Evaluación del Resultado de las Pruebas del Sistema

Sorry, it’s quite long. Almost everything was important and/or related.

Facts: Preliminary matters to understand the case – not so important: Judge Angeles was the foster mother of her 14yr old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. Judge Angeles provided the child with love, care...etc., and catered to her needs. This love for the child also extended to her siblings particularly Maria Mercedes’ half-brother Michael Vistan.

One evening, Michael Vistan had a falling out with Judge Angeles because of some errand that he failed to perform. He was reprimanded over the phone, was informed that he would no longer be assisted in any way

and that he is no longer welcome at Judge Angeles’

residence.

Michael Vistan retaliated. He took his half-sister Maria Mercedes from Judge Angeles’ house while the latter was at work. The location of Maria Mercedes was kept from Judge Angeles. In fact, when Judge Angeles was looking for the girl, she was misled by Michael Vistan and his co-conspirators.

A complaint for Kidnapping (Art.271 Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) was filed against Michael and the maternal relative of Maria Mercedes who helped keep her location secret. Warrants of arrest were issued but Michael, dragging his half-sister with him, went into hiding.

He was later forced to bring Maria Mercedes to the DSWD (he felt cornered because of the police action against him).

Important part: Judge Angeles then filed a complaint against Michael for violation of the Child Abuse Act and for 4counts of PD1829 (Obstruction of Justice).

Judge Angeles also filed a complaint for libel against Maria Cristina (aunt of Michael Vistan).

The Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig upheld the charge for violation of the Child Abuse Act but recommended that only 1 information be filed. The charge for Obstruction of Justice was dismissed and the libel charge upheld.

Provincial Prosecutor Amando c. Vicente denied the recommendation of Benjamin Caraig that Michael Vistan be indicted for violation of the Child Abuse Act (no mention of what happened to the libel charge). The dismissal of the charge for obstruction of justice was approved. A motion for partial reconsideration was filed but this was denied.

Judge Angeles filed a petition for review before the DOJ. Undersecretary Manuel Teehankee (acting for the Sec) denied the petition for review. The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied by the DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez.

Judge Angeles then filed a petition for review before the Office of the President. The petition was dismissed and the MR denied based on Memorandum Circular 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review off decisions/orders/resolutions of the Sec of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.

A petition for review was filed in the CA assailing the constitutionality of the Memorandum Circular. It is argued that said Memo Circular diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Sec of Justice an almost unencumbered power. CA dismissed the petition affirming the stand of the OSG in applying the doctrine of qualified political agency (alter-ego doctrine).

Issue: Whether the Memo Circular is Valid? YES!

Held: The president’s act of delegating authority to the Sec of Justice by virtue of the Memo Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency which has already been long established in our jurisdiction.

Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Exec dept;

heads of the various exec dept’s are agents of the Chief Executive; and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Consti or law to act in person or that circumstances require that he act personally, the multiple functions of the Chief Executive are performed through the exec dept’s. As such, the acts of the secretaries of such dept’s when performed in the regular course of business are acts of the Chief Executive unless disapproved.

In the 1939 case of Villena vs Sec. of Interior, it was said that: “Sec1, Art.VII means that... the president of the Phil is the Exec of the Government of the Philippines and no other. The heads of the exec dept’s occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity.

‘each head of a dep’t is, and must be, the president’s alter ego...”

Under the Memo Circular, the president himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/order/resolutions of the Sec of Justice for the expeditious disposition of cases. Judge Angeles’

contention that the president is helpless to correct errors of the Sec of Justice is speculative.

Nevertheless, the power of the president to delegate has limits. The constitution makes it clear: There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy. This list is not exclusive however it must be shown that the executive power being questioned is of the same gravity.

In this case, the decision dealing with the preliminary investigation cannot be said to fall under the exception (of those cases wherein the Chief Executive must personally exercise the power). The Chief executive cannot be burdened with deciding all cases involving preliminary investigation because the other duties of the president will be hampered. Thus, if the president is burdened with duties which should ordinarily be delegated to a cabinet member, the president would have to pause from running the country to focus on these time-consuming and detailed activities. To do so would negate the very existence of the Cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders of the office hold.

Note that the memo circular was issued by the office of the president and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such dept’s are presumptively the acts of

the chief executive unless disapproved. In this case, the memo circular has not been disapproved or reprobated by the President.

SECTION 18

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

LANSANG V GARCIA

FACTS:

 This is a consolidated decision of various cases for habeas corpus filed by petitioners against respondent general – Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

 At the wake of the Plaza Miranda Bombing, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

 Pursuant to this, many people, including petitioner were arrested and detained on suspicion of rebellion and insurrection.

 Petitioners sued for Habeas Corpus. Respondent contend that the arrests and detentions were made pursuant to bona fide finding of rebellion and insurrection, probable cause and Proclamation No. 889. Respondent also contends that appropriate measure have been taken up to ensure the safe guard of human rights such as directives issued by the President not to arrest without a warrant unless in flagrante delicto, creation of the Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to hear violations committed in connection with PN 889 and many more. Respondent also argues that the determination made by the president was in the nature of a political question which is beyond the reach of judicial inquiry.

 Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the determination by the president of an existence of rebellion etc. justifying the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is conclusive upon the courts

 Whether or not the requirements for the suspension of the privilege were satisfied

HELD:

 NO.Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. The courts have the power to check – not to supplant – the executive or to

ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction.

 YES. There are two requirements before the privilege is suspended. First, there must be an actual invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent threat thereof.

Second, public safety must require the suspension of the writ.

 In this case, the first requirement is satisfied. No matter how small it is, the NPA epitomizes an actual rebellion going on [Thus the court considered the existence of the communists as the embodiment of rebellion]. The second requirement is also satisfied.

Petitioners have underestimated the threat of the communists when they say that the NPA was too small for the AFP. The Court then made an extensive enumeration of facts tending to show the power of the communists such as numerous assassinations of local officials, bombings of the NAWASA pipeline, bombing of the Constitutional Convention Hall etc. the Court said, all this was within the knowledge of the president. Thus, PN 889 could not have been issued arbitrarily.

 PN 889 was superseded, after a few days, by PN 889-A wherein the actuality of the lawlessness was made specific. Thus the argument that PN 889 did not declare the existence of an actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion is moot.