Etapas clave para un sistema de monitoreo de un proyecto

Modelling a central bank's behaviour is not an easy task for economists. Being one of the key economic agents, modelling a central bank's behaviour is an integrated part in the study of macroeconomic research. In the case of Malaysia, the above results indicate that representing BNM's policy behaviour as a rational and optimizing economic agents works reasonably well. By using Malaysia's economic outcomes for the 1975Q1-1998Q2 period, representing BNM's action using the optimal control theory provides valuable information regarding its policy behaviour. In particular, the results identify BNM's policy targets and relative preferences, as well as the ination target that it wants to achieve.

Most essentially, the results indicate that modelling BNM's policy behaviour does not dier very much to its counterparts in the developed countries. Despite having a dierent economic structure (and hence dierent policy constraints), BNM's policy behaviour can be reasonably represented by using the optimal control approach, which is the standard modelling methodology used in the literature to represent a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy. Perhaps, the outcome of these results would prompt the use of the same approach to model BNM's behaviour in future research involving Malaysian data. The above results indicate that this approach works well for the period that excludes September 1998 to July 2005, i.e. when the capital controls and xed exchange rate regime was in eect.

The results presented in the previous section highlight a few important characteristics regarding BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy in Malaysia. Each of these characteristics are discussed below.

4.4.1 Objective of Monetary Policy in Malaysia

By assuming that BNM's preference can be represented by the standard loss func- tion, the estimate for BNM's relative preferences are found to have a plausible size, be correctly signed and are statistically signicant. This holds in all cases, except for the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period, when BNM was pursuing several unconventional and temporary agendas.

The results indicate that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is not very much dierent than those pursued by the central banks in the developed economies. Based on its policy action, the results suggest that BNM formulates monetary policy to achieve three common objectives - stabilizing ination, stabilizing output and smooth- ing interest rates.

In addition, the positive and statistically signicant estimated parameters for the relative preferences on output stabilization and interest rates smoothing (λ1 and λ3) suggests that BNM is not a central bank which Svensson (1999) categorized as a strict ination targeter. In contrast, it can be inferred from these empirical results that besides achieving price stability, BNM also takes into account the objective to stabilize output and to smooth interest rates.

The results also reveal important information about the way BNM balances the trade- o between achieving price stability and stabilizing output growth. The estimated parameter on relative preferences to stabilize output (λ1) is found to be greater than 1, suggesting BNM puts greater weight on attaining output stability ahead of stabilizing ination. Hence, with λ1 > 1 , the results rearm the proposition made by Tang (2006) that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is the attainment of sustainable economic growth with price stability. In doing so, BNM's policy preferences are biased towards achieving output stability.

4.4.2 Stabilizing Exchange Rate is not one of BNM's monetary

policy objectives

In all the sample periods, the estimated coecient for λ2 are not statistically signi- cant. These results suggest that smoothing the real exchange rate is not one of BNM's policy objectives. Given the knowledge that BNM does intervene regularly in the foreign exchange market, the outcome of this result is rather unexpected. Nevertheless, despite the strong reasons to believe that smoothing the real exchange rate is one of the important objectives that BNM pursues in its policy formulation, results of this exercise fail to capture any empirical evidence to support this proposition.

On this regard, Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) also attempted the same exercise in the case of central banks in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. By also modelling central bank behaviour using the optimal control theory set-up, they too, do not nd empirical evidence to support the proposition that smoothing real exchange rates is one of the policy objectives for the central bank in these countries.

Perhaps, the main reason that contributes to the failure of the empirical exercise to nd supportive evidence for this proposition is related to dierences in the actual method that central banks use to achieve exchange rate stability and the way that this is being represented in the model. Instead of using interest rates as the instrument to inuence the real exchange rate - which is the key assumption in the model of representing central bank behaviour using the optimal control theory - most central banks in practice, prefer to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market (Jurgensen (1983); Bank for International Settlement (2004)).

There are two possible reasons for central banks' favouring the direct intervention method - speed and accuracy. The mechanism of the interest rate to inuence exchange rate movement in the short-run relies on the sensitivity of the short-term capital ows to the interest rate. Change in exchange rates is triggered by the actual demand for domestic currency following the movement of the capital ows. In reality, movement of short-term capital across borders is bound by factors other than interest rates alone. Factors like country risk premium, players' expectation on future returns, performance of the stock markets, as well as political stability are also important. As a result, the eect of changing interest rates to inuence exchange rate movement could be full of

uncertainty, which makes the direct intervention to be a more favourable option to the central banks.

The direct intervention method inuences the exchange rate movement through three main channels - monetary policy, portfolio and expectation channels.12 _{The monetary}

policy channel - that requires the change in interest rate to trigger the adjustment in the exchange rate through the standard Mundell-Fleming mechanism - works when the intervention operation is unsterilized.13 _{Nevertheless, many central banks do not favour}

the unsterilized intervention due to its negative impact on interest rate stability (Craig and Humpage (2001)). On this regard, Fry (1995) nds that Asia-Pacic countries have attained autonomy in both monetary policy and exchange rate stabilization by means of sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange markets. Also, Takagi and Esaka (2001) argue that sterilized intervention was eective in Asian countries, particularly during the period before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. With the sterilized intervention method, exchange rate stability is achieved with interest rate levels left virtually unchanged. Nevertheless, this condition is not consistent with the mechanics assumed under the optimal control theory. The stability of the exchange rate - one of the state variables in the optimal control system - is achieved without the use of the interest rate (control variable). This factor could directly contribute to the failure of the empirical exercise to nd evidence that smoothing the exchange rate is one of the central bank's policy objectives. For the same reason, the knowledge that BNM conducts most of its foreign exchange intervention through the sterilized intervention method (Lin See Yan (1991), Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b, 1999)), could also explain the failure of this exercise to generate positive evidence to support the proposition that smoothing the real exchange rate is one of the BNM's policy objectives.

Having said that, the truth of the matter lies in the diculty in identifying the exact role of real exchange rate smoothing to the Malaysian policymakers. If the empirical result using the optimal control theory is taken as the correct specication representing BNM's

12_{See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a detailed description of each channel.}

13_{In short, the mechanics of sterilized intervention is as follows. Central banks operation of buying}

(to smooth appreciation pressure) or selling (to smooth depreciation pressure) of foreign currency in the foreign exchange market will see the injection or contraction of domestic currency (liquidity) into the foreign exchange market. The injection or contraction of liquidity in the domestic money market leads to constant uctuations of short-term interest rates. To avoid unwanted interest rate uctuations, central banks conduct a contra operation in the domestic money market to neutralize the amount of liquidity that it initially injected/contracted in the foreign exchange market. See among others, Taylor (1982); Jurgensen (1983); Craig and Humpage (2001) for details.

policy behaviour, then its regular intervention operation in the (nominal) exchange rate market could have an alternative role to the policymakers. Putting together two sources of information regarding BNM's policy and operational behaviour - the insignicant of parameter λ2 as found in this empirical exercise; and the knowledge that BNM conducts regular sterilized intervention operations in the foreign exchange rate market - suggests a useful proposition regarding the role of the real exchange rate stability in the conduct of monetary policy in Malaysia. Smoothing the real exchange rate may not be one of BNM's policy objectives, but it has been used as the means to achieve its other policy objectives that have been identied in this empirical exercise - stabilizing ination, stabilizing output and smoothing interest rates.

This proposition is also consistent with BNM's ocial view in justifying its action to minimize excessive exchange rate uctuation. The quotations below outline the importance of stable exchange rates to the conduct of monetary policy for a small open economy like Malaysia.

"As a matter of policy, the Central Bank's intervention in the foreign exchange market is only to moderate day-to-day uctuation in the value of ringgit and not to ght the underlying trend dictated by the market."

page 270, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)

"...Competitiveness needs to be achieved through eciency and productivity gains rather than relying on currency deprecation. As a matter of policy, Malaysia does not rely on the exchange rate to gain competitive advantage." Governor's Statement, Bank Negara Malaysia (2001) Annual Report More importantly, the last quotation also reiterates BNM's stand for not using the exchange rate to promote exports. This lends support to the proposition that stabilizing real exchange rates is not one of BNM's policy objectives.

4.4.3 Evolution of BNM's Relative Preferences and Ination

Target

Estimation results using the sample period of 1975Q1-1986Q4 and 1987Q1-1998Q2 indicate considerable changes in BNM's relative preferences between dierent objectives and the ination target. To non-policymakers, two possible reasons could contribute to this outcome. First, changes in BNM's relative preferences and ination targets could be attributed to the changes in the key policymaker itself, i.e. the Governor.14 _Second,

the change in policymakers' relative preferences could reect a change in its policy emphasis. For example, the strengthening of the banking sector and the liberalization of the interest rate structure would cause the central bank to be less concerned about the impact of policy changes on nancial stability. This could prompt the central bank to reduce its preferences to smooth interest rate.

While the ideal way to investigate the rst reason is to divide the estimation period according to tenure of the BNM's Governor itself, this option is not being pursued in this exercise. The fact that BNM does not enjoy goal independence, highlights the possibility that its policy directions are heavily inuenced by the Government.15

Hence, the change in BNM's Governor is less likely to cause signicant changes in the way BNM pursues its policy objectives. In contrast, the way that the estimation period is divided in this empirical exercise, is more inclined to cater for the second reason. The change in BNM's relative preferences over time could be more likely attributed to the change in its policy emphasis, in line with the evolution of the Malaysian economy.

4.4.3.1 Evolution of BNM's policy preferences to stabilize output

The estimated value for parameter λ1 increases during the later period, suggesting BNM's higher relative preferences to stabilize output to be close to its potential level. A higher estimated value for λ1 could reect BNM's continuous eort in trying to

14_{In the case of the US Federal Reserve, this factor was investigated by Ozlale (2003), and Dennis}

(2004, 2006), by dividing the estimation period under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns, Paul Volker and Alan Greenspan.

15_{Page 109, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999) states: "...BNM is independent within the Government,}

but not of the Government." This suggests that BNM has operational independence, but its policy objective(s) is set by the Government. Having said that, the way BNM prioritizes its designated policy objective(s) is unknown to the non-policymakers.

moderate the accelerated economic growth experienced during this period. In the aftermath of the mid-1980 recession, the Malaysian economy staged a strong recovery and recorded a decade of uninterrupted growth until the outbreak of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. During this period, its GDP grew constantly to over 8% every year. This prolonged growth created a new challenge to the policymaker. The risk of rising ination became an important issue together with the need to ensure economic growth remained sustainable. The three quotes from a series of BNM's Annual Reports below, reects its long-standing concerns about this issue during the course of this period.

"The primary thrust of macro-economic policy in 1991 was on the manage- ment of rising price pressures to ensure that the rapid pace of economic expansion in recent years would not precipitate an inationary spiral in the country. The maintenance of price stability was particularly important as there were increasing signs of overheating in the domestic economy, charac- terized by rising wage pressure amidst a general tightening of the labour market, and the buoyant and sustained expansion in domestic demand."

Page 16, Bank Negara Malaysia (1991) Annual Report

"The challenge of economic management in 1994 continued to be sustaining the growth momentum, while at the same time maintaining price stability. It was recognized that the price pressures and the imbalance in the current account of the balance of payments reected not only excess demand conditions, but also supply constraints."

Page 19, Bank Negara Malaysia (1994a) Annual Report

"During 1996, the monetary policy strategy was undertaken against the background of continued resource constraints reected in higher wages and persistent inationary pressures despite a moderation in exports and growth."

Page 68, Bank Negara Malaysia (1996) Annual Report

To reinforce this point, the estimation result of the PC indicates that the contribution of the output gap to overall ination in Malaysia becomes more important as the economy progresses. From Table 4.5, the estimated parameter for κ₅ of the PC equation turns

positive and statistically signicant during the 1987-1998 period. Hence, the strategy to achieve price stability could not only rely on an orthodox instrument like price control, but also needs to focus on the source of the price pressure. In the Malaysian case, price pressure during the 1987-1998 period mostly originated from the demand side (demand-pull ination). Due to this factor and as suggested by the estimation results of its loss function, BNM's policy preferences during this period gave more attention to stabilizing output. The strategy to make output operate close to its full potential level minimizes the risk of an excess demand in the economy. Consequently, with a more sustainable economic growth, it will directly reduce the risk of demand-pull ination.

4.4.3.2 Evolution of BNM's relative preferences to smooth interest rates

In contrast, BNM's relative preferences to smooth interest rates declines markedly in the later period. This outcome is consistent with the advancement of the Malaysian banking system and nancial sector. For example, the success of the banking system reforms in the late 1970s and the rst half of the 1980s made Malaysian banking institutions stronger and more resilient to face competitive pressure (Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b, 1999)). As maintaining banking system stability is also one of BNM's main tasks, this advancement reduced BNM's concern that its monetary policy action would generate negative impact to the overall stability of the banking system.

In addition, the successful interest rate liberalization in late 1978 made the economy more responsive to the interest rate changes. This can be seen from the parameter estimate of γ₃ in the IS equation. During the 1975-1986 period, the estimate for γ₃ is wrongly signed and is not statistically signicant. The situation reversed in the 1987-1998 period, signifying the positive impact of the interest rate liberalization to the Malaysian economy. For the policymakers, this change indicates vast improve- ment in its monetary transmission process. As central banks are generally reluctant to reverse policy action in order to maintain reputation and credibility (Goodhart (1999)), the knowledge that its policy action is now being transmitted more eectively, could re- duce BNM's concern of making policy mistakes. On top of that, BNM's progression to move away from non-market based monetary policy instruments (like direct controls on interest rates, credit controls and high Statutory Reserves/Liquid Assets Requirement) in favour of market based instruments (like direct borrowing/lending and open market

operation) has enabled the central bank to inuence market interest rates more eec- tively (Bank Negara Malaysia (1999) and Bank for International Settlement (1999)). Consequently, these factors made BNM less reluctant to change interest rates in the later period.

4.4.3.3 Lower implicit ination target

The change in BNM's behaviour over the period is also reected in the evolution of its implicit ination target. The estimation results indicate that BNM's ination target during the 1987Q1-1998Q2 period was around 3.9%, which is lower than the 4.6% estimated for the earlier period. The change in the implicit ination target over these two periods could be due to two factors - policy outcomes attributed to the economic circumstances and a possible change in BNM's policy behaviour.

First, the higher estimated ination target during 1975Q1-1986Q4 could reect the outcome of the policymakers' diculty during the period to bring actual ination near to its targeted level. The impact of the rst and second oil price shocks experienced in 1973 and 1979 caused ination during the subsequent periods to be highly volatile. In general, experiences indicate that ination originating from the cost-push factor is much more dicult to contained compared with the demand-pull factor. Hence, the "failure" of BNM to pin-down ination during the aftermath of the rst and second oil price shocks could 'inate' the estimation of its implicit ination target for the period. The second possible reason to explain this outcome is related to the possible change in BNM's policy behaviour itself. The higher ination target for the 1975-1986