance to my hypothesis. As described in Chapter 5.4.2, activity in this region has been shown to be associated both with the affective distress caused by physical pain and by distress resulting from social exclusion (i.e. social ‘pain’): a finding that, I suggest, may be involved in the damage done to Speaker competence when confronting the social exclusion indicated by Addressee indifference. The section also discusses evidence associating automatically-responding brain regions with face perception in general.
Chapter 5.5 and 5.6 consider two other theoretical frameworks that may offer insight into the connectivity between Speaker and Addressee: mirror neuron research and theory of mind (ToM). Although the implications of mirror neuron theory for human social interaction are still the subject of considerable controversy, research on ToM shows that the mentalizing capacity may be a dual system in its own right, calling on both automatic and controlled neural processes to fulfil different mentalizing tasks. The chapter ends with a discussion of possible interactions between language production and comprehension processes and neural regions associated with automaticity, particularly the basal ganglia and the amygdala.
Some of the results discussed in the chapter are controversial, and many come from young areas of research, accompanied by the warning that such results must be regarded as preliminary (cf Lieberman, 2007: 276). Overall, however, they appear to offer some support for the idea that there is a wide range of automatic social
responses that help a Speaker adjust continually to an Addressee’s needs. How far this automaticity extends to the verbal level of interaction is discussed in Chapter 6.