Evaluación del impacto

The stagnant pace of the relocation has, first and foremost, resulted in a tense relationship between the prefectural and central governments. Anni Baker notes that ‘the activists blamed the Japanese government rather than the Americans for the problem because the Japanese government had come up with the [relocation] plan in the first place’.70 _{Government officials whom I interviewed}

often expressed an awareness of this issue. ‘We spent lots of time consulting with the local people to end up at the V-shaped runway planned in Henoko’, recounts Maher71_{; another former MOFA}

official concurs that ‘we were paying attention to the number of residents around the FRF, and obviously we wanted to reduce the number of affected houses, as much as possible’.72 _‘The

Okinawan government and the Japanese government have a common view that we want to try to minimise the burden on local residents of Okinawa’, continues a former MOFA official. ‘So moving it out of Futenma is lessening the burden of the people of Ginowan around Futenma. If that is moved to north Okinawa, we want to minimize the impact that’s going to have on the people of north Okinawa’.73

These officials’ narrative about their efforts to minimise the ‘impact’ or ‘burden’ of the bases on local communities in the prefecture plays into the symbolism of the bases – as an extension of the USM presence – as being at the ‘heart’ or ‘foundation’ of the alliance. A current adviser to the

68 _{The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee formed an ‘Expert Study Group’ in 2010 to evaluate the} benefits of a V-shaped versus an I-shaped runway at the FRF and concluded that the V-shape was preferable because it ‘would enable takeoffs and landings mostly over water, so aircraft won't have to fly directly over nearby communities. That would reduce noise impact and wouldn't restrict local development’ (Gidget Fuentes, ‘Runway design debated for new Japan airbase’, Marine Corps Times, 12 September 2010, available online at: http://archive.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20100912/NEWS/9120305/Runway-design-debated- new-Japan-airbase).

69 _{Thom Shanker, ‘U.S. Agrees to Reduce Size of Force on Okinawa’, The New York Times, 26 April 2012,} available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/asia/united-states-to-cut-number-of- marines-on-okinawa.html?ref=japan.

70 _{Anni Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,} 2004), p. 146.

71 _{Maher 2014.} 72 _{Anonymous 2014d.} 73 _{Anonymous 2014a.}

Diet justifies this framing:

74

The same adviser continues:

A former official notes that it is, indeed, one of MOFA’s responsibilities that the base issue ‘doesn’t go on its own, that it is very much the heart of the whole US-Japan alliance. And to put that into that context is something that we placed a huge importance on’.75 _{This is confirmed in the}

frequent mentions of Okinawa and the GOJ’s commitment to ‘minimising the impact’ of US bases on the prefecture in the annual Diplomatic Bluebooks and PM speeches to the Diet since the SACO was formed in 1995, usually in tandem with a vow to support the ‘economic revival’ or ‘promotion’ of Okinawa as a special trade and tourism zone.76 _{Particularly in the speeches of PMs past and present,}

they make sure to emphasise that they ‘recogniz[e] the vital importance of taking a sincere approach to coping with this issue’77_{, will ‘devote’ their ‘utmost efforts’}78 _{to the base issue, or, as is the case in}

74 _{Anonymous 2014b.}

75 _{Anonymous 2014a.}

76 _{MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook’, 1997, available online at:}

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/index.html; Ryutaro Hashimoto, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the 141st Session of the National Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 29 September 1997, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/rekidaisouri/hashimoto_e.html; Keizo Obuchi, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 143rd Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 7 August 1998a, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/980810-143diet.html; MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 1998’, 1998, available online at:

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1998/index.html; MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 1999’, 1999, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/index.html; MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2000’, 2000a, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/index.html; MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2001’, 2001, available online at:

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/index.html; Naoto Kan, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the 176th Extraordinary Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 1 October 2010b, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin_e.html; Naoto Kan, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the 177th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 24 January 2011, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin_e.html. 77 _{MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2007’, 2007a, available online at:}

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/html/index.html; Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 154th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 4 February 2002, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2002/02/04sisei_e.html; Naoto

Because … that [the bases] is one of the most important pillars of Japan-US security- related negotiation, and how to … make the most of US Marine Corps is actually one of the most crucial functions of this alliance, because […] we really wanted to use them for any kind of crisis scenario. So without the settlement of the Futenma issue, this foundation of [the] US Marine Corps will be very unstable, so … we have to make progress.

Some US officials worked in the government fifteen or eighteen years ago, but many people are new to the government. But in [the] Japanese system, if you are an alliance manager, you have to work for the alliance for ten years, twenty years, thirty years—that is our system. I mean, even career diplomats, if you are a security specialist […] you work for the alliance issue many times [during] your career. So they know the problem very well [and] they always tend to very highly regard Okinawa and the relocation issue.

more recent years, will make ‘every effort’ on the USM’s realignment’s ‘steady progress’ by ‘listening to the voices from the heart of local communities including Okinawa’.79

In claiming that they are ‘sincerely’ aware of the problems stemming from US bases in local Okinawan communities – but at the same time that these bases are at the ‘heart’ of the alliance and its reproduction – these officials touch upon a significant challenge to the PBD. If the USM presence poses so many issues, then how do these officials maintain that it is still so critical to the future of the alliance, particularly in Okinawa? Brooks argues that although the alliance itself may be ‘amorphous’, the US presence in Okinawa ‘remains the same due to its continued strategic

importance’.80 _{Former US Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Richard Teare confirmed this belief in a}

1998 interview that Okinawa ‘represents the base position in case all hell breaks loose on the Korean Kan, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the 174th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 11 June 2010a, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201006/11syosin_e.html; Kan 2011.

78 _{Hashimoto 1997; Keizo Obuchi, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 144th Session of the} Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 27 November 1998b, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/souri/981204policy-speech.html; Yoshiro Mori, ‘Policy Speech By Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori To The 150th Session Of The Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 21 September 2000c, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/souri/mori/2000/0921policy.html; Mori Yoshiro, ‘Policy Speech By Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to the 151st Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 31 January 2001, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/souri/mori/2001/0131siseihousin_e.html; Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 153rd Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 27 September 2001b, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/index2001_e.html.

79 _{Shinzo Abe, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of} Japan and His Cabinet, 29 September 2006, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2006/09/29speech_e.html; Shinzo Abe, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 166th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 26 January 2007a, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html; Shinzo Abe, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 168th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 10 September 2007b, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2007/09/10syosin_e.html; Yasuo Fukuda, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 168th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 1 October 2007, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hukudaspeech/2007/10/01syosin_e.html; Yasuo Fukuda, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 169th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 18 January 2008, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hukudaspeech/2008/01/18housin_e.html; Taro Aso, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Taro Aso to the 170th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 29 September 2008, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/asospeech/2008/09/29housin_e.html; Taro Aso, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Taro Aso to the Hundred and Seventy-first Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 28 January 2009, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/asospeech/2009/01/28housin_e.html; Yukio Hatoyama, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama at the 173rd Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 26 October 2009, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin_e.html; Shinzo Abe, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 186th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 24 January 2014a, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201401/24siseihousin_e.html; Shinzo Abe, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister to the 187th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 29 September 2014b, available online at:

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201409/policyspch.html.

80 _{William Brooks, personal interview, 27 August 2014, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced} International Affairs, Washington, DC, USA.

Peninsula’.81 _{Former CG in Naha Aloysius O’Neill adds that several bases in Okinawa, including}

Futenma, form part of the ‘UN Command Rear’ which is linked to ROK contingency planning and the UN Command there, ‘so you had this factor as well, the concern about the availability of the bases in Okinawa for a Korean contingency. In fact, there's a 6,000 acre ammunition storage area adjacent to the 5,000 acre Kadena Air Base [in Okinawa], where a huge amount of ammunition for a Korean contingency was stored’.82

In fact, as far back as 1965 – several years before Okinawa was ‘reverted’ from its post-war USM administration back to the central GOJ in Tokyo – this ‘strategic importance’ of Okinawa was emphasised in a speech by then-PM Eisaku Sato to the prefecture, the first by a post-war PM. According to The Yomiuri Shimbun:

83

While historical circumstances may have changed in the meantime, this discursive strategy of linking the USM presence in Okinawa to the ‘freedom of Asian countries’ or the ‘peace and stability’ of Japan and the region has not. ‘The best guarantee of U.S. extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of U.S. troops’, Armitage and Nye wrote in their 2012 report84_{; a former MOFA official}

agrees, saying that ‘the core issue is security. And ... that will not change’.85

Evidence for this perspective abounds in the recent Diplomatic Bluebooks, 2+2 statements, and PMs’ speeches as well. In instances where the documents emphasise the necessity of US forces in Okinawa prior to acknowledging the bases as a ‘burden’, the realignment plan and relocation of Futenma are highlighted as essential in ‘maintaining the deterrence of the USFJ [US Forces Japan]’ or in ‘maintaining the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan’.86 _{In instances where the}

81 _{Richard W. Teare, ‘Interview with Ambassador Richard W. Teare’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and} Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 31 July 1998, available online at:

www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Teare,%20Richard%20W.toc.pdf, p. 185. 82 _{O’Neill 2008, p. 226.}

83 _{‘U.S. had Sato revise 1965 Okinawa speech’, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 January 2015.} 84 _{Armitage and Nye 2012.}

85 _{Anonymous 2014a.}

86 _{Junichiro Koizumi, ‘General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 162nd Session of the} Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 21 January 2005a, available online at:

The U.S. government told the Japanese government on Aug. 17, 1965, that it strongly hoped Sato would state in his speech that he recognized Okinawa’s importance in the defense of Japan […] [Furthermore,] John Emmerson, U.S. minister­counselor in Japan, said if changes were not made in the planned speech, it would be ‘disparaging’ to the U.S. administration of Okinawa. After arrangements by the two governments, the speech was revised to include a statement that Okinawa plays an extremely important role for the peace and stability of the Far East. […] The documents also showed that U.S. High Commissioner in the Ryukyu Islands Lt. Gen. Albert Watson […] said during a meeting with Sato on Aug. 19, 1965, that administrative rights over Okinawa would be returned to Japan when there was no longer a threat to the freedom of Asian

documents discuss the base ‘burden’ first, they usually still frame the realignment and relocation plans as ‘important issues for ensuring smooth implementation of the Japan-U.S. security

arrangements’ or as ‘important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan’.87