Etapas del proceso lector

The EU-Palestinian Authority Action Plan came into force in 2013. The priorities here are

“[to] resolve the Arab – Israeli Conflict, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State, the support of state building measures in the disputed territories, including the support of the rule of law and the respect for human rights within a functioning democracy with accountable institutions, achieve fiscal consolidation and sustainable economic development, reduce poverty and social exclusion, enhance quality of education, research and innovation (European Union-Palestinian Authority Action Plan, 2013).

The respective Action Plans are concluded in the form of an international agreement between the EU and the respective partner. In order to answer the research question, this thesis analyzes some of the measures of the Action Plans. First, this thesis demonstrates some measures which can be categorized as ‘practical support’ to show then some measures which fall under the category of ‘financial support’. A practical example of the Union's assistance in the conflict under the ENP framework is the provision of technological solutions for the swift control of goods passing the borders between Israel and the disputed territories ("Middle East Peace process," 2016). Although this specific measure does not appear to provide a direct measure to solve the conflict, it nevertheless falls into the category of assistance since a smooth control of goods contributes to a fast transition of the good into the disputed territories and hence mitigates the tensed humanitarian situation in some parts of the disputed territories. Such mitigation can have a positive effect on the conflict itself. First of all, the incentives for violent resistance are lowered by moderating quickly human suffering in the disputed territories. A smooth transition of goods also allows establishing bureaucratic procedures between the conflicting partners, contribution to institutionalizing their relationship with each other, and subsequently establishing regular relationships between the parties on an institutional level.

When analyzing the Union's ‘practical support’ in the conflict, one must also address its state-building activities in the disputed territories. State building activities

refer, in this thesis, to political and historical processes of creation, institutional consolidation, stabilization and sustainable development of states (Leibfried et al., 2015). The EU is a fierce advocate of the ‘Two-States Solution’, which entails the creation of a Palestinian state in some form in the disputed territories. In order to become a functioning state, the Palestinian Authority is assisted gradually by the EU when it comes to state building. An example of a concrete measure on the ground is the ‘EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories’ (EUPOL COPPS). This mission was established on the 1st _{of January 2006 in the Westbank. It is tasked with the support of}

the Palestinian Civil Police reform and development, with the strengthening and supporting the Criminal Justice System, with the improvement Prosecution-Police interaction and with the coordination and facilitation of external donor assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police (Bouris & İşleyen, 2018). The missions’ budget for the period of 1st _{of July 2018 till 30}th _{of June 2019 is 12.667 million Euros. The mission includes}

72 international staff members working together with 40 national staff members (Bouris & İşleyen, 2018).

Another example of ‘practical assistance’ provided by the EU was the ‘European Union Border Assistance Rafah’ (EUBAM Rafah). This mission was deployed at the Rafah crossing, which is the sole crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Until the unilateral disengagement of Israel in Gaza in 2005, Israel maintained the border crossing. From 2005 until 2007 EUBAM Rafah maintained the border crossing. The mission was tasked to monitor the operations of the border crowing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, after Israeli and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access in November 2005 (Bouris, 2012). The EU suspended this mission formally in 2007 after Hamas won the elections in the Gaza Strip and effectively became the dominant political organization of the coastal enclave (Bouris & İşleyen, 2018). The Union regards Hamas as a terrorist organization and hence pursues a policy of no contact with it (Charrett, 2019). Such a mission falls as well in the scope of ‘practical assistance’, allowing for tensions to deteriorate by mitigating the limitation of freedom of movement of the population in the Gaza Strip.

As mentioned above, despite the practical support, the EU uses ‘financial support’ as a means to intervene and assist in solving the conflict. The EU provides financial support via different projects aiming at achieving the goals formulated in the

action plans. This happens, for instance, in the form of EU Development assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Further, the EU helps the Palestinian Authority to meet its recurrent expenditure by contributing to the payment of salaries and pensions ("The EU contributes €15 million to the PA payment of April salaries and pensions," 2019). The EU also supports Palestine refugees through the ‘United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’ (UNRWA). The baseline ENI contribution to UNRWA amount to 82 million Euros yearly. In 2017 the contribution reached 102 million Euros (Jaya & Van Ooij). Today this support draws international attention since the Palestinian Authority is criticized for their "pay for slay" policy, paying money to people and the families of people who commit terror attacks and other violent acts against the Israeli population (Asseburg, 2019; Feith & Gerber, 2017; Lazarov 2019).

These financial positions are crucial factors for the reason that the Union has clear goals and policies in the conflict and concerning the use of its funds, among them the promotion of peace, the rule of law and democracy. The use of EU funds for the pensions of the above-mentioned people might lead to a potential contradiction of EU goals.