Evaluación de la actividad antiinflamatoria

This third phase of the Lebanese political order shows an ‘un-sharing’ of power and is marked by the militarisation of political life. The Lebanese Civil War lasted 16 years, during which the magnitude of damage to the country was staggering. About 170,000 perished, twice as many have been wounded or disabled, and close to two-thirds of the population experienced some form of dislocation from either their homes or communities.94 The war transformed political zu’ama into leaders of armed groups and militias, each with their foreign patrons providing weapons and financial backing. It also epitomised the weakness of a state that was incapable of brokering a political deal, stabilising tensions, or even using its army to end the conflict.

The initial period of the war, between 1978 and 1982, ended both politically and militarily with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6th, 1982. The trigger that expanded the conflict to all parts of the country was the PLO’s armed presence, which fuelled polarisation among sectarian leaders. The PLO’s presence heightened tensions among confessional groups and gave them ideological grounds for their military activity. The right-wing forces led by the predominantly Christian Kata'ib (Phalange) Party formed another bloc called the Lebanese Front. The polarisation and militarisation signalled a period where the power-sharing agreement had failed to maintain stability and caused state institutions to be overridden by non-state armed groups.

On June 1, 1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon and supported the Lebanese Front in holding back the Palestinian forces.95 In October 1976, two Arab summits held in Cairo and Riyadh established an Arab Deterrent Force, the majority of which was composed of Syrian troops.96 _The

Syrian intervention was motivated by three factors: Syria had historically regarded Lebanon with closeness even inseparability and shared deep linkages with Lebanon’s social and political developments.97 _{The second main factor was Syria’s security interests vis-à-vis Israel. Lebanon’s}

94 _{Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, 4.}

95 _{See Karen Rasler, “The Internationalized Civil War: A dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in} Lebanon,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (1983): 421-456, at p. 422.

96 _{El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 200.}

97 _{Adeed Dawisha, “The Motives of Syria’s Involvement in Lebanon,” The Middle East Journal 38, no. 2} (1984): 228 – 236.

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southern border was seen by Syria as a defence frontier against any military thrust from Israel to Syria.98 Lastly, Syria and its regime feared that continued civil war could mean a partitioned Lebanon which would pose a direct threat to the borders of Syria99. The failure of power-sharing to be maintained during the war increased the need for foreign intervention to stop the fighting. But foreign intervention meant a continued weakening of the role of the state in bringing about an end to the war.

The power-sharing agreement made it difficult for one leader, even the President, to have the upper hand in the conflict and instead dispersed power and weapons among various sectarian groups.100 The subsequent Israeli invasion in 1982 dealt a staggering blow to the Palestinians and the LNM and dramatically strengthened the Lebanese Front, bringing its leader, Bashir Gemayel, to the presidency.101 The 1982 invasion reduced the PLO’s freedom of action and refocused the Palestinian national struggle back into the Occupied Territories marking a decrease in their military action from within Lebanese borders.102 In parallel, the early years of the Israeli occupation saw the emergence of Hezbollah, a newcomer to the Lebanese political scene for the Shi’a had historically been organised around the Amal movement and that of Moussa Sadr. Hezbollah (Party of God) organised an armed resistance against Israel and allied itself with the PLO fighters in the south of Lebanon.103 Supported by the Christian Phalangists, the Israeli invasion was seen as a swift and necessary move by the Americans for Israel, one that would also to limit Syria’s armed power over Lebanon. The war gave Israel control over Lebanon’s Litani River, seizing the water source was also one of Israel’s long-term strategic goals.104 _{The following phase of the war, June}

1982 - October 1990, witnessed heightened outside intervention, beginning with the Israeli invasion and concluding with the Ta’if Accord of October 1989 under Saudi auspices.105

98 _{Sam Younger, “The Syrian Stake in Lebanon,” The World Today 32, no. 11 (1976): 339-406.} 99 _{Dawisha, “The Motives of Syria’s Involvement in Lebanon,” 228-236.}

100 _{Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement”, 413.}

101 _{Bassel Salloukh, “Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed,” Middle East Research and} Information, (2005), http://ns2.merip.org/mer/mer236/syria-lebanon-brotherhood-transformed, (accessed May 20th _2014).

102 _{Yezid Sayigh, “Struggle within, Struggle without: The Transformation of PLO Politics since 1982,”} International Affairs 65, no. 2 (1989), 247-271.

103 _{Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987),} 20.

104 _{John Cooley, “The War over Water,” Foreign Policy 54, (1984): 3-26.}

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The foundations of power-sharing and the religious backing that sectarian leaders enjoyed as a result allowed them to forge their own international ties and secure sufficient resources to lead proxy wars in Lebanon. Bashir Gemayel, who was seen by the West as Israel’s Lebanese ally, was assassinated within days of his election to the Presidency, and his brother, Amin, was hastily elected to replace him.106 _{Following the assassination of Gemayel, Lebanese Phalangist groups}

angered by the death of their leader, with the Israeli military looking on from surrounding rooftops, entered the Palestinian refugee camp of Sabra and Shatilla, killing at least 1,500 Palestinians on the night of Friday September 16, 1982.107 _{Two days later journalists and reporters shared images}

of thousands of dead and mutilated bodies, which horrified the international community and pointed fingers at the collusion of the Israeli forces in the massacre.108

The extreme instability and horrific images of the massacre of Palestinians led the US to form a coalition of American, British and French troops to help stabilize Lebanon.109 Hezbollah’s first overt operation was the bombing of US and French forces killing 299 servicemen in October 1983.110 The suicide bombing led to a complete withdrawal of the US forces and the confirmation of Hezbollah as a new, serious threat to Israel.111 Israel began withdrawing from most Lebanese territories except a border strip in South Lebanon under the control of Israel's surrogate South Lebanon Army, a force comprised of Lebanese Christians. By 1985, Syria had regained most of the power over Lebanese affairs that it had lost to the Israelis and Americans in 1982.112

The Civil War became increasingly inter-sectarian and witnessed battles between Lebanese factions. It was in many ways a sectarian civil war where armed sectarian groups sided with or against each other. In December of 1985, with the encouragement and support of the Syrians, representatives of the dominant confessional militias, the Christian Lebanese Forces, the Shi’a Amal Movement, and the predominantly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, met in Damascus and reached an agreement, known as the Tripartite Agreement, on political reforms and special

106 _{Salloukh, “Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed.”}

107 _{Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), 255-257.}

108 _{Leila Shahid, “Testimonies: The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports,” Journal of} Palestinian Studies 17, no. 2 (2002): 39.

109 _{See Agnes Korbani, US Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decision-making, (New} York: Praeger, 1991).

110 _{Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story, 23.}

111 _{See for instance Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science} Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 1-19.

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relations with Syria.113 By early 1986 the Tripartite Agreement was nullified after President Gemayel and Samir Geagea (intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces) organised a coup against the Lebanese Forces’ leader Elie Hubayka, and ousted him from his position. The ouster and the resulting failure of the Tripartite Agreement was a result of the lack of a sharing of power, as the agreement did not provide for representation of the warring factions in such a way that would motivate them to end the violence. A state of political deadlock prevailed in Lebanon between 1986 and the end of President Gemayel's term in September 1988.114

At the end of Gemayel's term, the failure to elect a new president led to a complete political vacuum at the top of the Lebanese state. The deadlock was another facet of the failure of power- sharing to maintain state institutions during the conflict. Gemayel appointed an interim cabinet headed by Army commander Michel Aoun, but the cabinet's authority was only accepted in the predominantly Christian areas; in West Beirut and other regions of the country, the original cabinet headed by Salim al-Hoss was regarded as the legitimate cabinet. The two cabinets were trying to function at the same time and claimed exclusive legitimacy. The subsequent war between Aoun and the Lebanese army had devastating human and political consequences, and instead of curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, it caused an increase in the number of Syrian troops from around 30,000 to 40,000. In 1990, Syrian troops re-entered East Beirut and other predominantly Christian areas that they had been forced out of in 1978 during battles with Lebanese Forces armed group.115

Lebanese deputies met in the city of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia to discuss national reconciliation on the basis of a document that had already largely been prepared by the Arab Tripartite Committee after much consultation with Syria, the United States and various Lebanese leaders. They reached an agreement on October 22, 1989 and the resulting treaty was known as the Ta’if Agreement or the National Accord Document (wathikat al wifak al watany)116 and represented the outcome of political reconciliation among the Lebanese, supported by the Syrians and the international

113 _{Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement,” 416.}

114 _{Are Knudsen, “Precarious Peace building: Post-War Lebanon, 1990 – 2005,” (Oslo: Chr Michelsen} Institute 2005), 13.

115 _{Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement,” 418.}

116 _{It is referred to as an ‘accord’ but in Arabic the term wifak means conciliation so the agreement carries} a conciliatory notion among conflicting parties.

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community.117 The United Nations Security Council Declaration on October 31, 1989 supported the agreement and the Lebanese authority resulting from it. Once again, foreign intervention was needed to reach a national political agreement and, as before, it would be in favour of a power- sharing system among warring sectarian factions.118

On January 30, 1990, another conflict broke out, this time between the army led by Aoun and the Lebanese Forces militia.119 This inter-Maronite war diminished the capacities of both forces to effectively reject or alter any political compromise, represented by the Ta’if Agreement, that had been reached and that was in the process of implementation. An inter-Shia war took place between the two Shi’a forces: Amal and Hezbollah. During the war, these two groups had been openly siding with the PLO’s armed resistance and had formed guerrilla bases in the South of Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.120 The Ta’if agreement alone could not stop the war, it required foreign powers to substantiate and local zu’ama to adopt it before the war could come to an end.