Estudio de la demanda turística potencial

The modern ‘consensus’ macroeconomic model of monetary policy is a dynamic general equilibrium model with a real business cycle core and costly nominal price adjustment42. The model and the implications it has for monetary policy are presented, for instance, in Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003), and Goodfriend (2004)43 from rather different outlooks, yet with an underlying convergence in thinking. The basis of the model is made of two equations that can be described as follows:

a) A “forward-looking IS function” that describes current aggregate demand relative to potential output to be a positive function of expected future income and a negative of the short-term real interest rate. Resembling, though, the original Keynesian IS function, it differs on the inclusion of expected future income. Current aggregate demand depending on expected future income has been postulated early on in the theory of consumption proposed by Fisher (1930) and Friedman (1957).

b) An “aggregate supply function” (termed also the price-setting function or the ‘Phillips curve’) that describes current inflation to be inversely related to expected future inflation and the current output gap (the mark-up in Goodfriend and King

42

See, for example, for a survey Goodfriend (2004), (2005).

43

Mankiw and Romer (1991) and the papers therein also give clear presentations of the relevant model.

(1997)). This aggregate supply function can be derived directly from Calvo’s (1983) staggered price-setting model and is closely related to the pioneering work of Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980)44.

The very introduction of expected future income in the IS function and expected future inflation in the aggregate supply function accounts for the impact of rational expectations in macroeconomics as introduced, for instance, by Lucas (1976), (1981).

The rational expectations theory and the relevant solution methods constituted a manageable and intuitive approach of modelling expectations. It also highlighted the critical importance for monetary policy analysis of the formation of expectations in a way that rationally reflects changes in the way that monetary policy is imagined to be conducted.

Solving the IS function forward, one can express current aggregate demand relative to potential with respect to the expected path of future short-term real interest rates and future potential output. Price-level stickiness enabling monetary policy to exert leverage over the path of real interest rates, then current and expected interest rate policy actions can determine current aggregate demand.

Solving the price-setting function forward, we can describe the current inflation rate to depend inversely on the path of expected future output-gaps. It is implied by the model that inflation will remain low and stable provided that monetary policy affects aggregate demand so as to stabilize the output gap, to keep the average mark-up at the profit maximizing mark-up. Monetary policy maintains price stability by

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anchoring expected future mark-ups at the profit-maximizing mark-up so that firms are reluctant to alter their prices. For monetary policy that stabilizes the mark-up at its profit-maximizing value the macroeconomy follows the underlying core real business cycle model with flexible prices. According to this viewpoint, “flexible price real business cycle models of aggregate fluctuations are of practical interest, not as descriptions of what aggregate fluctuations should be like regardless of the monetary policy regime, but as descriptions of what they would be like under an optimal monetary policy regime”45 (Woodford (2003), p. 410).

Recalling the account of the ‘consensus’ in monetary policy and theory as in Tobin (1980), several aspects are still the same. According to Goodfriend (2005) “there is [still] the idea that prices are marked up over costs; that price trends depend on expectations and on tightness of labour and product markets; that variations in aggregate demand alter inflation by influencing the tightness of markets; that there is a natural rate of unemployment (where output equals potential) at which wage and price setters perpetuate the going rate of inflation (presumably at the profit maximizing mark-up); that inflation accelerates when output is expected to exceed potential (the mark-up is expected to be compressed); and that inflation decelerates when output is expected to fall short of potential (the mark-up is expected to be elevated)” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 251). He further recognises the main advances since then to stem from “the proven power of monetary policy to reduce and stabilize inflation and inflation expectations at a low rate and, also, the progress in modelling expectations rationally to understand how monetary policy consistently committed to stabilizing inflation can achieve favourable results” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 251).

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The final element of the model of monetary policy is a description of how policy is imagined to be conducted. According to the rational expectations theory the way monetary policy influences behaviour can only be described when modelled as part of systematic policy. Thus, it has to be specified in the model how policy is conducted. The two ways employed involve either the use of a rule guiding the policy instrument – the most common case being a Taylor-type interest rate rule (see Taylor (1993)) – or the choice of the central bank instrument each period using the maximisation of a welfare function (which can be derived to reflect household utility).

Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages in either way employed. A policy rule (set on an ad hoc basis) even though it is easy as a reference point and may be selected to approximate the reaction function of a central bank in practice, it is unlikely to be optimal in the model in question. Conversely, if the model is incorrect the results will not be optimal for policy in practice and even if it is not mis-specified it may still yield an optimal rule that will not be followed in practice46. As it was first emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977), optimal monetary policy may be time inconsistent and monetary policy may be suboptimal unless the central bank commits to a specific rule47 (Goodfriend (2005), p. 250-251).

McCallum (2005) briefly contrasts models that are currently being used for monetary theory and policy similar to the consensus model discussed above, with the ones that were used during the early 1980s and provides lessons to be learned from the advancements made since. A model that he uses so as to illustrate the broadly

46

See Svensson (1999a) and McCallum (1999a).

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approved views of the time is the one in McCallum (1980), which was designed to demonstrate the effects of introducing rational expectations into a mainstream macroeconomic model48 (McCallum (2005), p. 287).

A number of researchers such as Lucas (1973), Fischer (1977), Sargent (1973), Taylor (1979), and McCallum (1980) conducted rational expectations analysis in order to derive the dynamic properties of several systems and alternative monetary policy rules. At the core of that analysis was whether, under rational expectations, it was the systematic components of monetary policy rules (rather that the random ones) that produce an effect on the cyclical properties of the real variables, including employment and the output gap (McCallum (2005), p. 287).

Lucas (1972), (1973), Sargent (1973), and Sargent and Wallace (1975) argued that alternative monetary policy rules would leave the behaviour of the output gap unaffected, while Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) advocated for the contrary. McCallum (1980) reached the conclusion each position could be supported by

(

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He actually considers the following basic model (admitting the fact that it may still not be the most representative of the time) (taken from McCallum (2005), p. 287):

) 0 1 1 1 0, t t t t t y =b +b i − ΔE p+ +v b < (1) (2) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 1 1 0, 2 0, t t t t t t t t p E−Δ +p α y −y +α y− −y− +u α > α < Δ = ( ) (3) _t+μ₀+μ_{1 t}−₁+μ₂ y_t−y_t−₁ =e_t μ₁>0,μ₂<0, 0 1 2 1 0, 2 0, t t c c yt c Rt t c c m m (4) m −p = + + +η > < (5)yt =γ₀+γ₁yt−₁+at γ₁>0.

Here the symbols are as follows: yt = log of output, y = log of natural-rate output, pt t = log of price

level, mt = log of money stock, it = one-period interest rate, and vt, ut, et, βt , at = stochastic shocks.

Equation (1) is an IS function in which the rate of spending on goods and services depends (negatively) on the real rate of interest. Equation (2) is a “natural rate” type of Phillips curve or price adjustment relationship, with a unit coefficient on Et –1Δpt implying the absence of any long-run trade-

off, as in Fischer (1977) or Lucas (1973). In addition, (4) is a money demand (or “LM”) function of a standard type, while (3) represents monetary policy behaviour with the central bank adjusting the money supply each period in a way that responds to the current (or possibly a recent past) output gap. Researchers concerned with operationality, such as Andersen and Jordan (1968) and Brunner and Meltzer (1976), tended to use the monetary base as the instrument variable in policy specifications that would be represented by (3) in the model. The output gap refers to the fractional difference between output and its natural rate value, with the latter being generated (exogenously, for simplicity) in equation (5).

plausible specifications. McCallum (2005) recollects that “most policy analysis conducted at the time was not of this type, focusing on properties of dynamic systems, but instead featured point-in-time exercises of the type that rational expectations analysis showed to be (in many cases) fundamentally misleading” (McCallum (2005), p. 287). Currently, the standard mode of policy analysis employs a comparison of the behaviour of target variables (such as inflation and the output gap) under different maintained policy rules, rather than point-in-time exercises49.

According to McCallum (2005) there is another aspect in which current policy analysis has evolved in a different direction, besides the uncontested use of the short- term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument and the neglect of the use of the monetary base. This is that recent models tend to employ optimisation-based general equilibrium analysis in an attempt to develop systems that are potentially structural and thus do not fall in the Lucas critique (as in Lucas (1976)) and also be specified quantitatively, either in terms of an econometric estimation or of careful calibration of their parameter values (the latter as emphasized in the real business cycle literature) (McCallum (2005), p. 288).

Nonetheless, a considerable number of vital issues concerning what we termed the ‘consensus’ approach to modelling monetary policy actions still remain controversial. Those refer, for example, to the theory of monetary policy, inflation targeting, interest rate policy, and communications. A concise discussion of some of these is deemed necessary.

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McCallum (2005) suggests that he would also include the design of optimal policy rules under the advances, despite various reservations mentioned in McCallum and Nelson (2004).

The part of the theory of monetary policy that seems to give rise to the most significant controversies is the price-setting function as it defines the nature of the short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment50. Aggregate-demand shocks pose no problem with respect to the stabilisation of inflation around its objective and of output around potential (as the effort to counter the shock works towards the desirable directions). This does not apply to aggregate-supply shocks, however. To appreciate these issues, it is worth to address the price-setting function as derived from Calvo (1983), according to which the current level of inflation depends positively on expected future inflation and inversely on the current output gap.

As it is emphasized by Goodfriend and King (1997), (2001), King and Wolman (1999), and Goodfriend (2002), in this baseline case, fully credible price stability (implying that current inflation equals expected future inflation and is consistent with a low inflation target) keeps output at its potential and employment at its natural rate. Even for aggregate-supply shocks, the function does not support the existence of short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Following this view, even those who care mainly about output and employment can opt for strict price stability (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254).

However, opposing views refer to the baseline case as unrealistic and advocate that by incorporating other potential features of the macroeconomy into the model, one can discredit the result that price stability is always the welfare-maximizing monetary policy. Taylor (1999a), for example, (and the papers therein) presented a

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The aggregate supply function that uses the Calvo (1983) staggered price-setting justification presents a small long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation which is, in fact, ignored in practical applications.

trade-off in the long-run variance of inflation and output relative to potential in models of monetary policy that resulted from a short-run trade-off in the levels of inflation and unemployment. According to Goodfriend (2005) “any of the following modifications of the Calvo price-setting function produce a short-run trade-off in inflation and unemployment, i.e. adding (i) a “cost” shock that feeds directly into inflation irrespective of expectations or the current mark-up, (ii) lagged inflation that reflects structural inflation inertia in the price-setting process, and (iii) nominal wage stickiness to the baseline model, which otherwise presumes that wages are perfectly flexible” (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254). By carrying out any of the above modifications, to stabilize both inflation and output at potential is not always possible and, thus, monetary policy must create a shortfall of aggregate demand relative to potential output to offset the effect of a cost shock or inertial inflation on current inflation. In addition, nominal wage stickiness creates a trade-off with respect to productivity shocks even without modifications (i) and (ii)51 (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254).

Even though the above modifications seem realistic, their practical importance is still questioned52. Ball (2005) remarkably asserts that “it seems that economists were

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To illustrate this, Goodfriend (2005) gives the example of a temporary negative shock to productivity in the baseline model. In that case, both output gap and inflation stabilization call for a contraction in aggregate demand to conform to the contraction in potential output. Nominal and real wages both fall with productivity, offsetting the effect of the negative shock to productivity on marginal cost and the mark-up. Thus, when wages are flexible, monetary policy can simultaneously stabilize the output gap and inflation. Yet, if nominal wages are sticky (see Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)), monetary policy must steer aggregate demand below potential (to raise the marginal physical product of labour) to offset the effect of negative productivity growth on marginal cost in order to stabilize the mark-up and the inflation rate (Goodfriend (2005), p. 254).

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First, strictly speaking, a ‘cost’ shock cannot be included in the price-setting function marginal cost is already taken into account in the underlying theory. The statistical residual found in practice may only be the result of mismeasurement or noise in the modelling of expectations. If one argues that some costs flow directly to prices in a perfectly competitive sector, then theory suggests that the central bank should consider stabilizing only a ‘core’ index of monopolistically competitive sticky

confused during the 1960s, as they believed in a long-run trade-off between output and inflation and advanced non-monetary theories of inflation and some, for example, suggested that inflation was caused by greedy firms and labour unions, whose behaviour could not be controlled by the monetary authority” (Ball (2005), p. 263), (on the latter see Nelson (2004)). Friedman, though, advocated that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’. In Friedman (1968) he provides an explanation that the output inflation trade-off exists only in the short run, while in the long run, unemployment must eventually reach its natural rate. Friedman’s ideas controversial, though, they where when they were first expressed, they soon gained wide acceptance influencing policymakers in addition to academics.

Friedman (1968), in particular, not only gave general principles about the economy, but also included a precise theory of the Phillips curve. Concisely the latter was presented using the statements that “there is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment and that there is no permanent trade-off” (quoted in Ball (2005), p. 263). The temporary trade-off is generated from unanticipated inflation, which means, in general, a rising rate of inflation. Ball (2005) gives the following equations to express Friedman’s verbal statements. The relation between unemployment and surprise inflation is described by the expectations augmented Phillips curve:

prices. Second, as argued in Furhrer and Moore (1995), theory that justifies structural inertia in the inflation-generating process is controversial. Lags of inflation in an estimated inflation-generating function could reflect persistence introduced into the inflation rate by central bank behaviour, in particular in the case of measurement or other specification errors. Cecchetti (1995a) and Cogley and Sargent (2001), for example, give evidence that apparent inflation persistence is reduced when inflation is low and stable. Third, an inflation target of 1 to 2 percent along with productivity growth of around 2 percent produces nominal wage growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. Average nominal wage growth that is as high should keep the economy away from situations in which significant downward nominal wage stickiness, as opposed to slower nominal wage growth, is required to keep price inflation stable and output at potential (see Goodfriend (2005), p. 255).

(

)

1 ,

t Et t ut u π = ₋π α− −

where u is the natural rate of unemployment. The fact that unanticipated inflation and rising inflation come to employ the same meaning implies that expectations are backward-looking (i.e.E_t−1π_t =π_t−1). Inserting the latter relation into the previous equation, one yields the “accelerationist” Phillips curve, which relates unemployment to the change in inflation and has the following form:

(

)

1

t t ut u

π =π ₋ −α − .

According to Ball (2005), four decades after Friedman formed his theory, his Phillips curve is still the best simple theory of the unemployment-inflation trade-off” (Ball (2005), p. 264).

Even though the introduction of rational expectations constitute a decisive advancement especially on the monetary theory side, implying a key role for central banks’ credibility as inflation fighters53, Ball (2005) questions the usefulness of rational expectations models for understanding inflation in the real world and projects several related reasons.

He, first, considers the broad history of U.S. inflation since 1979 and claims that the accelerationist Phillips curve still seems the best tool for this job. That is, changes in inflation are well explained by short-run movements in unemployment. In fact, the deep recession of the early 1980s caused inflation to fall sharply. Inflation rose a bit in the late 1980s as unemployment fell. And inflation fell moderately during the

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In rational expectations models, an increase in credibility shifts the output-inflation trade-off favourably. A major goal for policymakers is, thus, to build credibility.

recessions of the early 1990s and 2000s. Credibility being really important, shifts in inflation would not be explained by unemployment (or obvious supply shocks). In these episodes, changes in credibility would shift the short-run Phillips curve, which has not been the case in countries with moderate inflation. Ball (2005) recalls that “when Sargent (1983) looked for an example, he had to go back to France in the 1920s - and even this case is disputed by historians. The concept of credibility is not useful for explaining the history of inflation” (Ball (2005), p. 264).

The presence of credibility effects has been researched in various ways, albeit with negative results. Some examples include the following:

• Inflation expectations in the U.S. consistently follow actual inflation with a lag. No unusual episodes can be explained by credibility effects.

• In theory, greater credibility reduces the cost of disinflation, the sacrifice ratio. In practice, Ball (2005) claims that this is not the case. Sacrifice ratios are found by Debelle and Fischer (1994) to be higher for central banks that have a higher level of independence, and, are, thus, more credible. Sacrifice ratios are found to be especially high for Germany under the Bundesbank. Zhang (2001) finds the sacrifice ratio for the U.S. disinflation of 1990-94 was high compared to previous U.S. disinflations, despite the building-up of credibility by the Federal Reserve under Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan.

• Past the adoption of inflation targeting by several central banks (during the last two decades), with the consequent increase in credibility and anchoring of expectations, cross-country comparisons still produce little evidence that inflation targeting changes the behaviour of output or inflation (see Ball and Sheridan (2005)).

Currently, economists have converged on a specific model of the economy, which is,