ESTUDIOS DE CASO

Basis of liability The basis of liability is the gathering for an illegal purpose which constitutes a crime under the RPC.

The basis is the formation of or organization of an association to engage in an unlawful purpose which is not limited to a violation of the RPC.

of actual

meeting there is an actual meeting or assembly. there be an actual meeting. Acts punished Meeting and the attendance at such meeting are the acts punished.

Act of forming or organizing and membership in the association are the acts punished. DIRECT ASSAULTS

ART. 148

Ways of committing the crime of direct assault 1. Without public uprising, by employing force or

intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and

2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force or by seriously intimidating or by seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion of such performance.

Elements of the first form

1. Offender employs force or intimidation; 2. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the

purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the crime of sedition; and

3. There is no public uprising

Q: As the town president failed to pay their salaries, the defendant, accompanied by four armed men, went to the house of the former and compelled him by force to leave it and go to the Presidencia. He kept him there confined until the relatives of the town president had raised enough money to pay what was due them as salaries. What crime did the accused commit?

A: The facts constitute the crime of direct assault. There is no public uprising when the accused, accompanied by armed men, compelled by force the town president to go with them to proceed to the municipal building and detained him there. By reason of detaining the town president, he inflicted upon a public officer an act of hate or revenge. This is one of the objects of sedition, which is essentially what the accused intended to attain (U.S. v. Dirain,

G.R. No. 1948, May 5, 1905).

Elements of the second form 1. Offender:

a. Makes an attack,

b. Employs force,

c. Makes a serious intimidation, or d. Makes a serious resistance;

2. Person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent:

a. Is engaged in the performance of official duties, or that he is assaulted

b. On occasion of such performance;

4. The offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and

5. There is no public uprising.

“On   occasion   of   the   performance   of   official   duties”

It means that the assault was made because or by reason of the past performance of official duties even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged (Justo v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. L-8611, June 28, 1956).

In this form, there is a need to determine the reason why a person in authority or his agent was attacked. If the attack was made by reason of the past performance of official duties of the person in authority or his agent, the accused is liable for direct assault. If the attack was made by reason of revenge, then the accused shall not be liable under this article, but for physical injuries.

If the attack was done while the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of official functions, the crime is always direct assault, whatever be the reason. Not in actual performance of official duties The following are considered as not in actual performance of official duties:

1. When the person in authority or the agent of a person in authority exceeds his powers or acts without authority;

2. Unnecessary use of force or violence; and 3. Descended to matters which are private in

nature.

Kinds of direct assault of the second form 1. Simple assault; and

2. Qualified assault. “Qualified  direct  assault” Direct assault is qualified when:

1. Assault is committed with a weapon;

3. Offender lays hands upon a person in authority. No liability under Art. 148 for Direct Assault 1. If the public officer or officer in authority is a

mere bystander;

2. If the accused did not know that victim was a person in authority; or

3. If the person assaulted was no longer a public officer at the time of the attack even if the reason for the attack was due to past performance of duties.

Q: When the policemen effected the arrest of the accused, he approached them and hit one of them in the breast with his hand or fist, at which instant the policeman seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased. Is the accused guilty of direct assault?

A: No, as when the offended party is agent of person in authority, any force or aggression is not sufficient constitute to an assault. To come within the purview of Art. 148, the force used against the agent of a person in authority must be of serious character than that employed in this case. Logic tells us that resistance is impossible without force

(U.S. v. Tabiana, G.R. No. L-11847, February 1, 1918).

Q: When the news that his carabao, which earlier destroyed a planted area belonging to another, was seized and taken to the police station reached the accused, he confronted and protested to the municipal president, who was then inspecting the quarantine of the animals. The president, upon hearing his protest, promised to intervene in the matter and to see whether the carabao could be withdrawn. Upon hearing this, the accused insulted the president and gave him a slap on the face. What crime did the accused commit?

A: The accused committed direct assault upon a person in authority. When the offended party is a person in authority, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires in order to constitute an assault since the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in mere laying hands upon the person. The degree of force employed by the offender against the person in authority is immaterial as the law simply mentions the laying hands sufficient (U.S. v. Gumban, G.R. No.

L-13658, November 9, 1918). If the intent of the

accused is to embarrass the person in authority, the offense is Direct Assault with Slander by Deed. Q: Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in authority? (2000 Bar Question)

A: Persons in authority are those directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed persons in authority.

Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.

In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. Crime of direct assault can be complexed with the material consequence of the unlawful act As a rule, where the spirit of the contempt or lawlessness is present, it is always complexed with the material consequences of the unlawful act. If the unlawful act was murder or homicide committed under circumstance of lawlessness or contempt of authority, the crime would be direct assault with murder or homicide, as the case may be.

When offense is not complexed with direct assault

When the material consequence is a light felony, that is, slight physical injury because the said injuries are considered as an incident or a necessary consequence of the force or violence inherent in all kinds of assault.

Q: Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay Carinias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was delivering his speech, B, one of the guests, went to the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance movements, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone present to a fight. A approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his back twice when A turned his back

to proceed to the microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of the incident A was not armed. What crime was committed? (2000 Bar Question) A: The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. Since A was stabbed at the back when he was not in a position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing. Hence, the death caused by such stabbing was murder. The Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify B who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), the Supreme Court ruled that "as the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person   in   authority”   (People v. Dollantes, G.R. No.

70639, June 30, 1987).

INDIRECT ASSAULTS