1.5. Desempeño docente
1.5.1.4. Evaluación del aprendizaje
Now that we have seen how Procopius keeps his readers engaged with his narrative it is time to move on to how he explains the battles, and to return to the text’s didactic function.
Discipline, Confusion, and Disorder154
Two factors which for Procopius are integral to a battle’s outcome are the discipline of the respective armies and the order of the battle line.155 There are a number of occasions where Procopius stresses the indiscipline and disobedience of the Roman army in battle; though he will also do this for other armies. Rather significantly, wherever indiscipline is presented as a problem in the Persian Wars, the discussion is invariably couched with some mention of a failure of leadership.
153That does not mean that the reader’s emotional engagement with the text ceases, as
the citizens experience unspeakable horror at Khusro’s hands.
154I discuss the material in this section at greater length in Whately (2008).
155Discipline is a multi-faceted term that encompasses the somewhat disparate issues of
the obedience of soldiers in battle, and their willingness to hold the line in the face of enemy attacks; the actions of the soldiers towards the inhabitants of besieged cities and surrounding lands; and the obedience of the soldiers to their commanding officers, and here I am thinking about those places where disobedience to the soldiers’ commander/s leads to mutinies. As this analysis is focused on the battle itself, it is only the former that is relevant to this discussion.
Nevertheless, neither the treatment of civilians nor the mutinies of soldiers are unimportant issues. The prevalence of the latter, at least its character during the Justinianic period, is to a certain degree misunderstood. Kaegi (1981) believed that the reign of Justinian ushered in a new age of military unrest and that from that period on it became firmly entrenched in late Roman society. The problem is, military unrest had always been a problem in the Roman state, and the sixth century was not necessarily any worse than any of the previous six centuries. Brian Campbell highlighted this important point in a paper given at a conference in Oxford (July 2, 2006). The major difference is that the sixth century authors are vocal about these uprisings while their counterparts from the Principate are conspicuously silent. There were several major mutinies caused by unrest among the troops: c. 66 BC (Pompey), 36 BC (Lepidus), AD 14 (Pannonia), AD 68-69 (Nero), AD 89 (Germania), AD 175 (Avidius Cassius), AD 192-193 (Septimius Severus), and AD 235 (Severus Alexander) to name but a few. Thus, the significant difference is not the appearance of the mutinies themselves in the sixth (and to certain degree late fifth) century, but the attitudes of those who described them. On discipline in the Republican and Imperial periods see Moore (2002) and Phang (2008). For some comments on the historiography of discipline in late antiquity see Whately (2008).
As we have seen this relationship between discipline and leadership is stressed in the first battle and this example provides a proto-type against which all commanders will be measured. Let us now examine some of the other descriptions.
In the Battle of Dara Procopius describes in considerable detail the Roman battle-line.156 He also includes some information about these tactical manoeuvres which could only be effected through strict discipline. For example, after describing the left flank of the line, Procopius notes that Sunicas and Aigan with 600 horsemen were positioned on its right to support those troops should they be driven back.157 To be effective the horsemen would have to attack en masse, which takes strict discipline; in addition, the timing itself would have been difficult. At the end of the battle-line description Procopius tells us that the Persians “were astounded at the good order of the Romans”.158 The importance of order and discipline is even clearer in the battle exhortations.159 Five of the six points emphasized by Peroz in his speech refer to the bravery of the Persians or Romans, and the good order, and lack of confusion, of the Roman troops. In the exhortation of Belisarius and Hermogenes, which is closely modelled on the speech of Peroz, the two Roman generals emphasize their own bravery and claim that the Persian confidence is false for it rests on the supposition that the Romans will be disorderly in battle. Once the fighting does begin the Romans manage to stay in control, and they are obedient to their commanders throughout the course of the battle, which surely contributed to their success.160 This was even true when the Immortals are unleashed on the Roman right flank.161 And, after putting the Persians to flight, they manage to stay in order and ignore the
156Procop. Wars 1.13.19-24. 157Procop. Wars 1.14.39. 158Procop. Wars 1.13.24.
159See the discussion of battle exhortations above pp 137-142. 160Procop. Wars 1.14.34ff.
temptation to pursue them.162 Ironically, the one place where the Romans – or Roman in this case – show any disobedience comes in the second single combat involving Andreas, and it led to a tremendous boost in Roman morale. Andreas had been ordered not to repeat his actions against the younger Persian,163 but he ignores this and meets, and defeats, his older adversary. In fact, in this battle it is the Persians who are confused and disoriented; at the end of the battle when Baresmanas’ standard falls, “the barbarians become terribly afraid and no longer think of defending themselves, but flee while in much disorder.”164
By the Battle of Callinicum the tune has changed and the Romans are quite disorderly and disobedient. It is the indiscipline of part of the Roman contingent that is the principal cause of all the trouble in this battle, despite the protestations of some scholars.165 We are told from the beginning of this
narrative that the Persians had been on the verge of defeat, but that the Roman troops grew restless: Belisarius has to take his men – and most of his officers as it turns out – aside and implore them to relax, as they were on the cusp of a bloodless victory. This fails and Belisarius is compelled to urge on his troops. By placing the discussion of indiscipline so early in the narrative, and by making it the impetus for the attack itself, Procopius is emphasizing this factor. Once the battle begins and it starts to go wrong following the withdrawal of the Arab federates and the eventual collapse of the Roman line, Procopius again returns to this issue of discipline.166 We, the readers, are not to forget that the Romans had had victory in their hands. This hastily arrayed Roman battle-line – thanks to
162Procop. Wars 1.14.53.
163Procop. Wars 1.13.35. 164Procop. Wars 1.14.50.
165See in particular Cameron (1985: 125, 146-147, 158) and Shahîd (1995: 134-142).
Greatrex (1998: 195-207) and Whitby (1992: 75-77) are quite right to lend more credence to Procopius’ description of events than scholars such as Cameron or Shahîd have.
the insubordination of Belisarius’ men and his failure to deal with the situation - is in the end defeated by the Persians.
From the onset of the narrative of the Battle of Nisibis the Romans march with great order.167 This is soon overshadowed, however, when we learn that there are some men who are less than enthusiastic about heeding Belisarius’ orders.168 Belisarius acts quickly to restore discipline and having summoned his men he says: “But I see that many of you are giving way to a great deal of disorder and that each man himself wants to be commander-in-chief of the war”.169 In fact, throughout this speech Belisarius is constantly playing up the contrast between disorder and order; in that same line just referred to Belisarius closes with: “when many in the army follow their own inclinations it is impossible for the army to do what it must”. Despite Belisarius’ best efforts, Peter disobeys and camps too close to the fortifications; moreover, Peter and his men end up “moving around in no order”.170 Not surprisingly, the Persians had been
observing the Romans from the safety of their walls and when they catch sight of this, they charge out after them. When the two sides come to close-quarters confusion is added to the disorder and the unruly group seems doomed, just as Belisarius predicted it would, and they would have been defeated if Belisarius had not reacted well after anticipating such a calamity.171 Although Belisarius had done well to anticipate the events – another notable quality for a general – he failed, for the second time, to keep his men disciplined in the stages immediately preceding battle. Peter is, however, even more culpable than Belisarius for not only did he disobey his commander, but he failed to discipline his own troops. Finally, in the Battle of Anglon the Romans encounter more problems when Narses’ anger spreads throughout the whole army: “The troops broke camp,
167Procop. Wars 2.18.1. 168Procop. Wars 2.18.4. 169Procop. Wars 2.18.6. 170Procop. Wars 2.18.16. 171Procop. Wars 2.18.20.
accordingly, and without the guidance of generals and without observing any definite formation, they moved forward in complete confusion”.172 Their order is still not restored by the time that the fighting begins, for they line up in a
disorderly fashion.173 Procopius does seem to absolve them of much of the blame by saying that this disorderliness was due to the rough terrain.174 Still, given that some of the same figures responsible for the disorder of the Battle of Nisibis are involved, such as Peter, it would seem that we, the readers, are to remember what had happened in that last battle. The Romans lose the battle, and additionally Narses loses his life. Order and discipline were key factors in Procopius’ conception of battle in the Persian Wars, and in the battles discussed here, the onus fell on the commanders to maintain that discipline.175
The Psychology of Battle
Psychology has a big role in battle for Procopius and there are a number of specific matters that surface fairly consistently. These include zeal, anger, bravery, and fear. Let us begin with zeal.
Eagerness to fight can be both a blessing and a curse in battle. Alone, it will not lead to defeat; but, when it is not checked, it can, in conjunction with factors such as disorder and disobedience, increase such a possibility. In the
172Procop. Wars 2.25.13. 173Procop. Wars 2.25.17. 174Procop. Wars 2.25.18.
175This connection between generalship and discipline is found in some other
contemporary, or near contemporary, writers such as Agathias (1.6.19, 2.1.2, 2.9.1, 5.14.1-4), Syrianus (4.22), Maurice (passim, especially Maurice’s preface), and
Theophylact Simocatta (2.9.1, 2.9.14, 3.1.7-9, 3.12.6-7, 6.7.6-7, 8.6.2). Theophylact, for example, even begins his (Universal) History with a speech by the dying Tiberius II that includes a list of the characteristics of an ideal leader (1.1.14-21). Here the
characteristics are intended for an emperor, but they can just as easily be applied to any significant leader, be he an emperor such as Maurice, or a general such as Priscus. Thus, much as the battle between Ephthalites and Persians in Procopius’ Persian Wars
serves as a template with which all following battles are to be compared, so this list serves as the template with which all emperors, and leaders, are to be compared (cf. Whitby 1988, and 1992). Of course, the key similarity among these authors is that they are all still part, or heavily influenced by, the classical tradition. This connection is notably absent among writers not writing in Greek, or traditional classical genres, such as
Battle of Dara, for example, the eagerness of Andreas in the single combat with his second Persian foe is paramount. Both men are quite eager to fight each other, yet Andreas is able to walk away victorious.176 What is more, this zest for battle, which was channelled into a victory of sorts for the Romans, boosted the morale of the soldiers watching, manifested in the roar which erupted from the wall following his win.177
Anger, or something approximating anger, can be channelled to bolster one’s morale; at the same time, it can also be disastrous. The Ephthalites are angry at their king in the first battle for letting the Persians get away with the trick involving the proskynesis.178 He, however, is able to check that anger and the Ephthalite Huns win the battle. In that same battle Procopius presents us with the problem that arises when you have “a lot of anger towards the enemy”:179 the Persians are blinded by their rage, do not notice the stratagem employed by the Huns, and plunge to their deaths. In the Battle of Dara, after sending a young Persian to his death against Andreas, the angry Persians foolishly send another man to his death, though “they were pained by what happened”.180 In the Battle of Callinicum the Roman army becomes distressed at Belisarius’ use of Fabian tactics: “The army insulted him neither among themselves nor in a corner, but they came shouting and called him soft and a destroyer of their zeal to his face, even some of the commanders committed these acts of depravity with the soldiers, and demonstrated their boldness with this”.181 Although Belisarius ends up changing his plan in an attempt to use this eagerness – Belisarius even claims in an exhortation that he was unaware how eager these troops were for battle – the Romans are later defeated. Sittas attempts to forge an alliance with the
176Procop. Wars 1.13.36. 177Procop. Wars 1.13.38. 178Procop. Wars 1.4.3. 179Procop. Wars 1.4.12. 180Procop. Wars 1.13.33. 181Procop. Wars 1.18.24
Armenians in the Battle of Oinochalakon; but, there is a communication problem and some confusion results, which leads him to butcher some of the Armenian women and children.182 We do not actually know if Sittas is angry, though
Procopius alludes to the possibility; his later actions, however, suggest that this is the case. In that same battle Sittas’ spear is shattered due to the carelessness of a Herul horseman. Sittas “was particularly distressed by this” and is then
identified by the Armenians.183 Sittas’ actions give him away, which then leads to his death. The ill-fated Battle of Anglon gets off to a bad start when the Roman general Narses accuses his commanders of letting the Persians escape, and then lashes out at them for what he regards as insolence.184 This, however, backfires, as it soon spreads to the rest of the army, who end up lashing out at each other. Hence, the Romans march off in disarray and this angst leads to a heedless charge, and a Persian ambush.
Courage, bravery, and fear all play a part in Procopian battles.185 In the Battle of Satala the Romans find themselves outnumbered; but, Sittas uses a dust cloud stratagem to fool the Persians into thinking that it is they who are outnumbered by their attackers.186 This deft move on Sittas’ part frightens the Persians and contributes to the Roman victory; it also emboldens the Roman troops. The sight alone of the charge of part of the Roman army is enough to raise the morale and give them courage. When the Romans, though
outnumbered, come charging down the hill against the Persians amassed below, their compatriots become invigorated and come charging out of the
fortifications.187 In the Battle of Callinicum, when Mundir and Azarethes, their
182Procop. Wars 2.3.18.
183Procop. Wars 2.3.22. 184Procop. Wars 2.25.11.
185For an interesting overview of the representation of courage in Roman literature see
Harris (2006).
186Procop. Wars 1.15.12. 187Procop. Wars 1.15.13.
Saracen allies, learn the location of the enemy’s position, they get scared and flee.188
Single combat and individual feats of bravery can boost morale. Andreas’ two victories in the Battle of Dara encourages the troops; his victory over the older Persian in particular rouses his comrades: “Then a roar went up from the wall and from the Roman army as great, if not greater, than before”.189 The bravery of the Thracian Florentius in the Battle of Satala also plays a huge role.190 Indeed, Florentius’ seizing of the standard adds to the Persian fear and this in turn leads to disorder and then defeat.191 At the beginning of the Battle of Callinicum Procopius notes that many valorous deeds were performed.192 A little later, Procopius singles out the actions of Ascan who, despite facing seemingly insurmountable odds, manages to hold out and kill numerous Persian notables.193 Ascan’s brave actions in turn persuade Belisarius to keep on fighting as long as Ascan holds out, despite the perilous situation that Belisarius himself is in.194 Unfortunately for Ascan, he is later butchered by the Persians.195 By the end of the battle confusion has settled in and the Romans find themselves in
considerable trouble.196 In the battle in the pass, before the Battle of the Phasis River, the heroic stand on the part of the 100-strong Roman garrison also boosts the morale for the Roman troops. Somehow they manage to hold off the whole of the Persian army at the pass, at least for a while. Although it did not immediately lead to victory, it is not long after that the Romans manage to expel the Persians from Lazica for good.197 Although the scale here is smaller, Procopius is alluding
188Procop. Wars 1.18.9. 189Procop. Wars 1.13.38. 190Procop. Wars 1.15.15. 191Procop. Wars 1.15.16. 192Procop. Wars 1.18.31. 193Procop. Wars 1.18.38. 194Procop. Wars 1.18.41ff.
195Procop. Wars 1.18.38. I should point out that Procopius adds “and with him 800 other
men died having acted bravely in this predicament” (1.18.38).
196Procop. Wars 1.18.48.
to the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, though it is less likely that he is
specifically referring to the description of Herodotus.198 Thus, the psychology of battle has an instrumental role in the outcome of a battle.
The Standard199
The standard – or even a flag or banner – could be an important tool in battle. In the battle between Ephthalites and Persians the king’s banner is used as part of the stratagem to lure the Persians into the trench.200 The seizing of an enemy’s standard in and of itself could both boost the morale of the party doing the seizing, and sink the morale of the one whose standard is seized. In the Battle of Satala Florentius leads a group of horsemen and, after charging the Persian line, he seizes the general’s standard and bends it to the ground.201 This is an important moment: “For when the barbarians could no longer see the standard, they became quite disorderly and were consumed with fear and, having