Between 1975 and 1999, during the Indonesian occupation, anywhere from 100,000 to 180,000 people, or one-third of the population of Timor-Leste were killed (CAVR, 2005, p.44;
International Crisis Group, 2006; Rawnsley, 2004, pp.2-3). Cribb (2001, p.82) estimates that approximately 50,000 died in the initial bombardments and violence in 1975, and approximately 50,000 died of famine, disease and malnutrition due to forced resettlement and arbitrary
detention in concentration camps. Massacres were systematically carried out by the Indonesian military (Martin, 2001; Rawnsley, 2004). Women were subjected to forced sterilisation, sex slavery and gang rape; and children were removed and reallocated to Indonesian families (de Oliveira, 2002; Mason, 2005).
During the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR –
Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação) hearings, former Governor Carrascalão described Indonesia’s isolationist policies: “Timor-Leste was a closed land…it was a place of lies and falsities…the people that came here could do anything. It was secret” (CAVR, 2005, p.46). Testimonies from CAVR detail the widespread use of violence by UDT, FRETILIN, militias and the Indonesian military including, murder, rape and torture (CAVR, 2005, p.13). The abuse of women was organised and systematic, aimed at reducing the power of the resistance (CAVR, 2005, p.48).
Indonesia sought legitimisation of its annexation of Timor, basing their claim on the Balibó Declaration representing a legitimate act of self-determination, and in July 1976 legislated that Timor-Leste was the 27th province of Indonesia. FRETILIN appealed to the international
community to intervene, but no key power acted (Cristalis, 2009; Fernandes, 2004). However, emboldened by constant lobbying from the East Timorese diaspora, the UN listed Timor-Leste as a non-self governing territory under Portuguese administration until 1999.
The context of international politics during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste is critical. I will not go into detail in this thesis except to state that in the wake of the de-colonialist
movement and the Cold War, a number of countries (including Australia, New Zealand, United States, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and most of Western Europe) feared Timor-Leste was susceptible to communism and was a political and military threat, and therefore they supported integration with Indonesia, which was seen as stable (Cabral, 2002, p.176). Other issues swayed support including Australia’s negotiation with Indonesia over resource rights in the Timor Sea, security concerns and doubts over Timor-Leste’s economic self-sufficiency (Anderson, 2003). United States, Japan, United Kingdom and Australia trained, armed and provided diplomatic support to Indonesia (Chomsky, 2001, pp.127-129; Fernandes, 2004; Ramos-Horta, 2005). This lack of support for Timor-Leste’s self-determination between 1975 and 1999 by the majority of the international community has had significant implications for post-1999 bilateral relationships.
The violence with Indonesia went through a number of phases: direct violence between Indonesia and Falantil forces from 1974–1979; and from 1979–1999, a dual strategy of
“diplomatic war” and an “arduous and protracted guerilla war” supported by clandestine activity which had two distinct phases (da Silva, 2012, p.183). The first was from 1979–1987 when the Commander-in-Chief Xanana Gusmão formally separated FALINTIL from FRETILIN to form a non-partisan national army. This act divided the political party from the military and gave political power to the diaspora. The second phase was from 1987–1999 when the focus of
resistance activity shifted to Dili and the major towns, and the diaspora-led FRETILIN boosted their efforts at international diplomacy with strong involvement of Timorese student activists and clandestine groups in Indonesia and Europe (Cabral, 2002; da Silva, 2012, p.205; International Crisis Group, 2006; Smith & Dee, 2003, pp.40-41). There was significant variation in the geographic areas of violence (Justino et.al., 2011, p.9). No group was homogenous; there were internal shifts within FRETILIN and between those who stayed to fight and the diaspora (International Crisis Group 2006, p.2). Ideological and personality divisions between key individuals during this time caused bitter rifts that are echoed in elite political power struggles today, and were instrumental in the 2006–2008 violence.
Some commentators (Cabral, 2002; Aarons & Domm, 1992) assert that Indonesia engaged in acts of genocide in Timor-Leste through military and other means. The Indonesian National Family Planning Programme Keluarga Berencana clashed with Catholic Church policy, and was viewed by East Timorese as a way of terminating population growth (Ingram, 2007). John Fernandes, an Indonesian civil servant, described the forced sterilisation under Keluarga Berencana as “indirectly aimed at murdering the indigenous people of Timor-Leste” (CAVR, 2005, p.49). De Oliveria (2002) also argues that Indonesia used systematic rape and sex slavery as a weapon of war to suppress, humiliate and terrorise women. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000) reports that there were gross violations of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law, but did not explicitly describe these violations as constituting acts of genocide. Even if what occurred in Timor-Leste during this period does not meet the technical legal definition of genocide set out in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I agree with Saul (2001) that the violence could be viewed as ‘cultural genocide’ (UN General Assemby, 1948). Cultural genocide can mean “any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national group on grounds of national or racial origin, or religious beliefs” (Morsink, 1999, p.1023). But cultural genocide is not explicitly recognised as a form of genocide under international law. I note, for example that under the UN Convention the definition of genocide includes ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’, which appears to have occurred in Timor- Leste (TTR-0900-061010; Adcock, 2015, pers. comm., 2 December; UN General Assembly, 1948).
Indonesian governance was different from the Portuguese: based on an authoritarian military model of state administration they largely subverted the Indigenous knowledge systems that had been mostly ignored under the Portuguese (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.67). Hunt (2008a, p.278) describes Indonesia as an “all-powerful, repressive, developmentalist state” and Candio and Bleiker (2001, pp.66-67) comment that any Indonesian service delivery was aimed at “winning hearts and minds” and “countering resistance”. Despite increases in service delivery, continued
human rights abuses and atrocities strengthened resentment and Indonesia never won mass East Timorese support.
Indonesian occupation militarised the community at every level; women, men and youth were actively involved either against the occupation or through martial arts groups, which were a response by Indonesia to impose social control and in non-combatant clandestine movements, the women particularly through OPMT (Organização Popular da Mulher Timor - Popular Organisation of Timorese Women) (da Silva, 2012; dos Santos & da Silva, 2012; Mason, 2005; Scambary, 2009, p.1). While the majority of the violence was committed by Indonesian military (TNIor Tentara Nacional Indonesia), inter-communal violence was also perpetrated by East Timorese on East Timorese through Indonesian-supported militias and East Timorese military battalions 744 and 745 (da Silva, 2012; Roque, 2012b). This inter-communal violence was intensified under Indonesian occupation but had its roots in hundreds of years of structural inequities begun under the Portuguese and continued in the 1974–1975 divisions.
Understanding these historical layers is crucial to unpacking the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste post-1999.
Da Silva (2012), Cabral (2002), Hohe (2002a), McWilliam (2005) and Taylor (1991) emphasise that the resistance, structured around Indigenous governance systems, was a crucial factor in ending Indonesian occupation. While clandestine, uma lulik systems of kinship at the suku level enabled trust, mutual obligation and a commitment to independence (McWilliam, 2005, p.37). Indigenous systems were highly resilient under strain, flexible and intuitive to changes in personnel (through death or capture). By aligning with Indigenous systems the resistance was able to build trust, communicate and engage with the broader population. The Indonesian occupation was not just a military failure, it was a failure of governance, due to an inability of Indonesia to “win the battle for the hearts and minds” (McWilliam, 2005, p.35).
In 1997 after some previous attempts, the resistance factions, diaspora elite, Catholic Church and civil society united under the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense - CNRT (National Council of East Timorese Resistance) to cooperate to achieve independence. Ingram (2012, p.7) signals CNRT unity as a future root cause of violence that masked “deep fault lines within the political elite”, divisions that were “much deeper, fuelled by ideology and grievance, parallel histories and tactical positioning to snatch the prizes of victory”. At this time, greater international awareness was crucial in creating a shift in the international political stance on Timor-Leste. For example the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, a more engaged international media, the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Ramos- Horta, sustained diplomatic lobbying at the UN, combined with the fall of Suharto and
broadening support from international solidarity groups (Babo-Soares, 2000; Cabral, 2002, pp.348–357; Ramos-Horta, 1987)3 all contributed to a change in international opinion.