The introduction of participatory fisheries management or co-management resulted from failure of centralised management systems to reduce fish stock depletion. As indicated above, in order to address the issue, there was need for shared responsibility between resource users and the government where the fishing communities were seen as important partners in the management of the fisheries resources. Jentoft (2004) argued however, that management systems cannot gain support from communities unless they help to nurture them. There is need for in-depth understanding of what co-management practices require and not merely in the simplistic way of ensuring people’s presence in meetings and workshops. In all of the cases discussed above (see Section 1.5) co-management practices have been in existence for up to two or three decades now, but there are still challenges of declining fish stocks, conflicts among stakeholders and contradictions in a number of aspects within the co- management process. Co-management approaches therefore also need to be understood in relation to other complexities and factors that shape the fisheries concerns.
The declining fish catches in Lakes Malawi, Chilwa, Malombe and Chiuta and also Shire River are due to, among other things, high population growth and the resultant increase in fish demand (Turner, 1996). This was (and still is) exacerbated by the lack of essential social services and alternatives amongst rural communities who depend primarily on the fisheries for their livelihoods. As the fish catches continue to decline, fishers continue to develop survival strategies and there has been an increase in the number of modified fishing gears and changes in fishing methods over the years. This has resulted in the use of illegal fishing gears
and methods hence a decrease in legal fish catches. The low catch entails loss in revenue which in turn affects the living standards of large numbers of people (Matiya & Wakabayashi, 2005). The most recent estimated data for the two research sites show that there have been variations in the total fish landings from 2009 – 2012 as shown in the table below.
Table 1.1: Production for Lake Malombe and the south-east arm of Lake Malawi for the past four years (Source: Mangochi District Fisheries Office)
Year Lake Malombe and Upper Shire
(Annual production in metric tons) South-east arm of Lake Malawi (Annual production in metric tons)
2009 4 668.22 17 948.49
2010 368.92 20 524.58
2011 4 826.50 16 972.76
2012 1 097.44 5 995.81
The data shows that there was a sharp decline of fish landings in 2010 for Lake Malombe and in 2012 the south-east arm had the lowest total fish landings. The statistical figures show that fish landings are declining whist there is also an increase in human population (see Section 1.6), indicating loss of food security from the fisheries.
Some of the reasons for the declining fish catches are:
1. Overfishing of the fish stocks – no quota system is used in the Malawi fishery for the artisanal fishery;
2. Use of illegal gear that has resulted in the exploitation of fish stocks including the juvenile and immature fish;
3. Non-compliance of fisheries regulations leading to non-observance of closed seasons use of illegal fishing gear and fishing practices;
4. Destruction of fish habitat due to degradation of the environment – clearing of land cover up-hill for farming causing rivers to dry and increased siltation due to run-off; and
5. Human population increase and over-dependency on the fishery due to lack of alternative livelihood options. (GoM, 2005)
The overfishing of fish stocks in Lake Malombe and the south-east arm of Lake Malawi as well as other water bodies has a direct link to increases in fishing practices hence the increase in the number of fishers, fishing gears and fishing crafts over the years (GoM, 2005). It has been observed that there has been increase in the use of illegal gear with small meshes, which catch juveniles and immature fish. Increased effort has also resulted in ecological destruction, for example in Lake Malombe overfishing resulted in ecological overfishing where the large
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Chambo species has been replaced by the small Lethrinops species locally known as Kambuzi4 (GoM, 2005). The clearing of the vegetation cover along the shores of lakes and rivers and in shallow areas of the lakes also has diverse effects on the habitat. Degradation and loss of aquatic vegetation reduces food and refuge especially for fry and juveniles, affecting breeding areas of fish (Banda & Hara, 1994). One of the issues associated with the surrounding terrestrial environment has been the increased rate of soil erosion that has led to increased siltation and eutrophication affecting the breeding and spawning grounds for fish. Clearing of vegetation coupled with the cutting down of trees along river banks and clearing of upland areas for farming activities has also resulted in many of the rivers that flow to the lakes drying up in certain periods of the year, further affecting the aquatic ecosystem.
As can be seen from the discussion above, aquatic ecosystems cannot be seen in isolation from social systems, and co-management practices therefore need to be seen within a social- ecological systems view (see Chapter 2). Other socially related factors affecting the aquatic ecosystem include non-compliance with fisheries regulations, a practice which has also contributed to the decline of the fish stocks especially the Chambo5 e.g. the closed season which was introduced to protect the spawning of Chambo has never been observed by fishers resulting in the catching of brooders, juveniles and immature fish. This has resulted in the reduction of brooders and baby fish which are meant to increase fish population, paradoxically reducing the availability of Chambo as a highly prized food source amongst the very communities that over-fish the species.
A combination of increased poverty and increases in human population numbers along the shore districts of Karonga, Nkhata Bay, Nkhotakota, Salima and Mangochi further contribute to the complexities of co-management practices. In these areas lakeshore populations have rapidly increased over the years and this has been due to migration of people from upland areas to the lakeshore areas in search of economic opportunities (Todd, Kaphuka, Kanyanda, & Chinula, 2000). This increase in human population exerts pressure over the fish stocks because the emerging population requires socio-economic support from the fishing industry which is already exploited. Lack of alternative livelihood options leaves the rural people with no option but fishing.
In the Malawi report to the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002, Malawi highlighted its concern over the decline of its fisheries, and
4 Kambuzi are small benthic species genera Lethrinops and Otopharynx found in shallow waters less than 50m deep.
5 Chambo is the sub-genus of the genus Oreochromis and comprises three closely related species of tilapiine cichlid, namely Oreochromis lidole, Oreochromis karongae and Oreochromis squamipinnis all of which are endemic to Lake Malawi.
expressed a commitment to develop measures to restore particularly the Chambo fishery to its maximum sustainable yield by 2013 (GoM, 2003). This is because the declining fish catches affect the socio-economic development of the country.
Further light on the complexities of co-management emerged from management programme evaluation conducted in Lake Malombe in 1999 following a recommendation to assess the patterns and interactions among stakeholders and the outcomes which may have resulted from co-management. The evaluation process assessed three aspects to assess change of behaviour towards sustainable exploitation of the fishery: efficiency in the exploitation and management of the fishery; signs of improved equity in representation and sharing of benefits among resource users; and sustainability of the co-management arrangement (Hara et al., 1999).
The evaluation found that the establishment of Beach Village Committees (BVCs) caused some conflicts with other local structures (chiefs, village headmen) which were already present when BVCs were put in place. The introduction of BVCs brought about misconceptions that the BVCs should have greater powers than the village headmen. By custom, village headmen derived privileges from the fishery through their positions (ibid.). Traditionally chiefs and village heads are the overall controllers of the activities taking place in their areas. This meant that all BVCs were theoretically under their authority and power. Under the co-management arrangement however, incoming migrant fishers have to seek permission from both the village headman and the BVC and this directly infringed the benefits and authority of the chiefs (Hara, Donda, & Hara. 1999). BVCs were democratically elected by the fisher community to represent their interests, but because they assume enforcement activities they thought and continue to think they derive their powers from government. The above tensions and contradictions regarding power in the management of the BVCs have been shown to constrain the implementation of the co-management programme (ibid.).
These complexities indicate that while the co-management approach to fisheries resources management has over the years been seen as a solution to resource management in a number of countries (see Section 1.5), it is not without complexity and tension and it is a practice that may also be characterised by contradictions. The general assumption in the cases of co- management that have been mentioned briefly above, was that involving resource users in the management of the resources through local structures (Zone Management Committees and Integrated Village Management Committees in Lake Kariba, Beach Management Units in Lake Victoria and Beach Village Committees in Lakes Chilwa, Malombe and Malawi) would bring the resource users close to their resources and make them accountable for any kind of mismanagement. Introduction of the above local structures and the co-management concept
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itself has however resulted in a number of newly emerging tensions and contradictions. As in the case of the Lake Malombe evaluation cited above, issues of power and power conflicts have been observed in all four cases mentioned above (Chipungu & Moinuddin, 1994; Malasha, 2003, Hara, Donda, & Njaya, 1999, and Donda, 2001). A number of studies have highlighted weaknesses of co-management arrangements around Lakes Malawi, Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta: (Banda, 1996; Dawson, 1997; De Gabriel, 1998; Donda, 2001; Ferguson & Derman, 2000; Njaya, 2002; Njaya, Donda, & Hara, 1999). Analysis of co-management weaknesses in some of the above water bodies are generally represented in terms of conflicts between fishing communities and government due to unclear roles and responsibilities between the government and the community and also lack of accountability and transparency amongst stakeholders in the programme.
The evaluation results on outcome-efficiency in the Lake Malombe case showed that there were still cases of illegal gear use and low catches even with the co-management arrangement. One of the outcomes highlighted in Hara, Donda and Njaya, (1999, p 10), provided further insight here:
According to Banda (1996) the experimental fishing trials done in Lake Malombe as part of the monitoring of the fishery over a period of two to three years (1994-96) showed that the agreed 19 mm mesh size nkacha net still caught 40% immature fish. Furthermore, by 1995, 40% of the fishermen had not yet changed to the 19 mm mesh size and were still using nets of mesh sizes less than 19 mm (Mtika, 1996; Jumpha, 1996). Apart from this Banda further points out that a simple gear selectivity test between a 19 mm mesh size net and another of less than 19 mm mesh size (0.5 or 0.25 inch) showed that the former caught 54% less fish than the latter. Implementation of the 19 mm mesh size regulations has thus serious socio-economic implications for the fishers as it would result in much less catch. There is strong suspicion therefore that even fishermen who changed to 19 mm are still using mosquito net linings in their bunts to keep their catches healthy.
The above shows that illegal fishing activities (use of under-meshed netting and practices) were still taking place even while co-management arrangements were being implemented, as fishers did not change to the agreed recommended mesh size nets. Those who changed to 19 mm were not catching many fish, and therefore resorted to using mosquito nets at the bunts, a practice which is even more destructive. Though the case quoted above is a bit dated, not much has changed in terms of the use of illegal fishing gear and the fish catches have increasingly declined over the years (see Table 1).
Engeström (2001, p. 137) argued that contradictions are not the same as problems or conflicts but are historically accumulating structural tensions within and between activity systems. While studies such as those cited above focus on tensions in co-management, I was unable to identify specific studies focusing on expansive social learning processes as a model to
collaboratively address issues highlighted above where through mediated deliberation stakeholders came together to carefully explore the issues and find lasting solutions to the tensions and contradictions that constrain the implementation of fisheries co-management. However, despite the complexities and contradictions reported on above, contextual profile 6 data showed that since co-management was introduced, the government and the fishing communities have been brought closer together and that it is the coming together of these two parties that has necessitated the sharing of knowledge crucial for the proper management of the fisheries resources. Fishing communities have more access to extension officers and are able to sit together with fellow fishers through their formal and informal meetings (Kachilonda, January 3, 2010). Chief Msosa said and I quote “we are able to talk to each other as people who are benefiting from the same resources unlike the old days when government had full control of the resources”. Chief Msosa’s views on the successes of co- management through sharing understanding and people’s views in a social context are reflected in wider literature on social learning. Wals, van der Hoeven and Blanken (2009), for example, argued that the success of social learning depends a great deal on the collective goals and/or vision shared by those engaged in the process (see Chapter 2).
Wals (2007, p. 36) argued that sustainability education should mobilise engagement with sustainability problems that are faced by particular communities and focus analysis on such concerns by means of interdisciplinary, comprehensive approaches which will permit deeper understandings of sustainability problems, with potential engagement with solutions or new ways of doing and being. In all of the cases reviewed above, very little was said about mediated social learning processes that involved the training of extension officers for new forms of engagement within co-management approaches. This appears to leave the emerging tensions and contradictions unresolved.