and Lua land management regime has been credited as having a strong conservation ethic. For example, vegetation on steep slopes, along rivers, and at the headwaters of streams were preserved to prevent erosion (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:25). Forests in which spirits were believed to dwell were also preserved, and provided seed stores and wildlife shelters (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:25).
During the thirteenth century, Tai warriors migrated from China and seized power in
strategic places throughout South-East Asia12 (Wyatt 1984:38). Numerous small Tai
states were established in the lowlands of Northern Thailand in which a prince (jao)
would rule over a cluster of peasant villages which were primarily engaged in wet-rice
cultivation (Keyes 1989:28). Within this pre-capitalist sakdina society, peasants were
compelled to provide labour to the ruling aristocracy, who monopolised administrative,
political and economic power (Hewison 1989:36). During this period, the ancient Tai
Yuan kingdom of Lanna, which encompasses most of Northern Thailand as delineated
today, was founded, and construction of its capital city, Chiang Mai, began in 1296 (Wyatt 1984:48). Historical accounts suggest that Lanna was a highly contested region from the fourteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, with the kingdom constantly
engaged in internal and external warfare and control oscillating between various Tai and
Burmese regimes (Wyatt 1984:74). In 1776, Tai armies of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya
recaptured Chiang Mai, and by the late eighteenth century, the Bangkok-centred Siam state (the antecedent of the modern Thai state) had consolidated a loyalty-protection relationship with the semi-autonomous Lanna principalities (Keyes 1989:27, Wyatt
1984:142,155). It should be noted that at this time, territorial boundaries were perceived as irrelevant since a political sphere “could be mapped only by power relationships, not by territorial integrity” (Thongchai 1994:79).
During the Lanna period, the highland people lived a fairly autonomous existence.
However, they were not isolated from interaction with the lowland Tai courts. For
example, lowland Thai rulers negotiated feudal tribute and trade agreements with individual highland communities to acquire highland forest products, such as beeswax, which were a vital component of foreign trade (Marlowe 1969:54, Jonsson 1996:176-7).
Other interaction arose through warfare, slave raids by the Tai on highland
communities, and the employment of highland people by the Tai for menial labour.
These latter forms of interaction appear to reflect a pattern of domination by the Tai
over hill peoples which had been established prior to and during their migration from China to Thailand (Wyatt 1984:8,41). Despite their limited economic and political interaction, the highland and lowland communities maintained a distinct separation, largely because of the geographic remoteness of the highland settlements. Jonsson (1996:178-9) suggests that the separation was also partially maintained by opposing ritualistic constructions of space: “lowlanders lived in areas uplanders associated with witchcraft; uplanders inhabited what lowlanders viewed as the domain of wild animals and spirits”.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, small numbers of Akha, Lahu, Lisu, Hmong and Mien tribes also migrated into the highlands, where they settled in the unoccupied higher elevations above the Karen and Lua settlements (Bhruksari 1989 cited in Waranoot 1995:279). Savina (1930:173-176) suggests that lowland hostility drove the newcomers into the mountains. However, Geddes (1976:30-31) argues that
their settlement at higher elevations reflected a traditional attachment to mountain living. Kunstadter (1978) suggests that poor agricultural conditions at these higher elevations dictated a system of pioneer shifting agriculture for survival. Under pioneer shifting cultivation, a household would clear and bum forest and other vegetation on a small parcel of land to grow crops. When the productivity of the land declined, due to soil nutrient depletion or weed infestation, or i f ‘bad spirits’, sickness or conflict became associated with the land, the household would relocate to a new site. In contrast to the communal system of the permanent swiddeners, cultivation and relocation decisions were managed by individual households, and allegiances to the village were tenuous (Kunstadter 1992:29). As migratory groups, the pioneer swiddeners did not tend to emphasise conservation or sustainable management. None-the-less, given the low population densities, the abandoned land would gradually recover, and after around 15- 20 years, would become covered in secondary, closed-canopy forest (Fox et al.
1995:329). Thus, with low population pressures, an equilibrium was maintained between loss and recovery of closed-canopy forest cover, and sustainability of the ecological system was not compromised.
5.2.2 Colonisation o f the Northern resources
During the late eighteenth century, Chinese migration increased markedly into the area now delineated as Thailand, and by the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants controlled much of the internal Siamese trade (Keyes 1989:48). By 1850, a small teak industry, dominated by Chinese foresters, had been established in Northern Thailand.
The foresters were required to obtain leases from the relatively autonomous local jao
who granted concessions to forest use in exchange for fees and gifts (Vandergeest 1996:161). Fees were divided by the rulingy'ao into three portions: one for himself; one for his official ‘noble’ collector; and one for the owner of the forest (Phen 1981
(1903):306). The foresters sold the teak locally as a material for house building, fencing, boat building and fortifications (Slade 1981(1896)).
During the 1850s, Northern Thailand began to receive attention from the British, who were keen to demarcate a clear boundary between Burma and Northern Thailand (Thongchai 1994:68). Without the knowledge of Bangkok, the British negotiated a boundary treaty with Chiang Mai (Thongchai 1994:68). As fixed boundaries were perceived as irrelevant to political claims, Chiang Mai was amenable to signing a treaty so long as the British accepted the task of surveying and marking boundaries
(Thongchai 1994:69).
In the 1870s, the British, followed soon after by the French and Danish, shifted their teak exploitation activities from the South Burmese forests into Northern Thailand (Sharlardchai 1989:32). Not only were the Burmese forests near exhaustion, but the activities of the Western forestry firms had been increasingly disrupted by the Burmese civil war (Pasuk and Baker 1995:100). Of all the teak forests in Northern Thailand, those in Chiang Mai, Lampang, Lamphun, Nan, Phrae, Chiang Saen and Chiang Rai were most highly prized because of the superior quality and abundance of teak wood (Phen 1981(1903)). In 1875, a British Consul Officer concluded that “The teak worked out into the Bangkok river does not exceed 1,000 or 2,000 logs a year, though very much more might be obtained if the forests were worked” (Edwardes 1981(1875)). The foreign interests “tuned to the needs of the external commercial economy and equipped with a more efficient technology... set a course to exploit [the Northern forests’]
virtually untapped timber and mineral resources more thoroughly than subsistence farmers could ever have imagined possible” (McKinnon 1983:333).
Records from this time refer to the Northern mountains as being inhabited by lawless Karens and Shans who were liable to rob passing traders, and who had claimed and worked the mountain forests for many years (Edwardes 1981(1875)). These ‘bandits’ were portrayed by Bangkok as a threat to the security of the Northern Thai cities, demanding an attack by well-disciplined Thai troops (Government of Thailand
1981(1902)). Other records describe the Northern jao as having discredited the Siamese
reputation by slaughtering Shan and Karen men and forcing their wives and children into slavery where “they suffered as greatly as beasts” (Rama V 1981(1885)). With foreign interests in the North expanding, Bangkok became concerned that the Northern
jao would embarrass the central government, or worse, create conflict with the British,
who had demonstrated their military might during the Chinese opium wars. Hence, during the 1870s, Bangkok moved to secure the integration of Lanna into the Siam state through centralising revenue collection and other administrative functions (Wyatt
1984:194). However, despite the incorporation of the Northern periphery within the Thai administrative domain, wild animals, robbers and malaria continued to discourage settlement of ethnic Thai in the highlands, which remained sparsely populated by hill tribes (Pasuk and Baker 1995:50).
By the late 1880s, Chiang Mai had become a major exporter of teak, particularly to British ship builders (Vandergeest 1996:161). From an average of 5 000 m3 during the period 1873-76, the annual export of teak rose to around 62 000 m3 during 1895-99, and reached a peak of 122 000 m3 during 1905-1909 (Ingram 1971:96). Although a few small forests were worked by their Thai owner or local officials, the British
overwhelmingly dominated the Thai teak industry (Slade 1981(1896)). By the early 1890s, the British teak firms had become concerned about the viability of the Northern forests. Ingram (1971:110) comments that “wanton and indiscriminate cutting of timber... became so extreme in the late nineteenth century that the teak companies themselves urged government regulation to stop it because no single company could compete successfully if it alone took the proper measures of conservation”. The concerns of the teak industry should be considered in the context of increasing conflict
between the British companies and the jao, who often attempted to improve revenue
either by leasing the same area to several companies or by imposing extra charges (Van der Meer 1981:21).
Rather than submitting to the ja o's demands, the British chose to undermine the ja o's claims to power by encouraging the extension of Bangkok’s sovereignty to the northern frontier (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:396). To prompt swift action, the British
threatened to assume control of the northern periphery if the Thai government did not act swiftly and decisively to exert greater administrative control over the Northern forests and curtail the influence of the local jao (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:396). In response to the British pressure, the Ministry of the Interior sent provincial governors and district officers to start assuming control from the Northern princes. The
government officials organised the Northern villages into permanent, registered villages with recognised village heads (Thongchai 1994:120). At the time of the administrative reforms, the Thai state also rewrote the forest concession contracts, including requiring recipients of concessions “to plant 4 baby trees for every teak tree felled” (Phen 1981 (1903)).
By the early 1900s, western-style cartography had become accepted by the Thai state as indispensable technology in negotiations over contested spaces: “modem mapping was the only geographical language the West would hear and only a modem map could make an argument” (Thongchai 1994:121). Thus, the traditional conception of political claims as based on spheres of influence had been displaced by a concern for territorial proof. Along with surveying boundaries, the state had also developed an interest in mapping the internal geography of Thailand to enable clear identification of their legitimate space (Thongchai 1994:119, 131).
To ensure administrative control over unoccupied lands, the Thai state established the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) in 1896, under the directorship of a British forestry expert (Vandergeest 1996:161). British foresters continued to occupy the position of Director-General until 1924, when the first Thai was appointed (Sharlardchai 1989:43). Many of the early Thai directors of the RFD had been educated in the forestry schools in British colonies of India and Burma. Thus, as Sharlardchai (1989:43) remarks, the RFD “emerged from the philosophy and practice of British logging companies during the peak of exploitation of teak forests in Burma and Thailand”. Based on the Indian and Burmese forest management and policy models, in 1899, the RFD claimed jurisdiction over all land within the boundaries of Siam that was neither occupied nor claimed by any person or agency (Vandergeest 1996:161, Santasombat 1995:21). It is significant to note that since the hill tribes were not citizens of the Thai state, their occupation was not recognised. Hence, the centrally constructed responsibilities of the RFD served to delegitimise established hill tribe settlements. It is also significant to note that land officially classified as ‘forest’ was not required to be covered in forest. Thus, the RFD was able to claim jurisdiction over around 75% of Thailand, and emerged as one of the most powerful state agencies (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:408).
The RFD also assumed responsibility for the collection and distribution of royalties from forest leases (Phen 1981 (1903)). By the early 1900s, the granting of forest leases to foreigners had been recognised as having adversely impacted the local people. In the Mae Ping forest, Phen (1981(1903)) notes that “When common people wanted to construct teak houses, they could not buy any teak wood. If they bought the teak wood from foreigners (sic), the price they had to pay was very high... This was troublesome for poor people”. The freedoms of the highland people were further eroded by the
passage in 1938 of the Protection and Reservation o f Forests Act. This Act empowered
the RFD to demarcate ‘protected’ and ‘reserve’ forests, and was intended to stop peasants from clearing and cultivating forest land, and thereby taking it out of the jurisdiction of the RFD (Vandergeest 1996:163-4). Note that people who had been
living, often for many years, in forests which were declared as reserved were
transformed into illegal violators through the bureaucratic delineation. The Act also authorised state holdings of commercial forests which could be leased to foreign or Thai logging companies (Santasombat 1995:21).
Another significant environmental development during the early twentieth century was the expansion of opium cultivation in the Northern highlands. The expansion appears to have been initiated in part by the Chinese Imperial anti-opium decree (1906) which marked the beginning of a concerted effort by Chinese authorities to eliminate opium cultivation by Chinese farmers (Crooker 1986:69). These opium suppression measures encouraged more intensive opium production in the highland regions which overlap the borders of Burma, Laos and Northern Thailand, forming the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’
(Allen 1986:70). During this period, Chinese migration into Thailand also intensified, leading to an expansion in domestic demand. To control the opium trade, the Thai government taxed opium sales and established a state monopoly to which highlanders could legitimately sell opium (Geddes 1976:208, Jonsson 1996:180). By the early
1920s, around 20% of Thailand’s national revenue was due to opium (Scott 1969:136). During the 1930s, lowland Northern Thai introduced irrigated agriculture to
highlanders, and wet-rice cultivation began to spread throughout the upland ecological zone (Kunstadter 1992:31).
5.2.3 Post-war development, conflict and growth
Prior to WWI, the term burana, meaning ‘restoration’ or ‘(re)construction’, tended to
frame state and monarchical reforms aimed at modernisation (Demaine 1986:95)13. Post-WWI, discursive referents to notions of ‘development’ by the Thai state shifted to an interpretation of development as ‘progress’. As a result of the 1932 coup, which overthrew the absolute monarchy in favour of a constitutional system of government,
the hierarchical sakdina principles of economic and political organisation were formally
replaced by the logic of capitalism (Hewison 1989:59). As Thailand began to recover from the post-WWI depression, Prime Minister Phibun, who held office from 1938-
1944 and 1947-1957, reinforced industrial development and capital investment as the means to transform and strengthen the Thai economy (Hewison 1989:67). Phibun also
introduced the concept of wattana which promoted national advancement through
cosmetic deference to the social customs and dress style of Western civilisation (Demaine 1986:95, Wyatt 1984:255).
During this period, the government initiated limited development efforts in the
highlands. The Border Patrol Police (BPP), which was established in the early 1950s to ensure a security presence and gather intelligence in remote frontiers, was the first government agency to have formal development-oriented contact with the hill tribe people of the Northern highlands (Tapp 1989:32). In 1956, the Government also
established a Committee for the Welfare of People in Remote Areas to provide food and clothing to hill people (Suwan 1969:12).
During Phibun’s era, in the face of mounting pressure from foreign governments to better contain Thailand’s contribution to global narcotics production, opium cultivation was restricted to the highlands of Northern Thailand (Anderson 1993:116). The Thai state was reluctant to ban opium cultivation outright because of its contribution to the national economy. In 1953, a Thai government official admitted to an international convention on narcotics control that the Thai state “could not afford to give up the revenue from the opium business’’ (Walker 1991:214).
A new era of interventionist developmentalism was ushered in during Sarit’s prime ministership (1958-63). Firmly couched in western modernisation theory, Sarit’s
development model (pattana) equated national development with economic growth, and
transformed state treatment of the highlands from relative neglect and indifference to active political and economic intervention through substantive development policies
13 For example, King Chulalongkom’s (1868-1910) initiatives to refashion a modem Bangkok, create a