High reliability theory [HRT] (Weick & Sutcliffe, 1999, 2001, 2007) offers additional insight into the mechanisms underlying the relationships between patient safety climate, error, and employee behaviors that support safety, such as error reporting. HRT suggests that a certain set of organizations, identified as high reliability organizations (HRO), have mastered the ability to remain adaptive, anticipate the unexpected, and produce highly reliable safe outcomes through processes of collective mindfulness and adaptation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). They operate in complex, high risk environments, where the impact of error can be catastrophic; yet they are able to learn from, adapt to, and utilize this complexity to their advantage. Furthermore, these
organizations are better able to mitigate major errors through mindful management of near misses, unexpected outcomes, and minor errors (Weick, 1999). Nuclear submarines (e.g., Bierly & Spender, 1995), the US Naval aircraft carrier fleet (e.g., Rochlin, 1989), and healthcare teams (Edmondson, 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) are examples of HROs cited in existing literature.
The question relevant for the current dissertation is: What role does climate play in
helping these organizations maintain highly reliable safety outcomes? Weick and Sutcliffe (1999) argue that reliable outcomes (e.g., safety, quality) are the ―result of stable processes of cognition directed at varying processes of production that uncover and correct unintended consequences‖ (p. 35). While the term reliability is often used synonymously with the notion of highly
36
product of highly flexible procedures. This capacity to adapt behaviorally is underlain by a stable cognitive framework designed to maintain a collective state of mindfulness that Weick and Sutcliffe argue is vital for detecting and correcting minor unintended consequences that can snowball into serious adverse events. They argue that organizations focused solely on efficient production maintain stable activity patterns in order to ―get things done.‖ However, members often vary in cognitive patterns of awareness, relying on simplified heuristics and biases that can lead to distraction, rushing, and careless errors that go unnoticed. These cognitive shortcuts and variation in attention are argued to lead to mindless operations; where details are left out and new information is interpreted through a confirmatory lens (i.e., interpretations are biased toward confirming preconceived notions that operations are safe and effective).
Additionally, HRT argues that there is inherent variation in any standardized routine and as such, the notion of reliability as synonymous with inflexible routines is erroneous.
Environmental, situational, and social influences impact how even the most highly structured routine unfolds at different times and across different employees. HRT suggests that
standardization of procedures and scripts are insufficient means of mitigating serious errors. HRT argues that members of highly reliable organizations engage in on-going mutual re-
adjustment of their activities, but share a common, cognitive framework dedicated to identifying unanticipated cues indicative of potentially unfavorable outcomes. Termed collective
mindfulness, HRT argues that this shared cognitive framework is built upon three processes of
anticipation—preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations—and two processes of containment—commitment to resilience and deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These five processes are defined in detail in Table 2.
37
Table 2. The five processes of collective mindfulness articulated in high reliability theory (Adapted from Weick & Sutcliffe, 1999, 2007).
Process Definition
Preoccupation with failure
Error is considered an inevitable component of operations. Thus, close attention is paid to weak signals and early identification of potential symptoms of system malfunctioning is explicitly encouraged. Success is approached with a warily in order to avoid over confidence and complacency. Additionally, effort is
dedicated to imagining potential mistakes and simulations of potential failure pathways are encouraged.
Reluctance to simplify interpretations
Details are preserved. Assumptions, heuristics, categories, and biases are openly identified in an effort to limit the tunnel vision created by assumptions and labels. Negotiations and decisions focus on points of divergence versus convergence in order to detect anomalies and to elicit unique information. Sensitivity to operations A deep situational awareness that reflects objective observations of actual work
processes, rather than intentions or formal procedures. ―Seeing what we are actually doing regardless of what we are supposed to do based on intentions, designs, or plans‖ (2007, p. 59). Near misses are devalued and are not interpreted with a confirmatory bias that suggests that current approaches or operations are sufficient to mitigate error. Instead, near misses are attributed to luck and interpreted as cues indicative of potential system failures in order to prevent complacency.
Commitment to resilience
Acceptance of the inevitability of error and a commitment to absorb changes, persist, and continuously incorporate lessons learned from these inevitable errors. This commitment is demonstrated through support for improvisation, use of ad-hoc networks, and wariness about the applicability of past practice. Deference to expertise/
Underspecification of structure
Traditionally hierarchical structures of command and decision making are opened to all organizational team members, especially during crisis situations. Decision making authority is pushed downward to frontline experts. Structure and routines are fluid with that intention that (1) decoupling vital decisions from higher ranking positions far removed from frontline operations improves the efficiency of critical decisions and (2) expands the variety of expertise available to make sense of cues that might suggest the potential for unintended
consequences.
HRT indicates that these processes to lead to a rich, mindful awareness that optimizes collective capacity for action which in turn leads to adaptive behaviors and reliable collective
38
outcomes. In this sense, reliability results from enlarging the knowledge space regarding weak situational cues through high quality collective attention, differentiation of information about these cues, and reframing of these cues (Weick & Sutcliffe, 1999). However, this increased knowledge space must be tightly coupled with a comparable behavioral repertoire—that is, organizational members must have the resources and support to act on concerns regarding these cues in order for mindfulness to translate into reliable, safe outcomes.
In terms of patient safety, HRT suggests that organizational culture and climate are mechanisms for institutionalizing the five processes of collective mindfulness. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that ―culture affects how departures from expectations are detected,
interpreted, managed, and used as pretexts for learning‖ (p. 115). While they use the term culture, their definition also includes aspects of climate—including assumptions about applications of lessons learned and actual daily practices or ways of doing business. Since climate helps employees to form expectations about behavior-outcome contingencies, climate supports high reliability when four conditions are met. First, climate supports highly reliable performance when employees perceive that reporting errors and concerns is actively supported, encouraged and rewarded by mangers and peers. Second, climate helps reliability when employees perceive that there are clear definitions of acceptable versus unacceptable behavior and trust in the mechanisms for determining accountability for unacceptable behavior. Third, climate can positively impact reliability when employees perceive that enacted practices are flexible,
adaptability is encouraged and rewarded, and that deference is given based on expertise. Finally, climate can support reliability when employees perceive that continuous learning is enacted through candid and timely sharing of information. From this perspective, patient safety climate
39
should impact the degree to which errors are reported and the degree to which safe patient outcomes are maintained over time (e.g., are highly reliable). Initial evidence investigating patient safety climate has supported this hypothesis and suggests that examining the relationship among dimensions of patient safety climate may provide more theoretically meaningful insight into these relationships (Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005; Wilson, 2007; Zohar et al., 2007).