Evaluación de la toxicidad del extracto de puki

e challenge we face is to explain how norms can individuate mean- ings andthereby also provide essentially semantic reasons for com-

_{Discussion of internalism about reasons/motivation is lively in contemporary metaethics.}

Shafer-Landau (2003: ch. 5-7) is a useful starting point.

_{As Miller (2006: 109) notes with respect to Kripke and Boghossian.}

_{‘Meaning rationalism’ is a label due to Millikan (1993b). In her use, this is intended to indicate}

a commitment to the generalisedscrutabilityof sense to the agent. In contrast, my use here is in- tended to refer to rationalism aboutreasons. Meaning rationalism, as I use the term, is thus the view that grasp of meaning suffices to provide semantically-based ought-reasons to use an expression in a certain way. So, if the speaker judges that an expressionemeansF, then either she is motivated to useeto meanFor she is irrational (and on my view, she is not just practically irrational, for she is instead to be convicted of an inconsistency of pure rationality. In the next section, I explain how this can be the case).

_{I’m assumingakrasiais to be equated with weakness of the will, which, at least since Holton}

(1999) has been called into question. And I’m also assuming that the proper analysis ofakrasiais a charge of irrationality against the akratic subject, which again might be questioned.

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pliance with those speci cations. We want to secure, that is,intrinsic normative valence for expressions, a normativity that derivesentirely from semantic considerations (and not from pragmatic ones)—the routes from sense to action must be entirely semantic in character. My suggestion is that we should think of semantic norms as com- ing in pairs. _{For each expression in the language, that is, there are} norms of expectation, which are inviolable on pain of meaninglessness (and indeed of irrationality), andnorms of ful lment, which can, and routinely are, infringed on pragmatic grounds.

What a semantic norm primarily prescribes iswhat one should ex- pect the word to be used for (i.e. the set of circumstances where its sincere use would be warranted):

ExpNorm Necessarily [for anyL-speakerS, for anyL-expressione (emeansF-in-Lonly if (absent reasons to the contrary, S will expect (and be expected) to apply e only if conditions CF are seen to be satis ed))]

All other things being equal, the expectation will be ful lled. Vi- olation of the norms of ful lment, however, is to be countenanced and indeedrationallyanticipated (since ful lment-defeaters abound in the most normal of cases, triggered by, as well as triggering the standard Gricean mechanisms).

Norms of expectation, however, areconstitutivelyinviolable by par- ticipants in the language game. To violate those norms would be,

_{As Hattiangadi (2008: 55) makes clear, the objector intends to exclude a wide class of non-}

semantic considerations, including prudential, moral, legal ones, as well as communicative inten- tions. It is an interesting question whether one can espouse some form of intention-basedsemantics

and yet placate an objector who takes Hattiangadi’s line.

_{I’m taking a cue here from remarks in Husserl’sSixth Investigation(1900-01/2001: ch. 1, §10),}

Heyting (1931: 58-9), Wittgenstein (1930: §33) and (1945/1953: §445). Smith (1994: 85-7) speaks of expectations with respect to moral norms.

_{One might worry here about the beginning of a regress problem for a view of rules that makes}

their applicability conditional on theantecedentrecognition of the obtaining of certain conditions. e regress problem is one that has been much discussed in the meaning normativity literature and all I can do at this stage is point towards the recent discussions in Boghossian (2001, 2005b, 2008b) and Wright (2001b). Sellars (1954) is also (still) relevant.

_{I am not entirely sure how to t speakers’ judgements in the de nition, since a charge of ir-}

rationality against those who outExpNormwill only stand in caseSjudges thatemeansF-in-L and thatCFobtain. Perhaps the stipulation thatSis in relevantly ideal epistemic conditions would

suffice.

_{See Boghossian (2005a: 97) for the obvious point that we oen lie, set out to deceive, joke or}

what have you. Other more outlandish cases of norm violation are also discussed in e.g. Hattiangadi (2006).

When Authority Gives Out |  truly, to change not just the meaning of an expression (a concep- tual impossibility, given the de nition), but the entire language game too.

Or rather: it would mean placing oneself outside humanity, and indeed consigning oneself toidiocy, in the original (Greek) sense of the word, since the putatively deviantS would simultaneously judge thatemeansF and that there isnoexpectation that she would use it to mean F. It seems, that is, a conceptual truth that to mean F bye is to expect that e be taken to mean F on an occasion of use (quite regardless of whether the applicability conditions areactuallymet).

It is expectation conditions that individuate content; it is expec- tation conditions that set the standards for linguistic competence; it is expectation conditions that make deviancy with respect to the standards they set truly irrational. To understand an expression is ipso facto to understand the expectation commitments incurred by its uses.

What recent discussions of meaning-normativity seem to have overlooked, then, is precisely the fact that meaning-norms arecom- posite: the exclusive focus on applicability conditions has distorted the debate about these issues. Or so I have argued in this brief sketch.

Accordingly, it is a conceptual truth that meaning is given in terms of expectation conditions, and those conditions are categori- cal—unlike correctness conditions, any violation of expectation con- ditions offends againstpurely semanticnormativity.

_{For the game we play is one where it is essential that norms of expectation be respected, on}

pain of global incoherence for the practice—in Gibbard’s (1990: 65) terms, you may think here of linguistic cooperation ascoordinate expectations. To meanFbyeis to (defeasibly) expecteto be used to meanF. Norms of expectation, then, allow us to recognise a token as a token of its type, in exactly the way in which we identify the King in chess asthatparticularSpiel gurand not the actual “bit of wood” on the board (Investigations§35). e distinction between norms of expectation and norms of ful lment is similar (but not identical) to Searle’s (1969: 33) distinction betweenregulative

andconstitutiverules (the former regulating antecedently existing behaviour, the latter bringing a practice into being). Norms of expectation are constitutive precisely because to disregard them is to annihilate meaning: by breaking them, you’ve indeed changed the subject; you’re no longer using

signs(Zettel§320).

_{Another way of putting the point is that norms of expectation are norms about competence,}

whereas norms of ful lment are norms about performance.

_{We could imagine objections to this account along these lines: the account makes meaning}

mysterious, inaccessible, private. To which the proper reply is: certainly not, for the very possibility of communication requires a xed point in our conversational scorekeeping. Expectation condi- tions are the rock on which everything else stands. at they are in place is adetectablecondition, fully manifest in the linguistic behaviour of the participants. Of course, expectation conditions are just as vulnerable to RFC as any version of the language-as-rule-governed hypothesis. But that’s a

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