When approaching the media, the interests of political parties and individual MPs are not the same. Geography, electorate size and mass media technologies have all necessitated and
facilitated the use of mass media to communicate with voters. Moreover, before emails and text messaging, the media was used not only as medium in which to communicate with voters, but also with party members and parliamentary colleagues. In this context, the needs of individual MPs and those of parties can come into conflict. Media skills are highly visible and easy to assess and are increasingly becoming an important demonstration of broader political competence. For opposition parliamentarians who are not responsible for implementing (and often developing) policy, effective media skills are erroneously correlated with ministerial competence. Thus, ambitious MPs seek to build their media profile while parties require team members to sing from
the sa e so g sheet. Ho a d s do i a e of the Coalitio s e o o i age da i the id-1980s
egula l ought hi i to o fli t ith his leade A d e Pea o k. Ho a d as al a s illi g to do edia a d as the fo e T easu e , he e a e the auto ati gatekeepe o e the Coalitio s e o o i poli a d this, alo g ith Pea o k s la k of i terest in economic policy, hampered Pea o k s capacity to carve out his own credentials as an economic manager.480 Additionally, shadow ministerial rank comes with obligations and responsibilities to o e s o party when communicating in the media. For example, an ambitious backbencher may court the national media, in the hopes of gaining the attention of both the press and leading members of their party. John Carrick had advised a young John Howard to pick a policy area and make it his own as a way to improve his recognition within the party. Howard later passed this advice on to
479Fo studies o edia ias see Ma ia “i s a d Da iel Bolge , The Aust alia P i t Media a d Pa tisa
Bias i the Ca paig , i Ho ard s Age da: The Australia Ele tio , ed. John Warhurst and Marian
“i s “t Lu ia, Qld: U i e sit of Quee sla d P ess, ; Ma ia “i s, The P i t Media: Lap Dog o Wat h Dog? , i Mortgage Nation: The 2004 Australian Election, ed. Marian Simms and John Warhurst (Perth, W.A: Australia Research Institute, Cu ti U i e sit of Te h olog , ; ‘od e Tiffe , Aust alia: Gladiato ial
Pa ties a d Volatile Media i a “ta le Polit , i The Handbook of Election News Coverage around the World, ed. Jesper Strömbäck and Lynda Lee Kaid (New York: Routledge, 2008), 117.
480
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a young Joe Hockey.481 While backbenchers have the luxury of expressing their personal opinions, shadow ministers and shadow parliamentary secretaries — bound by shadow cabinet solitary — do ot. As offi e s of the pa t , the ust efle t shado a i et s position whether or not they personally agree.
The party leader speaks ith hat To A ott des i ed as the o po ate oi e of the Li e al party.482 Yet, the LPA leader also enjoys the privilege of asserting his policy and ideological preferences, though as demonstrated in chapter three, this privilege must be weighed carefully. Balancing the need to construct a favourable image and define oneself as a person the public can get to know, while also being the titular voice of a political institution is a major challenge for party leaders that constantly requires calibration. Leade s a e thei e atu e atte tio -
seeki g , ut for the party more broadly, resisting collapsing the leade s oi e i to the pa t s voice is a constant point of tension.
Finally, there is the additional voice of the organisational wing of the party which is occasionally heard. Given the political culture of the LPA and the relationship between the organisational and party wings of the party, public criticism from this corner is often destabilising and
discouraged.483 However, the LPA s oppositio ea s ha e it essed out eaks of internal criticism and dissent. John Valder, party President from 1985-87, publicly suppo ted Ho a d s careful formulation of a statement of loyalty to then Leader Andrew Peacock that rattled Peacock and his office.484 Further criticism by John Elliott in 1988, which was linked to
speculation that he would challenge Howard for the leadership, is another example of unhelpful forays by the party organisation into the public political fray.485 In 2011, A ott s dupli it i his support of Alan Stockdale over Peter Reith for party president provoked the latter into a more forceful and public critique of the federal party.486 Indeed, given the o ga isatio al i g s relative silence, outbreaks from that quarter are interpreted by the press as signs of division or of a lack of order in the party.
Thus, in this way we can see that political communication by political parties is the orchestrated and layered effort of multiple actors with differing levels of responsibility. This is not simply a
atte of sta i g o essage , ut also udgi g so e issues o to the age da, ope i g up
481
King, Hockey, 94.
482
Tony Abbott, Kitchen Cabinet, Australian Broad Casting Corporation, September 4 2013.
483
Liberal Party of Australia. Committee of Review and Valder, Facing the Facts, 69, 101.
484
Errington and Van Onselen, John Winston Howard, 119.
485
Kelly, The End of Certainty, Chapter 21.
486
Peter Reith, Pete ‘eith Calls o A ott to Ta kle Wo kpla e ‘efo , Radio National (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 28 June 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/peter- reith-calls-on-abbott-to-tackle-workplace/2919828.
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dialogues, and supressing politically dangerous topics. The o e all su ess of the pa t s edia strategy is dependent on the each individual party member deploying the message carefully and in unison. Changes in technology have tightened the centralisation and control of political messaging. 487 Yet, this trend, initially facilitated and accelerated by the rise of the fax machine, email and sophisticated computing systems, is now under challenge by social media and permanent connectivity which characterises our world today. Given these constraints, how did the Coalition navigate the media landscape between 1983 and 1996?