ETAPAS, ASPECTOS, MÉTODOS E INSTRUMENTOS PARA LA EVALUACIÓN

The decade between 1980 and 1990 saw nine different Belgian cabinets, eight of which were presided over by Christian Democrat Prime Minister Wilfried Martens. Most government coalitions fell due to linguistic squab- bles, such as the language conflict in the municipality of Voeren, a predomi- nantly Francophone town in a Flemish region. In addition, the center-right coalitions’ austerity policies characterized the early 1980s. The Martens V cabinet (1981-1985) requested emergency mandates from Parliament in or- der to enforce a ‘recovery’ policy. Over the next four years, the cabinet would (most of the time by decree) pursue a hard-line budgetary restriction policy and push through many cutbacks to get the Belgian economy back on track again. The Emergency Mandate Act was formulated with broad ob- jectives, such as economic recovery, increasing economic competitiveness, and restoring a financial balance to the social security system. The Act gave the government much freedom to fill in the policies to achieve these goals. In this regard, the government and the Central Bank decided to devalue the Belgian franc by 8.5%. If government spending had not been contained dur- ing this period, it would have accelerated inflation in the long run. This ne- cessitated a very strict budgetary policy. Besides imposing wage moderation and freezing the automatic indexation mechanism, the government decided to impose extra levies such as the ‘solidarity contributions’ for the social se-

In the second half of the 1980s, Belgium experienced a period of economic growth. This created budgetary possibilities to fight poverty among the un- employed and benefit-dependent people at the subsistence level. Until 1988, the center-right Martens vi and vii coalitions had initiated expenditure-in- creasing adjustments on several fronts: expanded the eligibility rules for starters, increased minimum level of benefits, allowed accumulation of ben- efits from different sources, and guaranteed the eligibility rights of those whose benefits were the sole family income. After the austerity period of the early 1980s, they decided to compensate the cutbacks to those in need. This was in part possible because of the improved economic situation.

The center-Socialist-regionalist Martens viii coalition (1988-1991) con- tinued the adjustment policy. Government spending increased again as did labor costs due to wage increases. In order to control expenditures, Martens viii focused on reducing the abuse of the unemployment insurance program by more strictly controlling entitlements and willingness to work. For in- stance, it used Article 143 of the 1963 Royal Decree, which allows the ad- ministration to suspend the benefits of someone structurally unemployed after a certain period of ‘abnormal unemployment duration.’ This is only possible if their benefits are the secondary family income and they cannot prove that they have been ‘actively seeking work.’

In 1991, the old Royal Decree that comprised the legislation on unemploy- ment insurance was replaced by a modernized Royal Decree (Belgisch

Staatsblad 911231). Several articles were slightly altered, regrouped,

redefined, or elaborated upon. Strangely enough, this major legislative oper- ation was not seized upon as an opportunity to embed the unemployment insurance policy in the law – instead as merely a new Royal Decree. Royal Decrees are not decided upon by Parliament, but fall under the direct juris- diction of the responsible minister and the cabinet. However, other minis- ters in the cabinet are very often uninformed on the highly complex social security system and its changes.

The accumulation of small changes did not end with the ‘renovation’ of the Royal Decree on unemployment insurance in 1991. On the contrary, the new Royal Decree was but a few weeks old when the first adjustments were already being announced. Within five years, 79 out of the 180 original arti- cles of the November 1991 Royal Decree would be adjusted, 8 would be abolished and 11 new ones added (Holvoet 1996: 706). The unemployment arrangement became the most complex component of the Belgian social in- surance system. Even for those dealing with it on a daily basis it became ‘to- tally unclear and inaccessible’ (Baeck 1991: 398).14

Another recession hit Belgium in the early 1990s. The growth of the

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Belgian economy slowed down and even saw a downturn in 1993. This re- sulted in an explosive increase in unemployment: 6% more unemployed in 1991, 14.4% more in 1992, and an increase of 15.9% unemployed people in 1993. The total unemployment figures were unprecedented (see Table 4.5).

It should be noted that ten years earlier the government had decided that the unemployed over 50 were no longer obliged to actively seek employ- ment. The over-supply of labor made this seem a wise strategy in an attempt to enhance the chances of young people and to lay off redundant older work- ers, who had already been working for nearly a lifetime and who were

Table 4.4 Unemployment Figures Belgium*

1992 In % of In % of

labor insured popula-

tion

Total population (in 1990, source: Deleeck, 2001: 142) 9,947,782

Total labor population (15-65) 4,237,239 100.0

Insured against unemployment risk 2,995,940 70.0 100.0

(excluding civil servants and self-employed)**

Full time, job seeking, unemployed 410,682 9.6 13.7

Older unemployed (not seeking work) 74,295 1.8 2.5

Other unemployed (not seeking work) 38,665 0.1 1.3

Family reasons (33,131)

Educational reasons (5,534)

Pre-pension (early retirement/unemployment scheme) 136,963 3.2 4.6

Part-time unemployed 176,195 4.1 5.8

Total unemployment benefit dependency 836,799 18.8 27.9

Source: RVA Year Report, 1993, own calculations

* This table does not include people on temporary leave.There are two categories of temporary leave. One is a sabbatical arrangement, which allows an employee to take a leave of 6-12 months un- der the condition that the employer replaces employee with an unemployed person.The employee on leave receives an unemployment benefit. A total of 58,423 employees used this arrangement in

1992.The other temporary leave situation allows a company in financial trouble – because of de-

creased demand for its products or services – to temporarily release redundant blue-collar workers. These employees receive an unemployment benefit until their employer has new work for them. An- other 52,996 employees were temporarily unemployed through this arrangement.

** All employees except civil servants are insured against the risk of unemployment.This means that they pay a contribution on their wages to cover the expenses of the collective unemployment insur- ance. Civil servants or the self-employed do not run the risk of unemployment and therefore do not benefit from the arrangement, therefore they do not contribute. Consequently, the costs of unem- ployment are a heavy burden on the shoulders of active employees (total civilian employment was

ernment turned this causal relation around. The cabinet stated that because the over-50 unemployed were not seeking employment, they should no longer be included in unemployment statistics. After all, the Ministry of Employment had to focus its active labor market policy on those beneficia- ries still obliged to (seek) employment, the ones who really ‘counted’ as un- employed. The unemployed who no longer seemed to ‘count,’ were thus ‘cleansed’ from the statistics.

Because of the low level of benefits, the total cost of unemployment insur- ance was modest compared to the cost of other benefit programs.15_Despite

the one million who were part of unemployment benefit scheme, the unem- ployment insurance actually only accounted for 21% of total social security expenditures. This is relatively little compared to pensions and health care expenses. Policymakers state that it was an inexpensive, though effective means of fighting poverty. Of all the families dependent on unemployment insurance, 46% of the household incomes would fall below subsistence level if it was not for this benefit (Deleeck 2001: 378).

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p o l i c y r e ac t i o n s to a d ve r s it y

Table 4.5 Evolution of Number of Beneficiaries in Different Categories of Eligibility

Regular Career Tempor-

Full-time Pre- Older Part-time inter- Exempted arily

unempl. pension1 _{unempl. unempl. ruption unempl. unempl. Total}

1975 177,367 4,402 0 3,343 0 0 82,541 267,653

1980 321,895 93,095 0 12,253 0 0 80,347 507,590

1985 476,629 124,708 32,417 97,887 0 209 67,302 799,152

1990 347,932 140,823 72,431 204,495 48,563 36,230 37,917 888,391

1993 475,867 136,963 74,295 165,975 53,528 30,477 64,127 1,001,232

Source: Cantillon et al. (1999b) Sociale Indicatoren 1976-1997, CSB Antwerpen, p. 48

1The pre-pension consists of an unemployment benefit plus a supplement at a level closer to the pre-

ceding income level.

Table 4.6 Benefit Dependency 1970-1990 (in 1000s)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Increase in % 1970-1990 Unemployed 111 220 504 857 898 709.0 Pension 917 1,103 1,230 1,289 1,404 53.1 Disability 92 121 147 165 163 77.2 Family allowance 883 956 1,009 1,011 1,015 14.9 Source: De Lathouwer, 1996: 17