Etimología y origen de los partidos

Political fatherhood is a central notion for the understanding of political alliances as political families. The 2009 parliamentary crisis was a contestation over the rules and leadership of the political family. With his statements and his acts, Kamerhe challenged Kabila’s political fatherhood and threatened the political family. Although the official arguments used concern procedural and legal mat- ters (whether the President should inform parliament or seek parliamentary sup- port for his decisions), the language used by participants in this crisis makes clear that it is a matter protecting the political family.

In his resignation speech Kamerhe himself speaks of the event in terms of the political family of the AMP. He emphasises that he feels part of the political family. He speaks about his statements on Radio Okapi which were not appreci-

ated by his political family nor by the head of his political family (Kamerhe 2009).

The figure of the political father functions as the organising principle for the alliance, for both the AMP as well as the opposition. The AMP has as its core not a socio-economic ideology but the person of Joseph Kabila, who assumes a posi- tion of father-chief in this alliance. The personalisation of power and politics is common in Africa, often referred to as ‘Big Men politics’ (Daloz 2003a, Hydén 2006, 94-115, Russell 1999) or personalised rule (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). It is also persistent, as various analysts have argued that despite democratic transi- tions politics and power remain personalised in many African countries (Van de Walle 2003, 310). Personalised rule is not only about the leaders, but also about how those that follow him participate in this system (Quantin 2005, 47). In the process of the formation of the AMP and other coalitions in support of a Presi- dential candidate we see how potential clients chose their Big Man. In the same way as clients will move away from a Big Man when they feel he is losing his power, people will join a new leader when they feel he will be the new Big Man. Personal rule is indeed very opportunistic and calculative (Hydén 2006, 102). A broad support base is thus an expression of power (Hydén 2006, 103). The AMP functioned as a platform on which the hegemony of Kabila is expressed. The openness with which pre-electoral agreements on power-sharing were shared aimed to make use of this logic. In the run-up to the run-off presidential elec- tions, the scramble for powerful political allies (with a proven support base) be- came an important electoral strategy. The fragmented political arena thus became de facto divided between those that supported Kabila in the run-off elections and those that supported Bemba.

The founding documents of the AMP provide important information on the conceptualisation of the role and position of Kabila in the alliance. As a protector of the well-being of the nation and its people, President Kabila elevates himself as a father-chief figure that will protect his people. The AMP initially presented itself as an alliance of true patriots that unite beyond their ideological and politi- cal differences, to protect the people of the Congo who are and have been threat- ened by war. They united themselves under the leadership of Joseph Kabila to ‘rally and mobilise the Congolese to maintain the flame of patriotism and protect territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (AMP 2006a, Art. 4.1. Author’s translation from French). The leadership status of Kabila was thus constructed on Kabila as a unifying leader, building on his campaign slogan and claimed credits of the transition period that Kabila was the bringer of peace, whose leadership has enabled the end of the war (Booysen 2007, 13). In 2007, the AMP was reorganised. Whereas the Charter of 2006 stat- ed that the aim of the AMP was for Kabila to win the elections, the aim of the

AMP according to the new Acte Constitutif of 2007 was to promote the leader- ship of Kabila, in terms of consolidation of his power, and the general objective of national coherence and institutional cohesion (AMP 2007, Art. 3). The Acte emphasises the formation of a political clientele of people that organise them- selves around Kabila.

But this form of political organisation in terms of a political family and leader- ship in the form of a father-chief figure is not restricted to the AMP or to those in power. Similar tendencies are at play within the opposition. The Statut de l’Opposition introduces the officially recognised position of Leader of the Oppo- sition (2007, Art. 19-21), a practice borrowed from the Westminster system. In the Westminster parliamentary system the Leader of the Opposition has the rec- ognised status of an official state function, with an additional salary and privileg- es such as a car with driver provided for by Parliament (Punnett 1973, 77-78, 98- 99). In the process of the adoption of the Statut de l’Opposition one of the more fiercely debated issues was that of the recognition, title and status of the Leader of the Opposition.19 _{In the context of the situation in which the assumed leader of}

the opposition, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was in exile,20 _{the emphasis on the recogni-}

tion of a leadership position is understandable. But it also emphasises the per- ceived need for a designated leadership figure within the opposition as a basis upon which to organise the political family.

For the opposition the identification of one leader, or spokesperson, of the op- position, is to enable the opposition to participate effectively and to negotiate at an equal level with the leadership of the majority.21 _{The opposition has, however,}

never been able to appoint a leader. For MLC the leader is naturally Jean-Pierre Bemba. But because he has been arrested and is on trial at the ICC he cannot as- sume his leadership role. The opposition cannot decide whether to appoint some- body else as its leader, and if they would decide to do so, who that would be. The opposition has throughout the first Legislature remained fundamentally divided over this issue and consequently paralysed.22 An initiative for a motion of no- confidence by an MP of MLC illustrates this. The motion was not supported by part of the MLC faction in the National Assembly, because ‘we cannot take such

19 _{Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording; Assemblée Nationale and} Sénat 2007.

20 _{Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of MLC, lost the run-off Presidential election in October 2006, but was} elected Senator in January 2007. After a military confrontation between Bemba’s bodyguards and loyal troops and FARDC in March 2007, Bemba went abroad, allegedly to seek medical treatment. In May 2007 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bemba, and in May 2008 he was arrested (Africa Confidential 2008, ICC-CPI 2008, MONUC/UNHCR 2007, Reuters 2008).

21 _{Hon. Ramazani, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Commission PAJ, presenting the PAJ report on} the Proposed Law to the National Assembly in Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording.

big decisions when Bemba is not here’.23 _{The figure of a leader, a political father,}

is critical for the functioning of a political family. The problems within the oppo- sition surrounding the leadership question and the consequences it has for the functioning of the opposition, emphasise that the opposition, like the majority is conceptualised/organised as a political family that strongly relies on political fa- ther-chief.

A father-chief is typically elevated above politics and political differences (Schatzberg 2001, 158). This enables a coalition of political parties and political leaders that have little in common, but unite beyond their political differences under the leadership of Kabila. Similarly, the absence of a clear political leader of the opposition results in a lack of cooperation. Despite participating in the elections (a political practice), Kabila presented himself as such a non-political father-chief. He participated in the 2006 elections as an independent candidate, the ‘candidate of the people’, not as the presidential candidate of his own politi- cal party (Matotu 2006, Soudan 2006, 44).24 _{Within the AMP he is referred to as}

the ‘Moral Authority’ (AMP 2007, Art. 5), a distinctly non-political but fatherly reference to somebody who ‘does not participate in the debate but dictates the debate’.25

An important aspect of the conceptualisation of the power of the political fa- ther as head of the political family is the notion that power is indivisible. All power resides in the hands of the political father (Schatzberg 2001, 58-9). A Congolese proverb says that le pouvoir se mange entier, ‘power is eaten whole’ (Fabian 1990). The notion of a political leader who is elevated above politics and who holds all power in his hands is difficult to combine with a democratic logic of the separation of power between institutions, as well as the sharing of power between different political parties. This excessive centralisation of power in the hands of the President is a common feature in African politics. Van de Walle notes that the far majority of African democracies have a Presidential constitu- tional system, while most of them initially started with a Parliamentary constitu- tion. The centralisation of power with the President normally means a weakened legislature and judiciary. But Van de Walle also points to the fact that regardless of constitutional arrangements (whether Presidential or Parliamentary) power is in either case centralised in the person of the President, whether this is formalised or not (Van de Walle 2003, 309-10). This is the current situation in the Congo. The Congo formally has a semi-presidential system with significant powers for Parliament, whereas in practice much of this power is delegated to the President in his role as political father.

23 _{Interview with MP 13, Kinshasa, 30 April 2010.}

24 _{For the 2011 Presidential elections, Kabila again stood as an independent candidate, despite being the} figurehead of the PPRD.

When Kamerhe criticised Kabila that he should have informed Parliament at least, if not seek Parliaments approval, he lays bare the tension between the divi- sion of power between different institutions and the unification of power in the hands of the President. Kamerhe openly challenged Kabila’s position as political father. The suggestion that decision making should be passed by the legislature means that the legislature assumes powers that according to the moral matrix of the father-family lie naturally with the President. Kamerhe’s suggestion thus challenges Kabila’s position as political father and the unity of power in his hands, something which is unacceptable. His position has thus become untena- ble.

The MPs of the Parliamentary majority also argued in their statement that:

‘The declarations of the Speaker of Parliament upset the mentioned dispositions and create a harmful tension to the harmonious functioning of the institutions of the DRC in general, and the National Assembly in particular.’ (Députées Nationaux de la Majorité Parlementaire 2009, Author’s translation from French)

The MPs emphasise the importance of harmony within and between the insti- tutions involved, that is, unity under the leadership of the political father-chief. Kamerhe himself followed this line or reasoning as well. When he decided to step down he does so to protect the country’s unity and hard won democracy. In his resignation speech he also said he did not want to ‘add (his) name to the his- tory of obstructions of the institutions that have been so dearly acquired by our people at the cost of their blood’ (Kamerhe 2009, 7, Author’s translation from French, Reuters 2009). He emphasised unity and a form of democracy that is not only conflict-avoiding but also debate-avoiding, while reaffirming the leadership of the political father-chief. As a true martyr he offers his political head in order to maintain unity within the political family and political consensus to prevent political conflict. It is a graceful exit.

The political father is a central figure for the functioning of governance and politics, much more than that of a President in a semi-Presidential system such as that of the Congo. Because the notion that ‘power is eaten whole’ prevents a sep- aration of power between the legislature and the executive, it has a significant impact on the functioning of the institutions of governance. The following para- graph will discuss the interaction of the notion of the political family and the democratic institutional framework in the practices of accountability between the executive and the legislative.